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I. INTRODUCTION
During the 1995 legislative session, the Legislature' passed a resolution that
made significant changes in the Louisiana institution of forced heirship. The
resolution proposed an amendment to Louisiana Constitution article XII, § 5 that
1. The author dedicates this article to the courageous members of both the House of
Representatives and the Senate of Louisiana who voted against the proposed constitutional
amendment to abolish forced heirship for descendants over the age of 23 who are capable of
managing their affairs and caring for their persons. Members of the House of Representatives
include: Joe Accardo, John Alario, Glenn Ansardi, Robert Bergeron, Shirley Bowler, Jim Donelon,
Yvonne Dorsey, Hunt Downer, "Alex" Heaton, "Woody" Jenkins, Charles Lancaster, "Mitch"
Landrieu, Audrey McCain, Arthur Morrell, "Ken" Odinet, Mike Russo, John Travis, and Cynthia
Willard-Lewis. In the Senate, Senators Bagneris, Bajoie, Bankston, Brinkhaus, Campbell. Chabert,
Cross, Guidry, Hainkel, Landry, Romero, and Ullo voted against the measure on all three occasions
that the issue was presented to the Senate. I consider those ladies and gentlemen of similar stature
as those lawmakers of an earlier era described so eloquently in Symeon C. Symeonides, All
Introduction to "The Romanist Tradition in Louisiana ": One Day in the Life of Louisiana Law, 56
La. L. Rev. 249, 253, 255 (1995):
Indeed, the legislators did something which by today's standards is simply unimagin-
able: they resigned en mass and dissolved the Legislative Council. This fact alone would
be sufficient to make this an important and unique day in Louisiana political history, not
just legal history. Perhaps more important, however, was what the members of the
Council had to say with regard to the reasons for their resignation. In a Resolution they
published in a New Orleans newspaper on June 3, 1806, they explained the reasons. In
this, one of the most important documents in Louisiana legal history, they demonstrated
an unusual attachment to, and high pride in, their ancient institutions [civil or Roman
law] ....
Thus, the civil law was protected in those early critical years in which the river of the
common law was inundating all the new territories. Since then, the Louisiana civil law
not only survived, but flourished as well. It is still alive today. The usual expression, of
course, is "alive and well." The omission of the last two words is not accidental. But
that is another story, for another day. The fact remains, however, that if the civil law is
alive today, a great deal is due to that fateful day, MAY 26, 1806, and a great deal is due
to those heroic lawyer-legislators who had the courage of their conviction. This may be
one additional reason for which we can feel nostalgic about that date.
This footnote is devoted to that other story for the day has arrived to tell it.
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would abolish forced heirship with two notable exceptions. The Legislature also
adopted Act No. 1180 which was intended to implement the constitutional
amendment in the event it was approved by the people of Louisiana. The
amendment was approved by the people of Louisiana on October 23, 1995, and
was promulgated by the Governor on November 2 of the same year. Act No.
1180 became effective on January 1, 1996.2 This article examines the
constitutional amendment and its temporal effect, and discusses in some detail
the provisions of Act No. 1180.
The subject matter of forced heirship was included in the call for the special
session that began in March, 1996, in an attempt to respond to criticism of
"glitches" in Act No. 1180. During the special session the Legislature adopted
Act No. 77, the avowed purpose of which was "to assist in implementing the
new rules on forced heirship, with a systematic approach to the issues of defining
who are forced heirs, what their rights are, and how those rights are implement-
ed."4 More explicitly, the purpose was "to present the rules in a coherent
framework that should be practical and workable."' This article examines the
coherency of the framework of Act No. 77, a revision that aspired to more than
simply remedying the "glitches," and the error apparently made in the transition
clause of Act No. 77. Act No. 1180, to the extent that it amended the same
Civil Code articles as Act No. 77, may still be in effect even after the effective
date of Act No. 77.6 After the discussion of each of the Civil Code articles
amended by Act No. 77, this article contains a specific reminder that the Civil
Code article was also amended by Act No. 1180 and that Act No. 1180 rather
than Act No. 77 may govern.
This author acknowledges a distinct bias in favor of forced heirship. The
author believes that forced heirship, an institution tested through the ages,
2. La. R.S. 9:2501 (as added by 1995 La. Acts No. 1180) (in relevant part): "A. The
provisions of Act No. I 180 of the 1995 Regular Session shall become effective on January 1, 1996,
and shall apply to the successions of all persons who die after December 31, 1995."
Amazingly, in Act No. 77 of the First Extraordinary Session of the 1996 Legislature, La. R.S.
9:2501(A) was amended and reenacted in Section 2 to read as follows: "A. The provisions of Act
No. 1180 of the 1995 Regular Session as provided therein became effective on January 1, 1996, and
shall apply to the successions of all persons who die after December 31, 1995."
By comparing the language of the two sections that are virtually identical, it is clear that in the
latter statute there is a change in tense making clear the legislative intent that the Act that became
effective on January 1, 1996, shall apply to the successions of all persons who die after December
31, 1995. What is amazing about this intent is that it makes the Act (Act No. 77, First Extraordinary
Session 1996) in which this Section is contained nugatory; it does not provide for the changes made
in Act No. 1180 by Act No. 77 to apply to any succession. See detailed discussion in the text at
Infra notes 141-145.
3. Among those criticizing Act No. 1180 were L. Paul Hood, IV and Gerald Le Van in 20 The
Louisiana Estate Planner Nos. 7-10 (1996).
4. Introductory Note, 1996 La. Acts No. 77 (First Extraordinary Session), on recommendation
of the Louisiana State Law Institute.
5. Id.
6. See supra note 2.
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remains a sound social policy to date because it helps preserve and strengthen
the family by reminding parents of their societal responsibilities and by binding
family members together throughout life and beyond.' Because of these beliefs,
this author has fought for the preservation of forced heirship in Louisiana and
against the constitutional amendment. The amendment passed and the fight has
been lost, for now, largely because the other side was able to exploit to its
advantage the fact that Louisiana was the only state in the United States to
adhere to this institution. While it is true that the other states do not have forced
heirship as such, much of the rest of the world does.' Furthermore, the other
states are now beginning to realize that the rampant disintegration of the family
is not unrelated to legal institutions that promoted a selfish individualism by
glorifying the unrestricted freedom of testation. These states are now beginning
to consider the potential of institutions like forced heirship in stemming the
disintegration tide and restoring the family unit. It is ironic that Louisiana chose
this time to turn its back on that very institution that has served the family well
over the centuries.9
Be that as it may, now the people have spoken. With this as a given, it is
still necessary to discuss the legal problems created by the legislation implement-
ing the constitutional amendment. This then is the purpose of this article.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT: TEMPORAL EFFECT
The constitutional amendment referred to above provides as follows:
(A) The legislature shall provide by law for uniform procedures of
successions and for the rights of heirs and legatees and for testate and
intestate succession. Except as provided in Paragraph B of this Section,
forced heirship is abolished in this state.
(B) The legislature shall provide for the classification of descen-
dants, of the first degree, twenty-three years of age or younger as forced
heirs. The legislature may also classify as forced heirs descendants of
any age who, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are
incapable of taking care of their persons or administering their estates.
The amount of the forced portion reserved to heirs and the grounds for
disinherison shall also be provided by law. Trusts may be authorized
by law and the forced portion may be placed in trust."0
7. See generally Katherine S. Spaht et al., Developments in the Law, 1983-84, "What Has
Become of Forced Heirship?," 45 La. L. Rev. 575 (1984).
8. See Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the Child from Disinheritance: Must Louisiana Stand
Alone?, 57 La. L. Rev. 1 (1996) (this symposium).
9. Ralph C. Brashier, Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 83
(1994). See also in this symposium, Ralph C. Brashier, Protecting the Child From Disinheritance:
Must Louisiana Stand Alone?, 57 La. L. Rev. 1 (1996) (this symposium).
10. La. Const. art. XII, § 5 (emphasis added).
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A. The Period Between 1990 and Adoption of the Amendment
The sequence of legal events affecting forced heirship that transpired from
1990 to October 23, 1995, when the constitutional amendment was approved by
the people of Louisiana, includes: (1) the enactment of Act 147 of 1990 which
revised the pertinent Civil Code articles significantly by reducing forced heirship
for descendants;" (2) the Louisiana Supreme Court decision of Succession of
Lauga in 1993 which declared Act 147 unconstitutional; and (3) the passage
of the constitutional amendment by the people of Louisiana on October 23, 1995.
These developments raise the question of which law applies for the period
between 1990 and 1995. Suppose, for example, that a parent died during that
period and by will left his entire estate to his second wife. Does it matter that
he was survived by descendants who under the 1990 legislation would not have
been forced heirs but were forced heirs once the Louisiana Supreme Court
declared the legislation unconstitutional? 3 If the widow argued that upon
approval of the constitutional amendment in 1995 the bar to enforcement of the
1990 legislation was lifted and nothing prevented the application of that
legislation as of its effective date in 1990, would she be successful?
The widow's legal position that the 1990 legislation can now be enforced
would probably consist of the following arguments: the declaration of
unconstitutionality by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Succession of Lauga'4
merely means that the statute was unenforceable because it was inconsistent with
the Constitution;' s the statute remains as the solemn expression of the legisla-
tive will; thus once the impediment to its enforcement is removed, it "resumes
its effectiveness" from the effective date of that legislation.' As authority in
11. 1990 La. Acts No. 147, § 1.
12. Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993). See also the companion case of
Succession of Terry, 624 So. 2d 1201 (La. 1993).
13. See, e.g., Succession of Villarubbia, 666 So. 2d 312 (La. 1996), which involved the death
of parent before the Lauga decision and the signing of a receipt for legacy by the grandchild that
allegedly waived any rights of inheritance he may have had as a representative of his predeceased
father. The issue that ultimately was decisive in the case was the interpretation and validity of the
receipt for legacy signed by the grandchild and the judgment of possession in essence consented to
by the grandchild. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that the heir could not reopen the succession
to assert his rights as forced heir because of his actions in signing the receipt of possession and
participating in the distribution of property of the succession with full knowledge of the possibility
that the forced heirship legislation of 1990 might be unconstitutional.
14. 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993). See also the companion case of Succession of Terry, 624 So.
2d 1201 (La. 1993).
15. See generally Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 2.07 (5th ed. 1994;
Supp. 1995).
16. William E. Crawford in the publication 1995 Recent Developments in Torts (pamphlet
published by the Insurance/Workers' Compensation Section of the Louisiana Bar Association) made
a similar argument about a different constitutional amendment at pp. 13-14:
The jurisprudential authority is solid that with the passage of the recent constitutional
amendment allowing the legislature to limit the liability of the state, the statutes declared
1996]
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support of the widow's argument that the 1990 legislation is "revived," she might
well rely upon authorities cited elsewhere 7 for the same arguments:' a law
review article and Dr. G.H. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Brothers
Giant Super Markets. 9 Closer analysis reveals, however, that neither authority
unconstitutional by Chamberlain were revived, and resumed effectiveness from the date
of their enactment, as though the decree of unconstitutionality in Chamberlain had never
been pronounced.
The basic authority of this position is set forth in the Louisiana jurisprudence in
Tchenor v. Schwegmann, 83 So.2d 502 (Orleans Appeal, 1956), and on a national basis
in 93 Columbia Law Rev. 1902, 1911.
The reasoning is as follows:
Courts cannot repeal statutes because of the separation of powers doctrine, our tri-partite
system of government.
When a court declares a statute unconstitutional and therefore unenforceable because of
an impediment in the Constitution it has. done no more than that. It has declared the
statute unenforceable, but the statute is not repealed and remains a statute whose
applicability has been blocked.
When the impediment in the Constitution is removed by constitutional amendment, there
is nothing any longer blocking the effectiveness of the statute and it resumes its
effectiveness as though the declaration of unconstitutionality had never occurred.
In the situation before us, it is crucial to recognize that this is not a question of the
retroactivity of those statutes in Act 828 that come into effect upon the adoption of the
constitutional amendment, but it is rather the springing back to life-the "unblocking"-of
the original statutes as adopted in 1985. Thus, all causes of action not reduced to final
and definitive judgments as of the effective date of the constitutional amendment are
governed by the 1985 statutes as they were adopted.
In a footnote in the Louisiana Supreme Court case of Deumite v. State, 668 So. 2d 727 n.3 (La.
1996), the Court refers to the same argument made by the State:
Prior to oral argument before this Court and submission of this case for decision, the
Louisiana electorate voted to amend La. Const. art. I, f 10(C), to authorize the
legislature to limit the extent of liability of the state and its agencies, including the
circumstances giving rise to liability and the kinds and amounts of recoverable damages.
1995 La. Acts No. 1328. In brief and at oral argument, the state has argued that this
amendment retroactively cures any constitutional defect in La. R.S. 9:2795(E). We
pretermit consideration of the effect of the amendment upon the statute's constitutionality
because we find that the facts presented do not require a ruling on the constitutionality
of La. R.S. 9:2795(E). Further, we decline the parties' invitations to exercise our
discretionary appellate jurisdiction over the numerous other issues presented by this
appeal. La. Const. art. V § 5(F).
See also Matherne v. Gray Ins. Co., 661 So. 2d 432 n.10 (La. 1995).
But see Begnaud v. Department of Transp. & Dev., No. 95-714, 1996 WL 78363 (La. App. 5th
Cir. Feb. 14, 1996), writ denied, 675 So. 2d 1087 (1996), in text at infra notes 30-36.
17. See authorities cited in quotation from Professor Crawford's argument in supra note 16.
18. The argument that the constitutional amendment to Article XiI, § 5 "revived" 1990 La. Acts
No. 147, § 1.
19. 83 So. 2d 502 (1956). At issue was the ability of the manufacturer of a product to set
minimum prices by contract with one retailer and thereafter obtain injunctive relief against another
retailer who sold the product at a price below the minimum set in the contract. Although the
Louisiana Supreme Court originally upheld the constitutionality of the Louisiana statute and the
United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal concluded that the statute was unenforceable because it
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supports entirely the legal position of the widow that the 1990 legislation is
"revived." The law review article concerns the situation of a court's declaration
of a statute's unconstitutionality that is subsequently overruled by the same
court.20 The Tichenor case involved, first, the enforceability of a Louisiana
statute' in light of federal anti-trust laws and, then, federal legislation'
enacted to remove the impediment to enforcement of the Louisiana statute; thus,
the case involved an issue of federalism not present in the widow's case. The
law review article is no doubt cited for the proposition that United States
Supreme Court cases favor revival of unconstitutional statutes; and the Louisiana
case, for the proposition that a statute declared unconstitutional is merely
unenforceable,' not null and void. 4
violated federal anti-trust laws, Congress responded with the McGuire Act to remove the impediment
of federal anti-trust laws to the enforceability of the Louisiana statute.
In the phase of the litigation cited above the court held the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction
under the now enforceable Louisiana statute. Subsequently, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeal decision on grounds that the Louisiana Fair Trade Law was unconstitutional under
the Louisiana Constitution. Obviously, the issue in Tichenor did not involve the "revival" of
unconstitutional statutes by a change in the constitution. The Louisiana Fair Trade Law was not
unconstitutional at the beginning of the litigation, but rather found in violation of federal anti-trust
laws. The impediment to its enforcement of the statute was an Act of Congress implicating
federalism issues, not a provision of a constitution.
20. William M. Treanor and Gene B. Sperling, Prospective Overruling and the Revival of
"Unconstitutional" Statutes, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1902 (1993). Professor Crawford cites page 1911 as
authority. Presumably, the authority on page 1911 is the following statement: "Supreme Court case law
thus weighs in favor of revival; in a variety of circumstances, the Court has found that statutes that were
inconsistent with a previous decision automatically became enforceable when that decision was
reversed. This does not, however, imply active consideration of the revival issue." (emphasis added).
Obviously, the statement was addressed to the subject of the article, which was revival of statutes
declared unconstitutional by a decision that is subsequently reversed, not state revival of a statute
declared unconstitutional when the constitution is amended to remove the impediment.
21. Former La. R.S. 51:391 et seq. (repealed 1977).
22. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994).
23. 83 So. 2d at 508:
It was contended that since the first act when passed purported to affect imports, it was
unconstitutional when passed and that after the Congressional act made it possible for a
State to pass such a statute it could not be given effect unless re-enacted after the passage
of the Act of Congress. The Supreme Court said (in U.S. v. Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545
(1891)): "This is not the case of a law enacted in the unauthorized exercise of a power
exclusively confided to congress, but of a law which it was competent for the state to
pass, but which could not operate upon articles occupying a certain situation until the
passage of the act of congress. That act in terms removed the obstacle, and we perceive
no adequate ground for adjudging that a re-enactment of the state law was required before
it could have the effect upon imported which it had always had upon domestic property."
The issue in the Tichenor case obviously involved issues of federalism not present in the issue of
the revival of a state statute declared unconstitutional under the state constitution by the state supreme
court and a subsequent amendment to the constitution removing the impediment to enactment of a
similar state statute.
24. Magee v. Landrieu, 653 So. 2d 62, 65 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1995) ("Generally, when statutes
are declared unconstitutional they are void ab initio and all acts done under such statutes are void
1996]
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The widow's argument for revival of an unconstitutional statute by an
amendment to the constitution overlooks at least in part the recognized effect of
the declaration of unconstitutionality: once the Act is declared unconstitutional
the applicable law "becomes that in effect prior to the unconstitutional
amendment."2 In the case of forced heirship the applicable law after the
Lauga case is clear. The 1990 Act which would deny the widow's stepchildren
forced heirship rights contained a repeal of prior law, and that repeal was also
declared unconstitutional and without effect.26 There is also the general
proposition recognized in some cases that a constitutional amendment is not
retroactive unless the amendment expressly adopts or ratifies the legislation
previously declared unconstitutional. 2 Furthermore, in some of those same
and of no effect." (citations omitted)). See also Jefferson v. Jefferson, 244 La. 493, 500-01, 153 So.
2d 368, 370 (1963) ("For a rule of court, like a statute, has the force and effect of law and, when a
law is stricken as void (declaration of unconstitutionality), it no longer has existence as law." (The
remainder of the quotation pertains to the resurrection of a statute declared unconstitutional by a
subsequent decision declaring the former decision incorrect because that "would constitute a
reenactment of the law by the Court," id., which is the subject of the Columbia Law Review article
cited in supra note 20.)).
25. Louisiana Republican Party v. Foster, 674 So. 2d 225, 226 (La. 1996); Concerned Busines
and Property Owners of DeSoto, Inc. v. DeSoto Parish School Board, 531 So. 2d 436 (La. 1988).
26. The result described is different than that contemplated by La. Civ. Code art. 8 (in relevant
part): "The repeal of a repealing law does not revive the first law." (emphasis added). There was
no repeal of the repealing law but a declaration that the repealing law could not be enforced.
27. See La. Const. art. XIV, § 26. See, e.g., Calogero v. State, ex rel Treen, 445 So. 2d 736
(La. 1984); Succession of Clivens, 426 So. 2d 585 (La. 1982); State v. Shepherd, 332 So. 2d 228 (La.
1976); Harrison v. Trustees of Louisiana State Employees' Retirement System, 671 So. 2d 385 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1995). But see Fox v. Municipal Democratic Executive Comm. of City of Monroe, 328
So. 2d 171 (La. App. 2d Cir.), affrd, 328 So. 2d 893 (1976), in which the Court opined that Section
26 of Article XIV was intended only to implement the transition from the old constitution of 1921
to the new constitution of 1974.
See also Long v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 595 So. 2d 636 (La. 1992).
28. In Singer, supra note 15, § 2.07 at 38, the author states:
Amendment or repeal of the constitutional provision which had rendered a statute invalid
is generally held not to place the statute in force without subsequent reenactment, except
where the new constitutional provision adopts or ratifies previously unconstitutional
legislation. In some cases, however, constitutional provisions have been construed merely
to be obstacles to the enforcement of an act, which can take effect when the obstacle is
removed by constitutional amendment. It has been held that if a decision declaring a
statute unconstitutional is subsequently overruled, the operative force of the act is restored
by the overruling decision without any necessity for reenactment.
(emphasis added). The implication of the last two sentences quoted is that the exception to the
general rule stated in the first sentence occurs when a decision declaring a statute unconstitutional
is reversed. Interestingly, as authority for the third sentence the author cites State v. Douglas, 278
So. 2d 485 (La. 1973) and adds the citation to Mark Graham, State v. Douglas: Judicial "Revival"
of an Unconstitutional Statute, 34 La. L. Rev. 851 (1974).
For an instance in which the Legislature expressed explicitly that former statutes declared
unconstitutional nonetheless be "resurrected," see Long v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 595 So. 2d 636
(La. 1992). According to the court in its opinion: "We have held that a ratifying clause in a
constitutional amendment can validate an unconstitutional statute from the date the statute would have
[Vol. 57
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cases, the court cautions that a ratification of previously unconstitutional
legislation can not deprive a person of vested rights.29 In Begnaud v. Depart-
ment of Transportation and Development,30 the most recent court of appeal
decision on this issue,' the Louisiana Fifth Circuit considered the issue of
revival of a statute previously declared unconstitutional by a constitutional
amendment passed in 1995, at the same time as the amendment to Article
XII, § 5 on forced heirship." Citing Long v. Insurance Co. of North Ameri-
gone into effect, had it not been unconstitutional." (emphasis added). Id. at 639. One of two
authorities cited for this proposition was Peck v. Tugwell, 199 La. 125, 5 So. 2d 524 (1941).
Immediately after the discussion of the Peck case in the opinion, the court cites the following
language from Plebst v. Barnwell Drilling Co., 243 La. 874, 884-85, 148 So. 2d 584, 588 (1963):
"[I]t is equally well settled that statutes, in conflict with the constitution at the time they
are passed, are validated by a constitutional amendment which expressly ratifies and
confirms them and they may be given retrospective effect ... provided such validation
does not impair the obligations of a contract or divest vested rights."
Id. (emphasis added).
29. Long v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 595 So. 2d 636, 639 (La. 1992). As to what constitutes
a "vested right," consider this definition in Matter of American Waste & Pollution Control, 597 So.
2d 1125, 1129-30 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writs denied, 604 So. 2d 1309, 1318 (1992):
A right is "vested" when the right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the
property of some particular person or persons as a present interest. It must be absolute,
complete, unconditional, and independent of a contingency; the mere expectation of a
future benefit or contingent interest in property does not create a vested right.
In the context of succession law, until the death of the decedent no right vests (La. Civ. Code art.
943); until his death the forced heir has a mere expectation. However, see Hildebrand v. City of New
Orleans, 549 So. 2d 1218 (La. 1989).
Despite the language quoted from the Long case quoted in supra note 28, there is a question of
whether a constitutional provision that ratifies previously unconstitutional legislation can in fact
deprive a person of vested rights since both provisions would appear in the constitution and
presumably be of equal dignity.
30. No. 95-CA-714, 1996 WL 78363 (La. App. 5th Cir. Feb. 14, 1996), writ denied, 675 So.
2d 1087 (1996).
31. Compare Ayers v. Brazell, 665 So. 2d 694 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1995), writ denied, 670 So.
2d 1236 (1996). The opinion contained unnecessary and unfortunate language when deciding to
affirm a trial court decision upholding the constitutionality of La. R.S. 9:2798.1 under La. Const. art.
XII, § 10 (A) (1974).
While on appeal, an amendment to La. Const. art. XII, § 10 (C), effective on November 23, 1996,
settled "the constitutional authority of the legislature to limit or prescribe the extent of the liability
of the state and its agencies." Ayers, 665 So. 2d at 696. The court decided that the amendment was
curative and remedial, about which there is serious doubt (see Socorro v. City of New Orleans, 579
So. 2d 931 (La. 1991)), and should be applied retroactively. Citing Fullilove v. U.S. Casualty Co.
of New York, 129 So. 2d 816 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961), the court affirmed the trial court judgment.
In the Fullilove case the court relied on the express terms of the amendment providing for retroactive
application.
The Louisiana Supreme Court denied writs in the Ayers case, but the court also denied writs in the
Begnaud case, which was the later of the two decisions.
32. La. Const. art. XII, § 10 (C): "Notwithstanding Paragraph (A) or (B) or any other provision
of this constitution, the legislature by law may limit or provide for the extent of liability of the state,
a state agency, or a political subdivision in all cases, including the circumstances giving rise to
liability and the kinds and amounts of recoverable damages. It shall provide a procedure for suits
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ca,3 the court concluded that the former statute which imposed a cap on
judgments' and which had been declared unconstitutional did not apply to the
plaintiff.3s
In the instant case the constitutional amendment does not expressly
ratify the prior law. Instead, it gives the legislature the discretion to
apply the cap "to existing as well as to future claims." La. Const. Art.
XII, §10(C), as amended 1995. In Long the court looked to the intent
of the legislature.
In the Long case the intent of the legislature was to give retroactive
validation. Additionally, the court also held that the retroactive
application of the prior law did "not result in an impairment of
contractual obligations or a loss of vested rights."36
In the case of forced heirship the Legislature expressed an intention contrary
to retroactive validation of the unconstitutional statutes enacted in 1990. That
intent can also be attributed to the people who voted on the constitutional
amendment, to the extent there can be such attribution. 37  Three important
factors evidence the contrary intention of the Legislature: (1) Article XII, § 5
did not, expressly or otherwise, ratify the former provisions that had been
declared unconstitutional in the Lauga case. s (2) The Legislature expressed its
intent as to the effective date of the changes made by the constitutional
amendment and implementation legislation in a specific clause. 39  (3) The
against the state, a state agency, or a political subdivision and provide for the effect of a judgment,
but no public property or public funds shall be subject to seizure. The legislature may provide that
such limitations, procedures, and effects ofjudgments shall be applicable to existing as well as future
claims." (emphasis added).
33. 595 So. 2d 636 (La. 1992).
34. Former La. R.S. 13:5106(B)(1) (1991) (in personal injury suits total amount recoverable,
exclusive of medical care and related benefits and loss of earnings, and loss of future earnings, shall
not exceed five hundred thousand dollars).
35. Begnaud v. Department of Trans. & Dev., No. 95-CA-714, 1995 WL 78363, "19 (La. App.
5th Cir. Feb. 14, 1996).
Applying the Long principles to the present case, we conclude the intent of the legislature
in enacting Act 838 was to make the triggering date for the cap to be the date of judicial
demand, As discussed infra there was no cap in the present case on that date. We
conclude the $500,000 cap does not apply.
36. Id. (emphasis added).
37. See John Devlin, Privacy and Abortion Rights Under the Louisiana Constitution: Could
Roe v. Wade Be Alive and Well in the Bayou State?, 51 La. L. Rev. 685, 717-18 (1991).
38. The old statutes that were amended were not the statutes declared unconstitutional in the
Lauga case, supra note 12, but were instead the statutes that were enforceable on the effective date
of the constitutional amendment and its implementation legislation. See discussion of the effective
date in the text at infra notes 44-53.
39. La. R.S. 9:2501(A) (Supp. 1996) (in relevant part): "The provisions of Act No. 1180 of
the 1995 Regular Session shall become effective on January I, 1996, and shall apply to the
successions of all persons who die after December 31, 1995."
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Legislature had the choice to enact the Civil Code articles contained in Act No.
147 previously declared unconstitutional by the Louisiana Supreme Court. When
the Legislature passed the constitutional amendment in 1995 the Civil Code
articles in effect at the time were those amended by Act No. 147. The
Legislature chose to adopt new Civil Code articles, different in some respects
from those contained in Act No. 147 that had been declared unconstitutional.'
Therefore, there were no statutes previously declared unconstitutional that
remained to be enforced.
In Succession of Jurisich,4' the testator died in 1991 having executed his
will in 1990 after the passage of the statutory forced heirship changes. He was
survived by his widow and six children by a former marriage, all of whom were
over twenty-three years of age. He left all of his property by will to his second
wife, stating that he was taking advantage of the 1990 statute that changed the
definition of forced heirs. Nonetheless, the testator provided alternatively in his
will that should the statute that permitted him to dispose of all of his property
to his second wife be declared unconstitutional, he disinherited his six children
for specified reasons as provided for by Civil Code article 1621 42 The bulk of
the opinion is devoted to exploring the grounds for disinherison, because the
court of appeal concluded that the testator could not rely upon the enforceability
of the 1990 statute declared unconstitutional in the Lauga case:
The initial question to be addressed by this Court is what effect, if any,
does this new legislation [La. Acts 1995, No. 1180] have on the case
subjudice .... The legislative intent concerning the application of the
40. There were differences between the statutes contained in the implementing legislation (1995
La. Acts No. 1180) and those in effect at the time of the passage of the constitutional amendment
by the Legislature (those repealed by 1990 La. Acts No. 147 but later became effective because of
the declaration of unconstitutionality). There were also differences between the statutes contained
in the implementing legislation (1995 La. Acts No. 1180) and the statutes declared unconstitutional
in Succession of Lauga. 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993) (1990 La. Acts No. 147).
For example, the differences between the statutes contained in the implementing legislation and
those declared unconstitutional include: La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (as amended by 1990 La. Acts No.
147, § 1) provided that only descendants of the first degree who were under the age of 23 would be
forced heirs, whereas La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (as amended by La. Acts 1995 No. 1180, § 1) provided
that descendants of any degree who were 23 years of age or younger are forced heirs. As a
consequence, reprinting the comments to the 1990 legislation as if interpretive of the 1995 legislation
(Act No. 1180) produced inconsistencies and discrepancies. See La. Civ. Code art. 1493 cmt. b (as
amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1180, § 1). Act No. 1180 was not introduced on recommendation
of the Louisiana State Law Institute, thus no comments could appear in the Act. The comments
reprinted under La. Civ. Code art. 1493, as amended in 1995, had appeared in 1990 La. Acts No.
147, § 1.
Compare Editor's Note to La Civ. Code art. 1493 (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1180, § I):
"Acts 1995, No. 1180, 1, effective January 1, 1996, has reenacted Article 1493 to read as it was
amended by Acts 1990, No. 147, I."
41. No. 94.1262, 1996 WL 203959 (La. App. 4th Cir. Apr. 25, 1996).
42. La. Civ. Code art. 1621 provides for twelve different reasons for disinherison and as to each
child the testator specified a reason under that Article and alleged facts to establish grounds.
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new law is found in La. R.S. 9:2501 .... This legislation specifically
states what law is to govern in cases where the testament was executed
prior to January 1, 1996. The wording of the statute indicates that
application of the new statute is limited to the successions of persons
who die after December 31, 1995 .... In reaching this conclusion [that
the new legislation does not apply to Mr. Jurisich's estate], this Court
is mindful of the ongoing debate concerning the revival of statutes by
the subsequent recall of a decision by popular vote. However, having
reviewed the newly enacted statute providing for changes in the forced
heirship laws, we are convinced that any overruling of Succession of
Lauga, supra, must be left to the Louisiana Supreme Court. In light of
the holding in Succession of Lauga, supra, the trial court clearly erred
in upholding the constitutionality of Article 1493 of the Civil Code.""'
B. The Period Between Adoption of the Amendment and January 1, 1996
During the Regular Session of the 1995 Legislature, at the same time that
the constitutional amendment was passed, the Legislature also adopted Act No.
1180 which was explicitly conditioned upon enactment of the amendment."
The objective of this Act was to implement the otherwise unenforceable
mandates contained in the amendment 5 and to exercise the permissive authority
accorded by the same amendment not previously exercised by the Legislature.'
6
43. Jurisich, slip op. at 7-9. Note that the emphasis placed on the word decision was emphasis
by the CourtL
44. La. Acts 1995 No. 1180, § 5:
This Act shall become effective on January 1, 1996, but only if the proposed amendment
of Article XII, Section 5 of the Constitution of Louisiana contained in the Act which
originated as House Bill No. 9 or Senate Bill No. 43 of this Regular Session of the
Legislature is adopted at the gubernatorial primary election to be held in 1995 and
becomes effective.
(emphasis added).
45. The Legislature is mandated to provide for "uniform procedures of successions and for the
rights of heirs or legatees and for testate and intestate succession," "the classification of descendants,
of the first degree, twenty-three years of age or younger as forced heirs," and "[t]he amount of the
forced portion reserved to heirs and the grounds for disinherison .... " La. Const. art. XII, § 5.
The Legislature had provided for uniform procedures of successions (see generally La. Code Civ.
P. arts. 2811-3462) and for the rights of heirs and legatees (La. Civ. Code arts. 871-1755) and for
testate (La. Civ. Code arts. 1467-1733) and intestate (La. Civ. Code arts. 888-901) succession. The
companion Act (La. Acts 1995 No. 1180, § I (effective Jan. 1, 1996)) fulfilled the mandate to
provide for the classification of descendants of the first degree twenty-three years of age or younger
as forced heirs.
46. "The Legislature may also classify as forced heirs descendants of any age who, because of
mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are incapable of taking care of their persons or administering
their estates.... Trusts may be authorized by law and the forced portion may be placed in trust."
(emphasis added). La. Const. art. XII, § 5 (B).
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Act No. 1180 makes clear that the legislative intent expressed by the companion
Act was that the law of forced heirship would not be changed before January 1,
1996. In fact the implementation legislation in Section 2 was very specific:
"The provisions of Act No. [1180] of the 1995 Regular Session shall become
effective on January 1, 1996, and shall apply to the successions of all persons
7
who die after December 31, 1995."
'4
The constitutional amendment, however, contained one unusual sentence that
was neither an unenforceable mandate nor permissible authority directed to the
Legislature---"Except as provided in Paragraph B of this Section, forced heirship
is abolished in this state." In a complete reversal of the limitation upon
legislative power contained in Article XII, § 5, the Legislature was prohibited
from expanding, rather than abolishing, forced heirship by statute. The
language-"forced heirship is abolished in this state"-is preceded by "[e]xcept
as provided in Paragraph B of this Section," thus limiting the abolition of forced
heirship by an exception. It is as if the abolition was conditioned upon the
provisions of Paragraph B, which contained mandates and permissible authority
directed to the Legislature and conditioned upon action by the Legislature. Read
together, the last sentence of Paragraph A and Paragraph B of Article XII, § 5
create a limitation upon the Legislature's power just as its predecessor had.' 9
The interpretation of the pertinent language of the two paragraphs of Article
XII, § 5 as nothing more than an expression of limitation upon legislative power
and conditioned upon action by the Legislature is relevant to ultimate resolution
of the issue of the effective date of the forced heirship changes. This raises the
question: Was forced heirship entirely abolished on November 23, 1995, or was
it abolished, with two general exceptions, on January 1, 1996?
Under Article XIII, § 1, paragraph C of the Louisiana Constitution, the
constitutional amendment became "effective" twenty days after promulgation;
promulgation occurred on November 2, 1995. The Attorney General of
Louisiana in a requested opinion about the effective date of the forced heirship
changes distinguished between an act "becoming 'operative' and an act becoming
'effective."'"0 The definition in the opinion of "operative" is simply that the
The Legislature had already provided for trusts (La. R.S. 9:1721-2252 (1991 and Supp. 1996)) and
for placing the forced portion in trust (La. R.S. 9:1841 (Supp. 1996)). 199S La. Acts No. 1180
simply implemented the authority granted to the Legislature to classify as forced heirs descendants
of any age, who because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are incapable of taking care of
their persons or administering their estates. See La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (as amended by La. Acts
1995 No. 1180, § I (effective Jan. 1, 1996)).
47. Rights of inheritance vest for all successors at the moment of the decedent's death. La.
Civ. Code art. 934.
48. La. R.S. 9:2501 (A) (Supp. 1996) (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1180, § 2) (emphasis
added).
49. See discussion of the previous text and restriction upon the Legislature's power in
Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993).
50. Op. Att'y Gen. 95-511 (1995).
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Act becomes "viable." 5' Nonetheless, as the Attorney General opines, the
Legislature by provision in the Louisiana Constitution"2 has the power to
express a later "effective" date. The Attorney General ultimately concluded "that
Act 1180 [implementation legislation] became operative on November 23, 1995,
with the effectiveness of the amendment to Article XII, Section 5, however; the
effectiveness of Act 1180 is delayed until January 1, 1996."'
If the constitutional amendment's "effectiveness" on November 23, .1995 was
conditioned upon action to be taken by the Legislature, the amendment's
effectiveness is suspended until implementation of its provisions by legislative
action. Legislative action in the form of Act No. 1180, according to the
Attorney General, became "operative" on November 23, 1995, but not "effective"
until January 1, 1996. Thus, "effective" legislative action occurred on January
1, 1996; and the changes in forced heirship law became EFFECTIVE as to
successions of persons dying after December 31, 1995.
Ill. IMPLEMENTATION LEGISLATION-ACT No. 1180 OF 1995
A. Forced Heir: Descendants of the First Degree Twenty-Three or Younger
Act No. 1180 became effective on January 1, 1996, and by specific statutory
provision applied to "the successions of all persons who die after December 31,
1995."-4 The paragraph containing that provision was followed by another
paragraph with a special rule for the person who died testate after December 31,
1995. ss In fact, as will be discussed in greater detail later in this
51. Id.
52. La. Const. art. III, § 19.
53. Op. Att'y Gen. 95-511 (1995) (emphasis added).
For a brief discussion of the issue of effective date of the constitutional amendment and the
implementation legislation, as well as the Attorney General's Opinion, see Hood and Le Van, supra
note 3, Nos. 7-10.
54. La. R.S. 9:2501 (Supp. 1996) (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1180, § 2).
55. La. P.S. 9:2501(B) (Supp. 1996) (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1180, § 1):
If the person dies testate, and the testament is executed before January 1, 1996, then the
testator's intent shall be ascertained according to the following rules:
(1) That the testament shall be governed by the law in effect at the time of the
testator's death in any of the following instances:
(a) When the testament manifests an intent to disinherit a forced heir or to restrict
a forced heir to the legitime in effect at the time of the testator's death.
(b) When the testament leaves to the forced heir an amount less than the legitime
in effect at the time the testament is executed.
(c) When the testament omits a forced heir and the language of the testament
indicates an intent to restrict the forced heir to an amount less than the legitime in
effect at the time the testament is executed.
(2) That in all other instances the testament shall be governed by the law in effect
on December 31, 1995.
This statutory provision, virtually identical to that enacted by 1990 La. Acts No. 147, § 2, was
subject to interpretation in Succession of Lawrence, 623 So. 2d 96 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1993). It is a
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article," the substitution of "became" for "shall become" was the only
significant changes' made in the transition clause during the 1996 Special
Session. Thus, Act No. 1180, the implementation legislation that was supposed
to "be cleaned up" during the First Extraordinary Session of 1996 by Act No. 77,
literally continues to apply to articles and statutes it amended beyond the
effective date of the "clean up" legislation, which was June 18, 1996.11
Forced heirs are defined in Act No. 1180 as "descendants of thefirst degree
"twenty-three years of age or younger,"" rather than as "descendants of the
first degree who have not attained the age of twenty-three years .... 60
Obviously, by comparison of the language of the two provisions, there is a
difference between being "twenty-three years of age or younger" and having
failed to attain "the age of twenty-three years." The common understanding of
"twenty-three years of age or younger" is that the descendant is under the age
of twenty-four; the descendant is twenty-three until his twenty-fourth birthday.
Having failed to attain the age of twenty-three years clearly only included
descendants until their twenty-third birthday. Therefore, Act 1180 in effect
extended the protection afforded descendants of the first degree another year
beyond that of the 1990 legislation6' in accordance with the precise language
difficult transitional provision to understand although the purpose of protecting the testator's intent
at the time the will was executed is clear.
Perhaps relying upon the general rules on interpretation of testaments, La. Civ. Code arts. 1712.
1723 would have been preferable since the testator who dies after December 31, 1995, may dispose
of his property to whomever he chooses if his descendants of the first degree are over the age of 23
and even if not of the first degree, not mentally or physically incapable of caring for their persons
or administering their estates. See La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1180,
§ 1), as discussed in the text at infra notes 59 et seq. As a consequence of his freedom of testation,
the court could conclude that at the time of execution of his testament he intended to bequeath to his
children a fixed percentage of his property as determined under La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (prior to
amendment by 1995 La. Acts No. 1180, § I (effective Jan. I, 1996)).
56. See infra text accompanying notes 141-145.
57. The language "as provided therein" was added to modify Act No. 1180 of the 1995 Regular
Session, which is another indication that the reference to Act No. 1180 was deliberate. La. R.S.
9:2501(A) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77).
58. La. R.S. 9:2501(A) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts, First Extraordinary Session, No. 77, §
2): "The provisions of Act No. 1180 of the 1995 Regular Session as provided therein became
effective on January 1, 1996, and shall apply to the successions of all persons who die after
December 31, 1995." (emphasis added).
For a detailed discussion of the issue, see infra text accompanying notes 141-145.
59. La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1180, § 1).
60. La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (1990) (as amended by 1990 La. Acts No. 147, § 1).
61. Although there was some esoteric debate about the meaning of "twenty.three years of age
or younger," the weight of opinion is that the clause means under the age of twenty-four. In La. Civ.
Code art. 1493 cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1), the redactors explain at length
as follows:
Article XII, Section 5 of the Constitution requires the Legislature to enact legislation
making all descendants of the first degree who are "twenty-three years of age or younger"
forced heirs. Indisputably, a child who has not yet reached his twenty-third birthday is
"twenty-three years of age or younger." Some scholars have raised the question, however,
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of the constitutional amendment.62 To extend forced heirship to children
between the ages of twenty-three and twenty-four gives children protection from
unjust disinherison by their parent for another year sufficient "to cover most
children until they [finish] college."' 3 The extension reiterates the Legislature's;
intent "to protect the children who are most probably being supported by the
decedent at the time of his death, but by the objective means of a fixed share
rather than a subjective evaluation of need."
whether, after reaching that birthday, and prior to reaching his twenry-fourth birthday,
he is still "twenty-three years of age or younger." Arguably, a child who has reached his
twenty-third birthday and is now midway into the year is twenty-three and one-half years
of age and therefore not "twenty-three years of age or younger." (emphasis added).
Legislation passed at the First Extraordinary Session of 1996 clarifies the meaning of this clause
by adding a new paragraph: "D. For purposes of this Article, a person is twenty-three years of age
or younger until he attains the age of twenty-four years." 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I. As the Official
Comments explain:
(a) The third sentence (sic] makes clear that the language "twenty-three years of age or
younger" in Article XII, Section 3(B) of the Louisiana Constitution, as amended in
October, 1995, means that the child has "not attained the age of twenty-four years." Act
147 of 1990 used the language "attained the age of twenty-three years" to clarify the exact
age, but neither the amendment of Article XII, Section 5, nor the implementing legislation
uses that language. Instead, both refer to descendants of the first degree "twenty-three
years of age of younger." The assumption seems warranted that the Legislature meant
that until the descendant of the first degree "attains" the age of twenty-four years he is
"twenty-three years of age or younger" and therefore will be a forced heir. (b) The
redactors believe, however, that the common sense meaning of"twenty.three years of age
or younger" is that the child has not yet attained his twenty-fourth birthday and therefore
that, throughout the child's twenty-third year he is still "twenty-three years of age." To
assist the courts if this becomes an issue, this Article contains language to that effect in
the third sentence [sic].
For the full official and revised comments to Article 1493, see the appendices A and B.
62. It is the constitutional amendment's language that particularly concerned the redactors of
La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I):
(b) Article XII, Section 5 of the Constitution requires the Legislature to enact legislation
making all descendants of the first degree who are "twenty-three years of age or younger"
forced heirs.... In order to avoid a constitutional issue in the very threshold definition
of forced heirs, this Article contains the exact language of Article XII, Section 5 of the
Constitution itself... To assist the courts if this becomes an issue, this Article contains
language to that effect in the third sentence [sic). That statement in the third sentence
[sic] should not jeopardize the constitutionality of the first and second sentences which,
by using the exact same language that the Constitution uses, must of necessity be
constitutional.
La. Civ. Code art. 1493 cmt. b.
63. Katherine S. Spaht et al., The New Forced Heirship Legislation: A Regrettable
"Revolution," 50 La. L. Rev. 411, 437 (1990).
64. Id. at 438.
The restriction (of forced heirs to those who have not attained the age of twenty-three
years under 1989 La. Acts No. 788, § 1] appears related to some idea of a need to support
these vulnerable classes of heirs. This conclusion has been articulated by the legislators
introducing the legislation, and can also be discerned by analyzing the original Bill 265,
which was later amended and blossomed into Act 788. The original bill provided for a
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B. Forced Heir: Mentally or Physically Incapable Descendants of Any Age
By constitutional amendment, the Legislature is authorized, but not
mandated,6s to classify as forced heirs descendants of any age who are mentally
or physically incapable. In Act No. 1180 the Legislature did provide for this
second category of forced heir: descendants of any age (and any degree)' who
are mentally or physically incapable of managing their affairs or caring for their
persons. 67 The statutory language of this Article differed significantly in
structure from the formulation contained in the 1990 legislation, which expressly
included only incapable descendants of the first degree." As the sentence was
structured in 1995, identical to its formulation in the constitutional amend-
ment,69 forced heirs included descendants of any degree-whether children,
grandchildren or great-grandchildren-who are mentally or physically incapable
of caring for their persons or administering their estates. In other words, such
incapable grandchildren or great-grandchildren are forced heirs whether or not
their parents, children of the decedent, are living. It is not representation;" they
maximum forced portion of one-fourth if the decedent died survived by one child under
twenty-three, and a maximum portion of one-half if survived by two or more children
under twenty-three. However, the actual amount of the estate going to any child was not
a fixed portion, but would depend on "the amount necessary for the support, lodging,
maintenance and education of each forced heir of the decedent, according to his station
in life, until such forced heir attains the age of twenty-three."
Id. at 417.
65. La. Const. art. XlI, § 5(B) (in relevant part):
The legislature may also classify as forced heirs descendants of any age who, because of
mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are incapable of taking care of their persons or
administering their estates,
66. The word degree in La. Civ. Code art. 900 means generation: "The propinquity of
consanguinity is established by the number of generations, and each generation is called a degree."
Interestingly, the word children in La. Civ. Code art. 3506(8) is defined as: "those persons born
of the marriage, those adopted, and those whose filiation to the parent has been established in the
manner provided by law, as well as descendants of them in the direct line." La. Civ. Code art.
3509(8) (in relevant part) (emphasis added). Therefore, the word children with the same legal
definition as descendants could have been used.
67. La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1180, § 1) (in relevant part):
"A. Forced heirs are descendants of the first degree twenty-three years of age or younger, or
descendants of any age who, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are incapable of
taking care of their persons or administering their estates."
68. La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (1990) (as amended by 1990 La. Acts No. 147, § 1) (in relevant
part): "Forced heirs are descendants ofthe first degree who have not attained the age of twenty.three
years, or of any age who because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are incapable of taking
care of their persons or administering their estates."
69. See La. Const. art. XII, § 5 (as amended effective Nov. 23, 1995).
70. Representation is expressly addressed by the legislation in a separate paragraph in the same
article: "For purposes of forced heirship, representation of a descendant of the first degree who
predeceased the donor is permitted if that descendant would not have attained the age of twenty.three
years at the donor's death." La. Civ. Code art. 1493(B) (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1180, § I).
See also La. Civ. Code art. 881, which defines representation.
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are forced heirs in their own right. Some commentators thought that the
structure had simply been an inadvertent error.7 However, during the First
Extraordinary Session of 1996 there was strong resistance by the author of the
1995 constitutional amendment to a proposed change recommended by the Law
Institute" in the structure of the Article, proving that the structure was intended
to include incapable grandchildren. Ultimately, as will be discussed later in this
article," a compromise was reached in the conference committee during the
special session to protect incapable grandchildren whose parent predeceased the
decedent grandparent.74
The creation of this class of forced heir regardless of age reflects the policy
"that a descendant unable to support himself is entitled to protection against
unjust disinherison by a parent."75 The public is served by exacting a sum from
the deceased parent that can be used for support of the descendant, relieving
society of the ultimate burden of his support. Ostensibly, both new classes of
heirs based on age and incapacity approximate by statutory rule the support
71. See Hood and Le Van, supra note 3, Nos. 7-10, at 1081.
72. The Louisiana State Law Institute, upon whose recommendation House Bill No. 55 was
introduced, recommended that (1) descendants who are forced heirs be restricted to those of the first
degree except for limited representation as provided for in paragraph (B) of La. Civ. Code art. 1493
(as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I) and (2) descendants who are incapable either mentally
or physically be eliminated as forced heirs. Both recommendations were rejected by the Legislature.
See infra text accompanying notes 152-172.
La. Civ. Code art. 1493 cmt. c (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I) (in relevant part) read
as follows:
The question whether to make grandchildren forced heirs is a policy decision as well as
a legal decision. There has been comment both in reported decisions as well as discussion
and debate in the Legislature and the Constitutional Convention, in some instances
decrying the remoteness in today's world of grandchildren from their grandparents. One
of the rallying cries of the proponents of the constitutional amendment adopted in
October, 1995 was the fact that it would cut off rights of grandchildren to be forced heirs.
It should be noted, however, that a constitutional challenge, when it comes, must come
from a relatively narrow pool of potential claimants. The grandchild must have a parent
who has predeceased him, and the predeceased parent must have been relatively young,
and the grandparent against whose estate the claim is made must have failed to provide
adequately for the grandchild. A grandchild whose parent is living would have no
standing, nor would a grandchild whose predeceased parent would have been in his mid-
twenty's or beyond. Thus, the practical problem is relatively narrow in scope, but it
nonetheless poses a very real constitutional threat theoretically.
73. For a discussion of this issue, see infra text accompanying notes 161.163.
74. La. Civ. Code art. 1493(C) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1):
However, when a descendant of the first degree predeceases the decedent, representation
takes place in favor of any child of the descendant of the first degree, if the child of the
descendant of the first degree, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, is
permanently incapable of taking care of his or her person or administering his or her
estate at the time of the decedent's death, regardless of the age of the descendant of the
first degree at the time of the decedent's death.
Compare La. Civ. Code art. 1493(B) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I).
75. Spaht et aL, supra note 63, at 438.
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provisions of other jurisdictions that recognize a right to claim maintenance or
support from the decedent's estate.76
The incapable descendant is described in the legislation as mentally
incapable or physically infirm such that he is unable to administer his property
or care for his person." The same descriptive language appears in the article
of the Civil Code that permits limited interdiction." Thus, the articles in the
same Title of the Code as the article on limited interdiction 9 should be
examined carefully to determine the meaning of the terms "mental incapacity"
and "physical infirmity." At least as to "mental incapacity" the Articles in Book
I, Title IX use numerous terms to describe varying degrees of mental impair-
ment-for example, habitual imbecility, insanity, madness, lunacy or idiocy;"0
76. Id.
77. La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1180, § 1) (in relevant part):
"who, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are incapable of taking care of their persons
or administering their estates."
78. La. Civ. Code art. 389.1 (in relevant part):
When a person is declared incapable by reason of mental retardation, mental disability,
or other infirmity under the provisions of Articles 389 or 422 of the Louisiana Civil Code,
of caring for his own person or of administering his estate, a court of competent
jurisdiction may appoint a limited curator to such person or his estate.
In fact La. Civ. Code art. 1493 rev. cmt. c (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) explains
(in relevant part):
The origin of the double disjunctive "either/or" approach to disability may be found in
Act 147 of 1990 and its predecessor, Act 788 of 1989, which provided that descendants
of any age who were "subject to interdiction" were forced heirs. The phrase "subject to
interdiction" in Act 788 was considered to be unclear, among other reasons, because it did
not differentiate between the two different kinds of interdiction, namely, the full
interdiction in Civil Code articles 389 and 422, and the limited interdiction in Civil Code
article 389.1. A decision was made to change the terminology and employ the terms
found in the concept of limited interdiction, rather than the full interdiction. The new
language was used in Act 147 of 1990, which provided that a child of any age would
qualify as a forced heir if he were either incapable of taking care of his person or
incapable of administering his estate, and which further made the disability exception
applicable whether the disability was either physical or mental. That identical approach
is followed in the amendment to Article XII, Section 5, of the Constitution that was
adopted in 1995. The drafters of Act 147 of 1990 contemplated that the guidelines that
the courts would use in interpreting and enforcing the disability provisions were the
jurisprudence under Civil Code Article 389.1 concerning limited interdiction.
This comment did not appear in the legislation as enacted by the Legislature during the Session;
however, as explained in the text infra at notes 146-147, Section 4 of Act No. 77 of 1996 gave the
Louisiana State Law Institute authority to redraft the comments for the purpose of accurately
reflecting the articles as enacted. For the official and revised comments, see the appendices.
See thorough discussion of limited interdiction in the context of forced. heirship in Spaht et al.,
supra note 63, at 44243. See also Katherine S. Spaht, The A)ermath of "Revolution ": 1990
Changes to the New Forced Heirship Law, 51 La. L. Rev. 469, 470-74 (1991).
79. La. Civ. Code, Book I, Title IX. Of Persons Incapable of Administering Their Estates,
Whether on Account of Insanity or Some Other Infirmity, and of Their Interdiction and Curatorship.
80. La. Civ. Code arts. 389, 422. For a criticism of the use of these terms, see Jeanne L.
Carriere, Reconstructing the Grounds for Interdiction, 54 La. L. Rev. 1199 (1994).
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mental retardation, mental disability, or other [mental?] infirmity.8 ' The first
list contains the more serious descriptions of mental impairment; and at least one
explanation may be that the second list appears in the article on limited
interdiction, the consequences of which are less harsh than full interdiction in the
deprivation of capacity and civil rights.8 2 Therefore, to be subject to limited
interdiction the mental impairment need not be as serious as that required for full
interdiction since the judgment need only deprive the person of such civil rights
as necessary to sufficiently protect the person from imposition by others. 3
Mental incapacity as defined elsewhere in the Civil Code is synonymous with
"deprived of reason.""M The expression according to the official comment,;
includes "all of the varieties of derangement that have been acknowledged by the
Louisiana jurisprudence," including habitual drunkenness, drug sedation, and
senility. 5 Yet "mental disability" and "[mental?] infirmity" connote some
impairment sounding less serious than derangement, as long as the impairment is
sufficient to make the person incapable of caring for himself or administering his
property." "Physical infirmity"8" is presumably "coextensive with the meaning
of 'infirmity' for physical reasons under Louisiana Civil Code article 422 and the
jurisprudence interpreting it."88 The jurisprudence is replete with examples of
both "mental incapacity" and "physical infirmity." 9  However, one should
81. La. Civ. Code art. 389.1.
82. Id. (in relevant part):
The rights of the limited interdict shall be infringed in the least restrictive manner
consistent with his incapacities. A judgment of limited interdiction shall not operate to
deprive the incapacitated person of any civil right, the right to contract, or any right
pertaining to any license, permit, privilege, or benefit unless specifically set forth in the
judgment.
83. La. Civ. Code art. 389.1 (in relevant part):
Pending appointment of a limited curator, the court shall inquire into the specific abilities
and disabilities of the incapacitated person and such limited curator shall have only those
powers necessary to provide for the demonstrated needs of the incapacitated person. The
powers, duties, responsibilities and any liabilities of the limited curator shall be
specifically set forth in a judgment of limited interdiction.
84. La. Civ. Code art. 1918.
85. La. Civ. Code art. 1918 cmt. b.
86. Spaht et al., supra note 63, at 441. For a general discussion, see also Spaht, supra note
78, at 470-74.
87. La. Civ. Code arts. 389.1 and 422.
88. Spaht et al., supra note 63, at 441.
89. In fact La. Civ. Code art. 1493 rev. cmt. c (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) (in
relevant part) directs the reader to such jurisprudence:
The new language was used in Act 147 of 1990. which provided that a child of any age
would qualify as a forced heir if he were either incapable of taking care of his person or
incapable of administering his estate, and which further made the disability exception
applicable whether the disability was either physical or mental.... The drafters of Act
147 of 1990 [the Louisiana State Law Institute] contemplated that the guidelines that the
courts would use in interpreting and enforcing the disability provisions were the
jurisprudence under Civil Code Article 389.1 concerning limited interdiction.
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approach the jurisprudence with the recognition that any standard of "mental
incapacity" or "physical infirmity" required for limited interdiction should be
relaxed in the arena of forced heirship.e For after all, a descendant alleging his
"mental incapacity" is not seeking to deprive another natural person of civil rights
afforded by the law. Rather, the descendant is seeking to avail himself of a right
accorded to him by the law to claim a portion of his ascendant's estate for his
support so that he is not dependent upon the rest of society.
C. Representation Only If Parent Under Age Twenty-Three at Decedent's Death
Although for purposes of succession generally representation occurs ad
infinitum in the direct descending line,9 there is an exception for forced heirship.
The right of representation is significantly restricted to permit the descendant to
place himself in the degree of the person represented92 only if the person to be
represented (1) is in the first degree of relationship to the decedent and (2) "would
not have attained the age of twenty-three years" at the decedent's death.93 Notice
that there is a discrepancy between the age required of the descendant of the first
degree to be a forced heir (twenty-three years or younger) and the age required of
the predeceased descendant if he is to be represented (not attained the age of
twenty-three years). The discrepancy was apparently inadvertent-in the former
case copying verbatim the constitutional amendment and in the latter case copying
the language of the 1990 statute." Recognizing the apparent error, the Legislature
corrected the discrepancy during the 1996 First Extraordinary Session in Act No.
77.9S
See numerous cases cited and discussed in Spaht et al., supra note 63, at 438-43 nn.120-153;
Spaht, supra note 78, at 470-474 nn.5-33.
More recent cases involving limited interdiction decided since those two articles were written
include In re Heard, 588 So. 2d 799 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991) (originally diagnosed with "chronic
schizophrenia with depressive reaction" and then fourteen years later diagnosed with less severe
"schizo affective disorder"; revocation of full interdiction and substitution of limited interdiction);
Interdiction of F.T.E., 594 So. 2d 480 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992), reh'g granted, 622 So. 2d 667 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1993) (multiple sclerosis with mild dementia; attorney's fees); and In re Smith, 646 So.
2d 1052 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1994), writ denied, 649 So. 2d 407 (1995) (testimony of psychiatrists and
lay persons as to bizarre behavior; daughter appointed curatrix not sister).
For an excellent article reviewing the law of interdiction and suggesting changes, see also Carriere,
supra note 80.
90. Spaht et al., supra note 63, at 441; Spaht, supra note 78, at 471.
91. La. Civ. Code art. 882.
92. La. Civ. Code art. 881.
93. La. Civ. Code art. 1493(B) (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1180, § 1).
94. "For purposes of forced heirship, representation of a descendant of the first degree who
predeceased the donor is permitted if that descendant would not have attained the age of twenty-three
years at the donor's death." La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (1990) (as amended by 1990 La. Acts No. 147,
§ 1) (in relevant part).
95. La. Civ. Code art. 1493(B) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1): "When a
descendant of the first degree predeceases the decedent, representation takes place for purposes of
forced heirship only if the descendant of the first degree would have been twenty-three years of age
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A similar provision contained in both Act No. 788 of 1989 and Act No. 147 of
1990 was criticized for the following reasons:
The new rule under Act 788 permitting representation only if the
forced heir represented would not have attained the age of twenty-three
when the parent died is inconsistent with the legislative assumption that
young heirs would most likely be in need of support and hence deserved
protection from unjust disinherison. Under Article 1493 as amended by
Act 788, if a child of thirty predeceases the de cujus and-leaves a child
who is three years old when the de cujus dies, the three-year-old grand-
child will have no protection from disinherison. Even if the three-year-old
grandchild had been orphaned by the death of the parent and thus had
been legally entitled to support from the grandparent while he lived, Act
788 does not protect him. The grandchild, no matter how young and even
if orphaned, cannot represent the predeceased parent unless the parent
would not have attained the age of twenty-three when the de cujus dies."6
Official Comment (c) to Article 1493 as amended in 1996 could be considered
a response to the criticism that a young grandchild orphaned at a vulnerable age is
denied the protection of forced heirship if his parent would have been over the'age
of twenty-four at the decedent's death. The comment first explained why the
redactors permitted representation by a grandchild at all:
[R]epresentation of a deceased parent is a fiction of the law of long
standing and general acceptance,97 and it is certainly reasonable to accept
the distinction that a grandchild who represents a deceased child is not a
forced heir in his own right but standing in "the place and degree" of a
child who would have been a forced heir if he were still alive."
oryounger at the time of the decedent's death." (emphasis added). For a complete discussion of this
provision, see infra text at notes 148-150.
The Official Comment (c) explains the correction:
In the redactors' view, Article 1493 of the implementing legislation [1995 La. Acts No.
1180, § 1] uses inconsistent ages: to be a forced heir in one's own right one must not
have "attained the age of twenty-four years," but for a grandchild to represent a
predeceased parent, the parent must not have "attained the age of twenty-three years."
96. Spaht et al., supra note 63, at 444.
97. Consider the following assessment:
In addition to leaving young descendants prey to an unjust disinherison contrary to the
general intent of the Act, the new rule of representation for forced heirship is also
inconsistent with the general theory of representation in Louisiana inheritance law. Under
the general rules of representation, the descendants who are the representatives of their
predeceased parent are the heirs of the de cuus; the predeceased parent was never the heir.
It would follow that the new law should be concerned with the ages of the representatives
who are the heirs in order to protect the young heirs from disinherison. But Act 788 is, on
the contrary, only concerned with the age of the predeceased child who was never an heir.
Spaht et al., supra note 63, at 444-45.
98. La. Civ. Code art. 1493 cmt. c (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
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Thereafter, the comment continued by explaining the lack of sympathy for
grandchildren generally and why the redactors were unmoved by the three-year-old
grandchild:
The question whether to make grandchildren forced heirs is a policy
decision as well as a legal decision. There has been comment both in
reported decisions as well as discussion and debate in the Legislature and
the Constitutional Convention, in some instances decrying the remoteness
in today's world of grandchildren from their grandparents. One of the
rallying cries of the proponents of the constitutional amendment adopted
in October, 1995 was the fact that it would cut off rights of grandchildren
to be forced heirs."
After the passage of Act No. 77, however, the Reporter revised'" the
comments and comment (d) replaced comment (c). Comment (d) now says simply
that representation is a fiction of the law of long standing and general acceptance
and it is reasonable because it accepts the distinction between the grandchild being
a forced heir in his own right and simply standing in the shoes of his parent."'
References in the comments to the rallying cries of opponents of forced heirship
about grandparents' remoteness from their grandchildren that help explain the
failure to provide for the young and vulnerable grandchild were eliminated. So, the
three-year-old child referred to above whose thirty-year-old parent predeceased him
is still unprotected from disinherison by his grandparent regardless of who railed
against grandchildren as forced heirs. 02
D. Size of the Disposable Portion
The size of the disposable portion is three-quarters of the active mass'0 3
of the donor's succession if he leaves one forced heir, and one-half if he leaves
two or more forced heirs.'14 At least as to the general rule on the size of the
disposable portion and the forced portion of the decedent's estate there has been
99. Id.
100. See 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 4 which directed the following: "[T]he Louisiana State Law
Institute is hereby urged and directed to include comments which are consistent with the provisions
of this Act." Utilizing Section 4 the Reporter for the Successions Committee of the Law Institute
revised the comments to two Civil Code articles (La. Civ. Code arts. 1493, 1235) after the bill was
enacted. The text of both the original and revised comments to Article 1493 are printed in the
appendices to this article.
101. La. Civ. Code art. 1493 rev. cmL d (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I).
102. For a discussion of how this provision fails to protect vulnerable children and grandchildren
of the decedent from unjust disinherison, see Spaht et al., supra note 63, at 445-47.
103. La. Civ. Code art. 1505 (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1180, § 1) refers to the
aggregate of all of the decedent's property minus his obligations to which is fictitiously added back
the donations inter vivos. For a discussion of the active mass calculation asfictitious collation, rather
than actual collation, see Succession of Fakier, 541 So. 2d 1372 (La. 1988).
104. La. Civ. Code art. 1495 (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1180, § 1).
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no change since 1981.5 Neither Articles 1494 nor 1495 use or define the
wordsforced portion, although in later legislation the term implicitly refers to the
aggregate of the decedent's property reserved for all forced heirs.'"e Rather,
it is legitime that is defined in Article 1494 as "the portion of the donor's estate
reserved to him [the forced heir] by law."' 7 The necessity for defining only
the legitime, often used interchangeably with the words forced portion to mean
the same thing, becomes apparent in the second paragraph of Article 1495.
As an exception to the general rule of the first paragraph,' "if the fraction
that would otherwise be used to calculate the legitime is greater than the fraction of'
the decedent's estate to which the forced heir would succeed by intestacy, then the
legitime shall be calculated by using the fraction of an intestate successor."''
9
What is immediately obvious is that under the terms of this paragraph there can be
a reduction of a forced heir's legitime if his legitime is greater than the fraction
used to calculate his intestate share. Thus, the forced heir who has many siblings
is disadvantaged in many cases when compared to a forced heir who is an only
child or comes from a smaller family."0 The use of legitime assures that the two
fractions being compared are the individual forced heir's reserved portion and his
intestate portion. Thus:
[Flor example, when a parent has five competent children, four of whom
are twenty-four or older and one of whom qualifies as a forced heir
because he is twenty-three or younger. . .the percentage used to calculate
the forced portion under Article 1495 would be twenty-five percent, but
the intestate share under Article 888 would be only twenty percent."'
Remember that the fraction may be the intestate fraction used to calculate the
legitime of the forced heir, but what he ultimately receives is not simply that
fraction of the intestate estate but instead that fraction of the active mass which
includes inter vivos donations."'
105. 1981 La. Acts No. 442, § 1.
106. See La. Civ. Code art. 1494 cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) (in relevant
part): "The legitime of a child is determined by dividing the forced portion by the number of
qualified children living or represented at the death of the decedent." (emphasis added).
107. La. Civ. Code art. 1494 (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 1180, § 1).
108. La. Civ. Code art. 1495(B) (as amended 1995 La. Acts No. 1180, § 1) begins with
"Nevertheless ... "
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. For a discussion of this issue as a discrimination against a forced heir who comes from a
large family when the decedent disposes of his property to a stranger, see Spaht et at., supra note 63.
at 449-50.
111. This is the explanation of an identical provision contained in 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1,
as La. Civ. Code arl. 1495 cmt b.
112. La. Civ. Code art. 1495 cmt. c (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1):
This Article reduces the amount that the forced heir may recover but does not eliminate the
right of the forced heir to calculate his legitime in accordance with the formula of Civil Code
Article 1505 by adding in the value of Inter vivos donations to calculate the portion. Thus,
[Vol. 57
KATHERINE SHA W SPAHT
The solution is similar to that first adopted in the case of I)arental forced
heirship in Succession of Greenlaw" 3 and later by amendment to Article
1494.14 The solution of reducing the forced portion to a forced 'heir who is "in
need" by virtue of the only remaining two categories of forced heirs "makes sense
when the decedent attempts to leave all his property to the other children, or
attempts to leave one-fifth of his property to each child."'" The second para-
graph of Article 1494 in such circumstances "insures that the testator can treat his
children equally as they would have been treated ab intestato.", 6
But when the other children do not receive the property, the forced heir's share
should not be scaled back. Furthermore, when the parent leaves everything to a
stranger, the Greenlaw solution arbitrarily discriminates against large families: the
forced heir with no more than three brothers and sisters gets one-fourth, whereas
the forced heir with more than three brothers and sisters gets one-fifth or less., 7
In the situation where the other brothers and sisters receive the property, the
countervailing policy to treat all children equally, reaffirmed as recently as the 1996
First Extraordinary Session by the retention of the concept of collation,", is
weighed against the policy reflected in the new forced heirship law, that is,
protection of children of the decedent who are most vulnerable and "in need." If
a stranger receives the decedent's property, the only countervailing policy is the
"freedom of testation" of the decedent who is no longer alive to give away all of his
property. This policy can not outweigh the interest of living members of society
to exact support for these vulnerable descendants from a share of' the decedent's
estate.
E. Collation Among Descendants, Not Confined to Forced Heirs
In Act No. 1180" 9 as in the 1990 legislation, 20 Article 1236 of the Civil
Code, restricting collation to forced heirs, was repealed.'' The consequence
the forced heir may receive a greater share than the actual intestate share, which is twenty
percent of the probate estate, but not as large a share as he otherwise would be entitled to
claim, namely twenty-five percent of the result of the Article 1505 calculation.
(Italics added).
113. 145 La. 255, 86 So. 786 (1920). See also La. Civ. Code art. 1495 cmt. c (as amended by
1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I).
114. La. Civ. Code art. 1494 (as amended by 1956 La. Acts No. 313, § I).
115. Spaht et al., supra note 63, at 449.
116. Id. "Without the Greenlaw solution, a testator in the assumed situation of five children
would be prevented from treating his children equally because the youngest child would be entitled
to one-fourth." Id.
117. Id.
118. La. Civ. Code art. 1229. See language of the Article in the text infra at note 389.
119. 1995 La. Acts No. 1180, § 3.
120. 1990 La. Acts No. 147, § 3 (effective July 1, 1990).
121. La. Civ. Code art. 1236 (1870):
Such children or descendants only are obliged to collate who have a right ta a legitimate
portion in the succession of their fathers, or mothers, or other ascendants.
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of repealing the article is to extend collation to all "descendants succeeding to
their fathers and mothers or other ascendants, whether ab intestato or by virtue
of a testament."' " Thus, rather than determining if a descendant is a forced
heir, the relevant inquiry is whether the descendant, forced heir or not, is coming
to the succession as an heir"T or a legatee. 24
Collation, a concept independent of impingement of the legitime, is "founded
on the equality which must be naturally observed between children and other
lawful descendants, who divide among them the succession of their father,
mother and other ascendants; and also on the presumption that what was given
or bequeathed to children by their ascendants was so disposed of in advance of
what they might one day expect from their succession."'25 The difference
between reduction 2' and collation has been succinctly explained elsewhere:
"Reduction is the protection of certain heirs from disinherison without cause, but
collation is simply the evening up between co-heirs who have inherited.""
Extending the obligation of collation to descendants other than forced heirs,
assures that younger children, even though forced heirs, are not treated
unfavorably when compared to their older siblings. Consider the following
compelling illustration which when written assumed that collation would remain
an obligation owed only by forced heirs:
[A]ssume a parent has three children, one of whom is under
twenty-three when the parent dies. The parent has made inter vivos
gifts totalling at least three quarters of the succession but that were not
designated extra portions to his two children who were over twenty-
three when the gifts were made. The children over twenty-three are not
obliged to collate those gifts because they are not forced heirs. The
same result may follow when the donees were under twenty-three when
the gifts were made, but are over twenty-three when the parent dies.
Thus even though the parent did not manifest an intention to treat his
children unequally, the child under twenty-three cannot demand
collation of his older siblings and thus is relegated to his forced share
of one-fourth, instead of an equal one-third share of all property donated
to the children. 2 '
Therefore, natural children, inheriting from their mother or father, in the cases prescribed
by law, are not liable to any collation between them, if they have not been expressly
subjected to it by the donor, because the law gives them no right to a legitimate portion
in their successions.
122. La. Civ. Code art. 1235.
123. La. Civ. Code art. 876 (in relevant part): "Intestate successors, also called heirs."
124. La. Civ. Code art. 876 (in relevant part): "Testate successors, also called legatees."
125. La. Civ. Code art. 1229.
126. La. Civ. Code art. 1502 (1981).
127. Spaht et al., supra note 63, at 451-52.
128. Spaht et al., supra note 63, at 451.
[Vol. 57
KA THERINE SHA W SPAHT
Despite the important social purpose achieved by a concept that assures
equality among children, there were unforeseen and unanticipated problems with
"a descendant coming to the succession" in cases where he was only a
legatee."' Collation among descendant heirs who all received a share of the
estate of the deceased under intestate succession law 30 involved little complex-
ity"' or subversion of one of, the principal reasons for the concept-the gift
represented a presumed advance on what the heir would one day receive. 3'
However, the collation among descendants when one or more are only legatees,
needs reconsideration. 3 Under French law, only intestate successors, includ-
ing those who were not descendants, owed the obligation to collate; legatees did
not." A sensible reform of collation would restrict its application to intestate
succession but extend the obligation unambiguously to all descendants, not just
forced heirs. The policy of treating children equally and solidifying the family
after the death of the parents, as even the majority of letters received by Ann
Landers would support, outweigh any arguments that implementing the policy is
129. Spaht, supra note 78, at 479.
130. La. Civ. Code art. 888.
131. Spaht, supra note 78, at 484-85. One "complexity" is that what the forced heir is entitled
to receive is initially calculated on the active mass of the succession under La. Civ. Code art.
1505(A), (B); whereas, the value of the intestate shares of the other descendants are calculated on
the net estate of the decedent.
132. Spaht, supra note 78, at 481:
Now that the obligation to collate has been extended to any descendant "coming to the
succession," it is more difficult to view the gift as one made "on the presumption that
what was given or bequeathed to children... was so disposed of in advance of what they
might one day expect from their [the ascendant's) succession." The presumption was
more reasonable when the descendant "coming to the succession" was a forced heir and
his expectation was grounded upon the law's guarantee of a reserved portion. Now, at
the time the gift is made, is there a reasonable lasting expectation that the descendant will
come to the succession of a parent? He comes to the succession if the parent dies
intestate, but all the parent has to do to prevent the descendant's coming to his succession
is to write a will.
(emphasis added).
The expectation at the time the gift is made may not be lasting, but it is reasonable if the
descendant under La. Civ. Code art. 888 is a descendant who ultimately comes to the succession as
an intestate successor because the decedent did not write a will presumably because he had
knowledge of the law and chose not to vary the terms of the disposition of his property. In the case
of a descendant who ultimately comes to the succession as a testate successor, or legatee, the
descendant may do so as a particular legatee (La. Civ. Code art. 1625) and as such, the expectation
is neither lasting nor reasonable at the time of the gift that the decedent gave in advance of what the
legatee might otherwise receive.
133. Spaht, supra note 78, at 485-86.
134. Charles C. Aubry & Charles C. Rau, Droit Civil Francais § 629, at 370 in 4 Civil Law
Translations (La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1971): "The obligation to collate arises only in successions
conferred by law. It is not imposed by law on universal donees with regard to each other although
they had, besides the title that calls them to the succession, the quality of presumptive heirs of the
deceased, nor to donees under universal title, whether they concur only among themselves, or whether
they concur with the heirs ab intestato."
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too difficult and requires too complex a scheme.' As the authors of the boo);
Beyond the Grave: The Right Way and Wrong Way of Leaving Money to Your
Children (and Others) expressed the sentiment:
If you care about maintaining family harmony after your death,
leave your money and property to your children equally, regardless of
their economic circumstances or their beau geste declarations.'36
Failing to equalize lifetime gifts is one of the most significant
sources of dispute between my clients' children. Why such emotional
upheaval? One child explained it to me this way: "My parents must
not have loved me as much as my sister. While they were alive, they
gave more to my sister than to me." '37
IV. ACT No. 77 OF THE FIRST EXTRAORDINARY SESSION OF 1996
A scant three months after Act No. 1180 became effective, a special session
was called by Governor Foster; he included within the call Item No. 121: "to
legislate relative to forced heirship; to provide as to forced heirs, to disposable
portion, the effect of testaments and otherwise to provide with respect thereto."
The inclusion of forced heirship within the call for the First Extraordinary
Session of 1996 resulted from urging by the Louisiana State Law Institute as
explained in the Introductory Note to Act No. 77:
The Council of the Louisiana Law Institute has reviewed the
constitutional amendment to the law of forced heirship and the
implementing legislation. The Council concluded that it would be
beneficial to draft a new document to assist in implementing the new
rules on forced heirship, with a systematic approach to the issues of
defining who are forced heirs, what their rights are, and how those
rights are implemented. The proposed revision seeks to present the
rules in a coherent framework that should be practical and work-
able. 38
135. Some other states that are not civil law jurisdictions have a similar concept referred to a
"hotchpot." "Hotchpot" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary:
Hotchpot, or the putting in hotchpot, is applied in modem law to the throwing the amount
of an advancement made to a particular child, in real or personal estate, into the common
stock, for the purpose of a more equal division, or of equalizing the shares of all the
children. This answers to or resembles the collatio bonorum, or collation of the civil law.
136. Gerald M. Condon and Jeffrey L. Condon, Beyond the Grave: The Right Way and the
Wrong Way of Leaving Money to Your Children (and Others) 22 (1995).
137. Id. at 24.
138. 1996 La. Acts No. 77. § 1.
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The expressed purpose in the Introductory Note exceeded merely repairing the
two "glitches," one perceived and the other real in Act No. 1180.", A
systematic approach, later referred to as a "coherent framework," suggested more
extensive legislation than the few Civil Code articles amended by Act No. 1180;
and that intention was bolstered by the additional language specifying the
purpose of defining the rights of forced heirs and the implementation of those
rights. As the Civil Code articles amended by Act No. 77 are examined in the
sections of this article that follow,"' the framework is at times systematic and
"coherent" and at times not. What is clear about the framework is that the
underlying purpose was to reduce the number of forced heirs and the amount of
the legitime and to eliminate collation and its principle that children should be
treated equally.
Nonetheless, Act No. 77 may not yet apply to some forced heirship issues.
In an ironic twist of fate the transition clause contained in Section 2 of Act No.
77 provides that "Act No. 1180 shall apply to the successions of all persons who
die after December 31, 1995."'.. The only exception is for a person who dies
testate and executed his will before January 1, 1996; the testator's intent under
some circumstances is deemed to be that the law in effect before January 1, 1996
(at the time of execution of the will) apply.142 Paragraph A of the Section that
139. See discussion of the two "errors" in text at supra notes 54-64, 91-102.
140. This article is not the first to appear describing the contents of 1996 La. Acts No. 77. See
Kathryn V. Lorio, Forced Heirship: The Citadel Has Fallen-or Has It?, 44 La. B.J. 16 (1996).
141. La. R. S. 9:2501(A) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 2): "A. The provisions of
Act No. 1180 of the 1995 Regular Session as provided therein became effective on January 1, 1996,
and shall apply to the successions of all persons who die after December 31, 1995." (emphasis
added).
142. La. R.S. 9:2501(B) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 2)
B. If the person dies testate, and the testament is executed before January 1, 1996, then
the testator's intent shall be ascertained according to the following rules:
(1) That the testament shall be governed by the law in effect at the time of the
testator's death in any of the following instances:
(a) When the testament manifests an intent to disinherit a forced heir or to restrict a
forced heir to the legitime under the law in effect at the time of the testator's death.
(b) When the testament leaves to the forced heir an amount less than the legitime under
the law in effect at the time the testament is executed.
(c) When the testament omits a forced heir and the language of the testament indicates
an intent to restrict the forced heir to an amount less than the legitime under the law in
effect at the time the testament is executed.
(2) That in all other instances the testament shall be governed by the law in effect on
December 31, 1995.
(3) That the term forced heir, as used above, shall mean a forced heir at the time the
testament is executed.
(emphasis added).
The italicized words in La. R.S. 9:2501(B) above represent the only changes made by 1996 La.
Acts No. 77, § 2 in this paragraph of the Section. 1990 La. Acts No. 147, § 2 contained a virtually




directs the application of Act No. 1180 of 1995 contained one change: the verb
"shall become" was changed to "became." The change in verb tense establishes
that the Legislature knew that Act No. 1180 became effective on January 1,
1996, and was in effect at the time that Act No. 77 of 1996 was passed.
Despite, or on account of, that knowledge the Legislature directs that Act No.
1180 shall be applicable, not Act No. 77, to the successions of all persons who
die after December 31, 1995. In fact Act No. 77, including Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:2501, makes no mention whatsoever of the applicability of Act No. 77.
As a general rule, had Act No. 77 contained no transition clause, it would have
become effective sixty days after final adjournment of the First Extraordinary
Session of 1996."' For succession purposes, new law takes effect as to "succes..
sions opened" after the effective date of the Act-in other words, to the successions
of all persons who die after June 18, 1996. Yet, Act No. 77 directs the continued
applicability of Act No. 1180 of 1995; and the applicability of Act No. 1180 is not
merely of academic interest. In the sections of this article that follow, the
differences between Act No. 1180 and Act No. 77 will be highlighted as to the
Articles of the Civil Code amended by both Acts, 44 for it is as to those Articles
that Act No. 77 directs that Act No. 1180 of 1995 apply. For example, Act No. 77
of 1996 restricts the concept of forced heirship to a greater degree than Act No.
1180 of 1995. As a consequence, a child who claims to be mentally incapable of
caring for his person would fare significantly better under Act No. 1180 of 1995
than under Act No. 77 of 1996;'" s so the fact that Act No. 77 does not apply
under the terms of its own transition clause is extremely important.
In the commentary on the provisions of Act No. 77, the author will refer to
Official Comments and then to Revised Comments. Section 4 of Act No. 77
contains the explanation: "[i]n accordance with Joint Rule No. 10 of the Joint
Rules of the Senate and House of Representatives, 46 the Louisiana State Law
143. La. Const. art. 3, § 19: "All laws enacted during a regular session of the legislature shall
take effect on August fifteenth of the calendar year in which the regular session is held and all lawsi
enacted during an extraordinary session of the legislature shall take effect on the sixtieth day after
final adjournment of the extraordinary session in which they were enacted .... However, any bill
may specify an earlier or later effective date."
144. 1995 La. Acts No. 1180, § I amended and enacted the following Civil Code articles that
also were amended in 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1: La. Civ. Code arts. 1493, 1494, 1495, 1496, 1498,
1505(B).
145. See discussion in text at infra notes 152-186.
146. Joint Rule No. 10:
A bill submitted on the recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute may be
introduced and considered by the Senate and House of Representatives in pamphlet form
and, whether in pamphlet form or not, may include introductory comments and
explanatory comments following proposed sections or articles.
Comments included in the bill shall not be enactments of the legislature, and shall be
included only as explanatory language, and shall not be law, but may be printed in the
official edition of the pertinent law with such changes to be made therein by the Louisiana
State Law Institute as it may deem necessary to accurately reflect the sections or articles
as enacted, or subsequently amended.
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Institute is hereby urged and directed to include comments which are consistent
with the provisions of this Act."" 7  Utilizing that section the Reporter for the
Successions Committee of the Louisiana Law Institute redrafted the comments
to Louisiana Civil Code article 1493 and drafted comments to Louisiana Civil
Code article 1235. As a consequence, the author refers to Official Comments to
mean those enacted with the legislation and Revised Comments to refer to those
comments redrafted by the Reporter. Of course, Section 4 also cautions that
"[t]he introductory note, headings, source lines, and comments in this Act are not
part of the law and are not enacted into law by virtue of their inclusion in this
Act."
A. Classification of Forced Heirs Under Act No. 77
1. Age
Article 1493, Paragraph D clarifies the meaning of the classification of
forced heirs who are "twenty-three years of age or younger," what arguably some
scholars had concluded was ambiguous. Paragraph D provides that "a person is
twenty-three years of age or younger until he attains the age of twenty-four
years.."" Furthermore, for purposes of representation by more remote
descendants, Paragraph B. eliminates the discrepancy in ages by correlating the
age the predeceased descendant of the first degree would have been at the
decedent's death and the age at which he would be a forced heir. 149 Unfortu-
(emphasis added). For Article 1493, the full text of the Official Comments appears in Appendix A
and the full text of the Revised Comments appears in Appendix B.
147. 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 4 (citation added).
148. La. Civ. Code art. 1493(D) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1). See also La. Civ.
Code art. 1493(D) cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) (in relevant pan):
In order to avoid a constitutional issue in the very threshold definition of forced heirs, this
Article contains the exact language of Article XII, Section 5 of the Constitution itself.
The redactors believe, however, that the common sense meaning of "twenty-three years
of age or younger" is that the child has not yet attained his twenty-fourth birthday and
therefore that, throughout the child's twenty-third year he is still "twenty-three years of
age." To assist the courts if this becomes an issue, this Article contains language to that
effect in the third sentence. That statement in the third sentence should not jeopardize the
constitutionality of the first and second sentences which, by using the exact same language
that the Constitution uses, must of necessity be constitutional.
The relevant substance of Official Comment (b) was incorporated into Revised Comments (a) and
(,).
149. La. Civ. Code art. 1493(B) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1): "B. When a
descendant of the first degree predeceases the decedent, representation takes place for purposes of
forced heirship only if the descendant of the first degree would have been twenty-three years of age
or younger at the time of the decedent's death."
Official Comment (c) reads (in relevant part):
For that reason, Article 1493 clarifies a provision in the enabling legislation [Act No.
1180 of 1995] which provides that the grandchild may represent his parent only if the
parent would not "have attained the age of twenty-three years." If being "twenty-three
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nately, Paragraph B. does not address the injustice to the grandchild who may
have been orphaned while a minor and be in desperate need but whose
predeceased parent would have been twenty-four years of age or older at the time
of the grandparent's death.se
Reminder: This is a provision of Act No. 77 that may not be effective
because the Civil Code article was also amended and affected by Act No.
1180.'s' Louisiana Revised Statutes 9.2501(A) states that Act No. 1180
applies to the successions of all persons who die after December 31, 1995.
2. Incapable Descendants
The Louisiana State Law Institute recommended that descendants who are
incapable of caring for their persons or administering their estates be eliminated
as forced heirs.' Because the constitutional amendment permits, rather than
mandates, the Legislature to include such descendants, no constitutional objection
could be raised to the elimination of these descendants."' The concern was
expressed by estate planners and others that the inclusion of incapable descen-
dants within the protection of forced heirship created uncertainty in planning the
disposition of a person's estate."54 The Revised Comments also add additional
elaboration: "concern has been expressed regarding a possible lack of precision
years of age or younger" is the same as "not having attained the age of twenty-three
years," then the enabling legislation is consistent in the same way that the provisions of
this Article are consistent, but the redactors believe that they are not consistent. In the
redactors' view, Article 1493 of the implementing legislation uses inconsistent ages: to
be a forced heir in one's own right one must not have "attained the age of twenty-four
years," but for a grandchild to represent a predeceased parent, the parent must not have
"attained the age of twenty-three years."
The relevant substance of Official Comment (c) was not reproduced in the Revised Comments.
Revised Comments (d) and (e) incorporate an explanation of representation without the explanation
that had appeared in Official Comment (c) above.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 141-145 (regarding the effect of La. R.S. 9:2501 (as
amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1)).
152. H.R. 55, First Extraordinary Sess. (1996).
153. La. Const. art. XII, § 5: "(B) The legislature may also classify as forced heirs descendants
of any age who, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are incapable of taking care of
their persons or administering their estates."
The Revised Comment (c) to La. Civ. Code 1493 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1)
reads as follows:
Article XII, Section 5, of the Louisiana Constitution, as amended in 1995, requires the
Legislature to provide implementing legislation to the effect that all children who are
"twenty-three years of age or younger" are forced heirs, but it also permits the Legislature
to provide that descendants of any age who, "because of physical incapacity or mental
infirmity, are incapable of taking care of their persons or administering their estates 'are
also forced heirs. Utilizing that authorization, Article 1493 (A) makes provision for such
disabled children to be forced heirs.
154. See generally Hood and Le Van, supra note 3, Nos. 7-12.
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in the double disjunctive 'either/or' approach, and also concerning difficulties
involved in taking criteria that may work to determine when appointment of a
curator is needed and applying them in a different context, namely inheritance
rights.'""' The result would have been a denial to those descendants of legal
protection from unjust disinherison by the parents and the potential imposition
of an increased responsibility on the State of Louisiana for the care of these
descendants.
In both the Senate Committee on Judiciary A and in the House Committee
on Civil Law and Procedure, the legislators rejected overwhelmingly"3 6 the
recommendation of the Law Institute after receiving testimony offered by
representatives of the Department of Health and Hospitals and a letter from the
Secretary of the Department of Social Services. From the perspective of the two
departments, representatives testified about the potential economic impact of
eliminating incapable descendants from the category of forced heirs and
anticipated taxpayer indignation about bearing the cost of care for such children
so that the parent could dispose of his own property after he died to other people
or organizations. Essentially, the legislators accepted the view that certainty for
those who are sophisticated enough to seek assistance in estate planning is not
the only societal value to be weighed in the calculation. Uncertainty, to some
extent, always exists: a person does not know whether he will die before or after
each of his children reaches the age of twenty-four. The described uncertainties
which can never be eliminated absolutely had to be weighed against the plight
of descendants who would have no protection from unwarranted disinherison and
be left either bereft of resources or as the taxpayers' responsibility, or both. This
argument, moreover, does not even consider the moral responsibility of the
parent. 7
a. First Degree
As previously mentioned the Law Institute had recommended that incapable
descendants not be forced heirs; however, the Legislature rejected the Law
Institute's recommendation as to incapable descendants. In an attempt to
"clarify" the language of Act No. 1180 to the effect that incapable descendants
of any degree are forced heirs, the Law Institute recommended in House Bill No.
155. La. Civ. Code art. 1493 rev. cmt. c (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) (in relevant
part).
156. In the Senate Committee on Judiciary A voting on Senator Roy Bean's Senate Bill No. 121
to amend La. Civ. Code art. 1493(A) the Committee voted unanimously to defer action on the bill.
The House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure voted 10.1 to amend House Bill No. 55 to
include descendants incapable of caring for their persons or administering their estates at the instance
of one of the authors of the bill, Representative Charles Riddle. As will be explained later in this
Article, the word permanently was added to qualify the descendants in this category. See infra text
accompanying notes 173-186.
157. Spaht et al., supra note 7, at 593.
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55 that descendants be restricted to those within the first degree 8 with the
single exception being the limited right of representation for a descendant who
seeks to represent his predeceased ancestor who would have been under the age
of twenty-four years at the time of decedent's death. 's9 Paragraph A. does
restrict forced heirs to "descendants of the first degree" of any age who are
permanently incapable of caring for their persons or administering their
estates. 160
b. Extraordinary Right of Representation
The one statutory expansion of forced heirship rights beyond descendants of
the first degree permits representation by an incapable "child" of a descendant
of the first degree who predeceases the decedent.' 61 Under the constitutional
amendment and Act No. 1180 of 1995 "descendants of any age" and of any
degree were forced heirs if they were incapable of caring for their persons or
administering their estates. Therefore, grandchildren who were incapable were
forced heirs even if their parent survived the decedent. Thus, it was possible that
the "child" of the decedent, who was the parent of the incapable grandchild,
might not be a forced heir because he was over the age of twenty-three years;
however, the incapable grandchild would be a forced heir. The extension of
representation to the incapable grandchild whose parent predeceases the decedent
regardless of the age the predeceased parent would have been at the death of the
decedent' 6 represented a compromise between the preference of the Law
Institute to limit forced heirship to those descendants of the first degree and the
158. La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77. § 1).
159. La. Civ. Code art. 1493(B) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
160. La. Civ. Code art. 1493(A) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1):
Forced heirs are descendants of the first degree who, at the time of the death of the
decedent, are twenty-three years of age or younger or descendants of thefirst degree of
any age who, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are permanently
incapable of taking care of their persons or administering their estates at the time of the
death of the decedent.
(emphasis added).
Official Comment (a) to Article 1493 reads (in relevant pan): "Article 1493 is the threshold
Article of the forced heirship revision. The first sentence of the Article defines forced heirs and
limits them to children, i.e. 'descendants of the first degree."' (emphasis added).
161. La. Civ. Code art. 1493(C) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1):
However, when a descendant of the first degree predeceases the decedent, representation
takes place in favor of any child of the descendant of the first degree, if the child of the
descendant of the first degree, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, is
permanently incapable of taking care of his or her person or administering his or her
estate at the time of the decedent's death, regardless of the age of the descendant of the
first degree at the time of the decedent's death.
162. La. Civ. Code art. 1493(C) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) begins with
"[hiowever ...," establishing that the paragraph is an exception to preceding Paragraph B, which
restricts the right of representation for purposes of forced heirship. Furthermore, Paragraph C end-i
with "regardless of the age of the descendant of the first degree at the time of the decedent's death."
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preference of some legislators"' to expand forced heirship to protect all
incapable descendants.
Interestingly enough, in the Official Comments to Article 1493 submitted
with House Bill No. 55 that became Act No. 77 of 1996 the "redactors" explain
the general rule of representation contained in Paragraph B. in the following
terms:
One argument supporting the constitutionality of allowing represen-
tation as provided in this Article is the permissive provision in Article
XII, Section 5 to the effect that the Legislature "may" provide that
descendants of any age are forced heirs if for mental or physical reasons
they are either unable to take care of their persons or administer their
estates. By biological necessity, if the predeceased parent would be no
older than his early twenty's, whether that age is twenty-three or
twenty-four years, any grandchild who would represent that parent
would of necessity have to be a very young infant, and grandchildren
of that age would probably not be able to take care of their persons
and, as minors, are legally incapable of administering their estates.
However, even though a minor child would lack capacity to administer
his estate, that disability is not a physical or mental handicap; it is a
legal disability.'"
The language highlighted from Official Comment (c) suggests that a
grandchild of the decedent who is a young infant would not be able to care for
his person and because he is a minor be legally incapable of administering his
estate. 6 Yet, Paragraph C. requires that for representation of his predeceased
parent a grandchild prove that "because of mental incapacity or physical
infirmity" he is incapable of caring for his person or administering his property.
The comment states that a minor child only lacks legal capacity to administer his
estate, not that his inability to care for his person is a legal disability.
Is a three-year-old grandchild, for example, mentally incapable or physically
infirm? If so, and there is some question as to whether a toddler can be
accurately described as mentally incapable of caring for his person,'" the
163. Principal among the legislators concerned with incapable descendants of any degree was
Senator James Cox of Lake Charles who was responsible for the final version of La. Const. art. XlI,
§ 5 that incorporated incapable descendants of a degree beyond those of the first degree.
164. La. Civ. Code art. 1493 cmt. c (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I) (emphasis
added). The Reporter for the Successions Committee of the Louisiana State Law Institute revised
the comments to Article 1493 and the substance of that portion of the comment quoted has not been
retained. Section 4 of Act No. 77 of the First Extraordinary Session of 1996 directed that "the
Louisiana State Law Institute is hereby urged and directed to include comments which are consistent
with the provisions of this Act." (emphasis added).
165. La. Civ. Code arts. 28, 29, 1918, 1922.
166. See discussion of the meaning of mental incapacity in text at supra notes 77-90.
Obviously, the three-year-old toddler is not physically infinn as that term is understood for purposes
of interdiction under La. Civ. Code art. 422. He is not physically mature or adept, but not infirm.
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argument proceeds that the young grandchild of a predeceased descendant of the
first degree is by virtue of his age unable to care for his person and can represent
his predeceased parent in the succession of his grandparent. At least one other
author has suggested such an interpretation.' 67 Arguably, the law adjudges the
minor child who is unemancipated'" incapable of caring for his person because
his care is entrusted to his parents"69 or tutor"0 who have authority over him
and concomitant custody. 7 ' But assuming for purposes of argument only that
the highlighted language from Official Comment (c) is correct, the grandchild
who is three years old, issue of a predeceased child of the decedent who would
have been thirty years of age at the time of the decedent's death, could not
represent his parent under Paragraph B. of Article 1493 but could under
Paragraph C. of the same article, If the child could prove he was permanently
incapable of caring for his person at the time of the decedent's death. It is the
additional permanently that may preclude the argument that the grandchild can
represent his parent and the solution to the injustice of denying that grandchild
protection from unjust disinherison. The Revised Comment (e) emphasizes that
167. Hood and Le Van, supra note 3, Nos. 7-10, at 1079.
168. La. Civ. Code arts. 365-385. See Katherine S. Spaht, Family Law in Louisiana, IV
Louisiana Practice Series § 16 (1995).
169. La. Civ. Code arts. 218-227.
See Spaht, supra note 168. § 15.1, at 652:
Parental authority, in the limited use of the term, includes the following principal
elements: a. Custody (care, supervision) of the child by both parents, with the will of
the father prevailing in the event of a difference of opinion between them. Articles 216-
218, 220, 235, 236; but see Article 99.... The right of the father (and sometimes the
mother) to administer the assets of the minor. Article 221; but see Article 99.
Spaht, supra note 168, § 15.4, at 654: "Custody incidental to parental authority is the right to
supervise and direct the care of the child and his activities with a view to his proper rearing and
development and his health and safety."
170. La. Code Civ. P. arts. 4261, 4262. Article 4261 reads as follows:
The tutor shall have custody of and shall care for the person of the minor. He shall see
that the minor is properly reared and educated in accordance with his station in life.
The expenses for the support and education of the minor should not exceed the revenue
from the minor's property. However, if the revenue is insufficient to support the minor
properly or to procure him an education, with the approval of the court as provided in
Article 4271, the tutor may expend the minor's capital for these purposes.
See Spaht, supra note 168, § 16.2, at 682: "The office of tutor normally combines obligations to
the person of the minor (obligations of custody) and to his patrimonial interests (administration and,
as necessary, disposition of his assets)."
Id. at § 16.23: "It has already been mentioned that by the general rule the tutor has custody of
the minor's person and supervision of his rearing and education; that where there are separate tutors
of the 'person' and 'property' of the minor the first has the minor's custody and supervision; and
that, in spite of the absence of civil legislation allowing it, there are decisions tending to regard
custody as separate from tutorship in civil actions."
"It should be understood that the 'tutor of the person' who is not 'tutor of the property' of the
minor may exercise all the rights and duties of a tutor so far as the person of the minor is
concerned."
171. See supra notes 162-163.
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"[t]he nature of the disability of the grandchild that is required for him to qualify
as a forced heir under Paragraph C is the identical kind of disability that is
required for a child to qualify as a forced heir."' 72 Can a three-year-old
grandchild who because of mental incapacity is unable to care for his person
prove that he is permanently incapable as of the moment of decedent's death?
c. Permanently
Revised 17 13 Comment (c) to Article 1493 explains why the adverb permanent-
ly was added to the clause describing incapable descendants:
Concern was expressed, too, that the broad scope of the terms might
encourage spurious claims for relatively minor disabilities, and also
concerning the uncertainty whether a temporary ... disability might
qualify a child as a forced heir. Article 1493 (A) clarifies the law in
several respects and should help reduce unwarranted or inappropriate
claims."4
The language quoted above suggests two "concerns"-the extent of the
incapacity and the duration of the incapacity. Permanent as a legal term of art
appears elsewhere in the law for a similar purpose. In the workers' compensa-
tion statute,173 the term is used to distinguish between disabilities that are
temporary" 6 and those that are permanent. The workers' compensation statute
establishes that the word permanent concerns the duration of the disability, not
the extent or nature of the disability, and the jurisprudence is reasonably
consistent.'" The extent of disability under the workers' compensation statute
is reflected in the words total, or partial."' Furthermore, disabled or disability
172. La. Civ. Code art. 1493, rev. cmt. e (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I) (in relevant
part).
173. For an explanation of the use of the term "Revised Comment," see supra text accompany-
ing notes 146-147.
174. La. Civ. Code art. 1493, rev. cmt. c (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) (in relevant
part).
175. La. IKS. 23:1221(2), (4) (1985 and Supp. 1996) (regarding permanent total and permanent
partial disability).
176. Id. at (I) (regarding temporary total disability).
177. See, e.g., Franklin v. Le Meridien Hotel, 634 So. 2d 64 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994); Henson
v. Handee Corp., 421 So. 2d 1134 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982); Delafield v. Maples, 2 So. 2d 704 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1941).
For an excellent discussion of the jurisprudence interpreting the workers' compensation statute, see
Wex S. Malone and H. Alston Johnson, III, Workers' Compensation Law and Practice §§ 273-274,
in Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1995).
In addition for a discussion of parallel considerations as to the meaning of permanent in the context
of disability and health and accident insurance, see Shelby McKenzie and H. AIston Johnson, 111,
Insurance § 290, in 15 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1986 and Supp. 1995).
178. La. K.S. 23:1221(1), (2), (4) (1985 and Supp. 1996) (regarding temporary total, permanent
total, and permanent partial, respectively).
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under the workers' compensation statute is not coextensive with incapacity to
care for one's person or administer one's estate. Thus, when the Revised
Comments refer to the extent of the incapacity to care for one's self or to
administer one's property, the comments do not constitute an accurate description
of the statutory language. Consider the following statements from Revised
Comment (c):
Concern was expressed, too, that the broad scope of the terms
might encourage spurious claims for relatively minor disabilities, and
also concerning the uncertainty whether a temporary, albeit severe,
disability might qualify a child as a forced heir.... More important,
the Legislature added the word "permanently" before the word
"incapable" for the express purpose of emphasizing that a temporary
disability, even (f severe, should not apply. The Legislature thereby
expressly manifested its intent that the rule making disabled children of
any age forced heirs should only apply to "seriously handicapped"
individuals. The Legislature requested specifically that these Comments
be written to explain that it is the purpose of adding the word "perma-
nently" to more effectively express the public policy intended, namely,
to protect children who are over the age of 23 as forced heirs if, and
only If, they are severely disabled. Although the jurisprudence on
limited interdiction may be helpful, the new rule expressed in this
Article is intentionally different and more restrictive than the standard
for interdiction because of the use of the word "permanently" to
describe the nature of the incapacity.'79
The paragraph of the Revised Comment that follows the one quoted above
belies the interpretation of intent of the Legislature in adding ' the word
permanently. The next paragraph refers to a specific legislative request that the
comments note that a descendant may be permanently "disabled" but "on
occasion have a temporary remission."' The legislative request came as a
response to the hypothetical of the descendant who suffers from multiple
sclerosis or schizophrenia and may enjoy a temporary remission of the illness;
but the condition that causes the physical infirmity or mental incapacity is
permanent. The impact on state resources for the long term and intermittent care
of these descendants may nonetheless be the same as for the descendant who is
in a coma or mentally retarded at the time of the decedent's death. The same
comment does recognize that "[i]t is not intended to be the policy of the Article
that a mere temporary remission at the time of the decedent's death would
disqualify an heir from being classified as 'permanently' disabled within the new
179. La. Civ. Code art. 1493 rev. cmt. c (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) (emphasis
added) (in relevant part).
180. Id. This specific legislative request by Senator John Guidry came during a hearing before
the Senate Committee on Judiciary A.
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definition of incapacity, provided that the disability is otherwise permanent."'
This paragraph recognizes and supports the proposition that "permanently" does
not address the extent of the incapacity but only its duration. Therefore,
references in the preceding paragraph of the Revised Comment, to severe and
seriously handicapped that were not considered at the time the bill was heard
find no support in the statutory language. Furthermore, comments are not the
law.'
8 2
Permanently incapable at the time of the decedent's death concerns the
known or anticipated duration of the incapacity. How does the descendant, who
should bear the initial burden of persuasion, prove that he is mentally or
physically incapable of caring for his person or administering his estate as of the
moment of the decedent's death"8 3 and that the incapacity is permanent in
nature? Clearly, although the term was borrowed from the workers' compensa-
tion statute, the parallel is not a perfect one. The strongest parallel from which
to borrow to add meaning to permanently is the moment at which a temporary
disability becomes permanent for the disabled worker. Under the workers'
compensation statute, the moment the worker's disability becomes permanent
occurs "when... the employee's physical condition has improved to the point
that continued, regular treatment by a physician is not required."'8 4 Another
way of phrasing the moment that the condition becomes permanent in a
meaningful way for purposes of succession law is when it is determined that the
physical condition of the employee will not improve.
In the context of succession litigation, the forced heir is permanently
incapable at the time of the decedent's death if at that moment a determination
is made that his condition will not improve even though he may have enjoyed
temporary remissions or the benefit of technological devices, such as a prosthesis
or hearing aid, that have eased the severity of his incapacity. The burden of
persuasion that rests on the alleged forced heir should be somewhat relaxed as
mentioned previously.'85 Unfortunately, the difficulty for the forced heir will
be that his incapacity is to be determined as of a particular moment in time-the
decedent's death-regardless of his current condition. Consider, for example, the
forced heir who is schitzophrenic at the time of the decedent's death but at the
time of the assertion of his claim or at the time of trial by virtue of effective
medication appears normal and capable of caring for himself. For purposes of
181. La. Civ. Code art. 1493 rev. cmt. (c) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
182. 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 4: "The introductory note, headings, source lines, and comments
in this Act are not part of the law and are not enacted into law by virtue of their inclusion in this
Act." (emphasis added).
183. La. Civ. Code art. 1493(A) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1): "Forced heirs are
descendants of the first degree who ... because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are
permanently incapable of taking care of their persons or administering their estates at the time ofthe
death of the decedent." (emphasis added).
184. La. R.S. 23:1221(1)(d) (1985 and Supp. 1996) (in relevant part).
185. See supra text accompanying note 90.
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forced heirship law, as contrasted to workers' compensation law that theoretically
permits continuous monitoring of the disability, only the condition of the
descendant as of the date of death of the decedent is relevant.'
6
Both the workers' compensation scheme and forced heirship law involve
social legislation designed principally to protect the worker (at least originally)
and the descendant, respectively, and to provide for their support. Initially,
because at the beginning the amount awarded the worker was modest, policy
dictated that a judge should err on the side of the worker. Considering the
unanimity with which the Legislature rejected the recommendation that incapable
descendants should not be forced heirs and the fact that the law reserves only a
portion, not the entirety of the decedent's estate, policy dictates that the judge
should likewise err on the side of the descendant if doubt exists as to the extent
of his incapacity or its permanency.
Reminder: This is a provision of Act No. 77 that may not be effective
because the Civil Code article was also amended and affected by Act No. 1180.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2501(A) states that Act No. 1180 applies to the
successions of all persons who die after December 31, 1995.
B. Amount of the Forced Portion
The disposable portion continues to be three-fourths of the decedent's estate
if the decedent dies survived by one child and one-half if the decedent dies
survived by two or more children."' In an improvement over its predecessor,
the same Article provides a definition of the forced portion: "The portion
reserved for the forced heirs is called the forced portion and the remainder is
called the disposable portion."'" Notice that the forced portion is the term
used to signify the total amount of the decedent's estate reserved for all forced
heirs; whereas, the legitime is defined as "the portion of the decedent's estate
reserved to him [the individual forced heir]." 1 9  As in Act No. 1180, the
legitime of a forced heir may be reduced if it is larger than his intestate
fraction. "*
Reminder: This is a provision of Act No. 77 that may not be effective
because the Civil Code article was also amended and affected by Act No. 1180.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2501(A) states that Act No. 1180 applies to the
successions of all persons who die after December 31, 1995.
186. La. Civ. Code art. 1493 (as amended by 1996 a. Acts No. 77, § 1). See also rev. cmt. c.
187. La. Civ. Code art. 1495 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
188. Id. (emphasis added).
189. La. Civ. Code art. 1494 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
See also id. at cmt. b: "The legitime of a child is determined by dividing the forced portion by
the number of qualified children living or represented at the death of the decedent."
190. La. Civ. Code art. 1495 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1). For an explanation
of the application of this paragraph of Article 1495, see supra text accompanying notes 103-117.
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What is new in Act No. 77 concerning the amount of the forced portion is the
ability to recalculate the forced portion if a forced heir renounces. Under Article
1500, the forced portion is reduced not only if the forced heir is declared
unworthy 9' or adjudged disinherited"2 as has been true since 1981,93 but
also the forced portion is reduced if a forced heir renounces. '" Prior to the
amendment to Article 1500 by Act No. 77, "the legitimate portion... being once
fixed by the number of forced heirs.., does not diminish by the renunciation of
one or any of them.""' 5 The comment to Article 1500 acknowledges the change
and explains, "[t]his ... makes the effects of disinherison, renunciation and
unworthiness consistent with each other instead of producing different results as
provided under prior law."'" That justification for the change in law may appear
reasonable, treating all instances that deny a forced heir his legitime in the same
manner. However, disinherison and unworthiness are distinct from renunciation.
The former events, disinherison and unworthiness, occur despite the will of the
forced heir generally by virtue of his extremely ungrateful or disrespectful behavior
directed toward the decedent." 7 Renunciation, on the other hand, occurs by
virtue of a voluntary act by the forced heir that requires the solemnity of an
authentic act.'9
Why did prior law not increase the disposable portion when a forced heir
renounced?'" The purpose of the rule under prior law was to give a forced heir
191. La. Civ. Code arts. 964-975.
192. Id. at arts. 1617-1624.
193. La. Civ. Code art. 1498(B): "But if an heir is adjudged disinherited or declared unworthy
of succeeding, then the legitimate portion is determined by the number of other forced heirs of the
deceased living or represented."
194. La. Civ. Code art. 1500 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1): "When a forced heir
renounces his legitime, is declared unworthy, or is disinherited, his legitime becomes disposable and
the forced portion is reduced accordingly. The legitime of each remaining forced heir is not
affected." (emphasis added).
Notice that Article 1500 focuses on renouncing the legitime whereas the predecessor Article
1498(A) (infra text in note 195) merely refers to renunciation. If a forced heir renounces, he
renounces the succession which includes the legitime as well as any other right he may have and is
no longer an heir. This is consistent with La. Civ. Code art. 1014.
195. La. Civ. Code art. 1498(A) (in relevant part): "The part of those who renounce goes to
those who accept."
196. La. Civ. Code art. 1500 cmt. (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77. § 1) (in relevant part).
197. The causes for unworthiness (La. Civ. Code art. 966) and disinherison (La. Civ. Code arts.
1621, 1622) overwhelmingly concern behavior directed toward the decedent; however, there are
instances where the grounds for unworthiness (failure to take measures to bring the murderer to
justice, La. Civ. Code art. 966 (3)) and disinherison (conviction of a felony for which punishment
could be life imprisonment or death, La. Civ. Code art. 1621 (11)) do not involve behavior directed
toward the parent.
198. La. Civ. Code art. 1017.
199. La. Civ. Code ast. 1236 (1870):
Such children or descendants only are obliged to collate who have a right to a legitimate
portion in the succession of their fathers, or mothers, or other ascendants.
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who had received an inter vivos gift an incentive to accept the succession and to
collate. If he renounced, the disposable portion would not be increased; ° and
he was not permitted to keep more property donated by the decedent than a stranger
could.2"' The rule under prior law thus prevented the forced heir from increasing
the disposable portion to his own advantage by renouncing the succession. As
introduced, Act No. 77 recommended a repeal of collation. Implicit in this
recommendation was the Institute's rejection of the equality principle embodied in
collation. Thus, it would have been consistent with the rejection of collation to
allow the renouncing forced heir to increase the size of the disposable portion to his
own advantage."2 However, the Legislature disagreed with the Law Institute on
the principle of equality and retained collation, albeit limited in form;.. 3 so, prior
law refusing recalculation of the forced portion upon renunciation of a forced heir
should have been retained as well.2"
Another more subtle change made by Article 1500 is that the adjustment of
the forced portion upon disinherison, unworthiness, and renunciation occurs by
reducing the forced portion by the renouncing heir's legitime. His legitime,
defined earlier under Article 1494205 as the portion reserved for the individual
heir, becomes disposable. Under the predecessor to Article 1500, when a forced
heir was disinherited or declared unworthy, "then the legitimate portion is
determined by the number of other forced heirs of the deceased living or
represented."" 6 The following hypothetical illustrates the difference. Suppose
that at the time of the decedent's death there are three forced heirs, and one is
Therefore, natural children, inheriting from their mother or father, in the cases prescribed
by law, are not liable to any collation between them, if they have not been expressly
subjected to it by the donor, because the law gives them no right to a legitimate portion
in their successions.
The Article was originally repealed in 1990 La. Acts No. 147, § 3, declared unconstitutional in
Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156, (La. 1993), and most recently repealed in 1995 La. Acts No.
1180, § 3.
200. La. Civ. Code art. 1498(A). See supra text accompanying note 195.
201. La. Civ. Code art. 1502 (in relevant part): "Any disposal of property, whether inter vivas
or mortis causa, exceeding the quantum of which a person may legally dispose to the prejudice of
the forced heirs, is not null, but only reducible to that quantum." The possibility existed that the
donation to the renouncing forced heir might be the subject of a reduction action by the remaining
forced heirs.
202. Grandchamps v. Delpeuch, 7 Rob. 429 (La. 1844).
203. La. Civ. Code art. 1235 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I) (in relevant part):
"The right to demand collation is confined to descendants of the first degree who qualify as forced
heirs, and only applies with respect to 8ifts made within the three years prior to the decedent's death,
and valued as of the date of the gift."
204. For an explanation, see supra text accompanying notes 119-137 as to why collation should
be retained and expanded and see infra notes 288-378 as to why Article 1501 (as amended by 1996
La. Acts No. 77, § i) should be repealed.
205. La. Civ. Code art. 1494 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I): "A forced heir may
not be deprived of the portion of the decedent's estate reserved to him by law, called the legitime,
unless the decedent has just cause to disinherit him."
206. ' La. Civ. Code art. 1498(B) (prior to repeal by Act No. 77 of 1996) (emphasis added).
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disinherited. Under prior law the legitimate portion at the time of the decedent's
death was one-half as the decedent was survived by two or more descen-
dants."07 After disinherison of one of the forced heirs, the legitimate portion
remains one-half since it is to be determined by the other two living forced heirs.
By contrast, under Article 1500, the deduction of the legitime of the forced heir
(one-third of one-half or one-sixth) from the legitimate portion means the forced
portion is no longer one-half but instead is two-sixths, or one-third. This is one
of many changes, the pattern of which is to reduce the forced portion to the
greatest extent possible even if the only remaining forced heirs are children under
twenty-four and those who are incapable, both of whom need support."5
Reminder: This is a provision of Act No. 77 that may not be effective
because the Civil Code article was also amended and affected by Act No. 1180.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2501(A) states that Act No. 1180 applies to the
successions of all persons who die after December 31, 1995.
C. No Charges, Conditions Imposed on Legitime
Article 1496 continues to state the general proposition that "[n]o charges,
conditions, or burdens may be imposed on the legitime except those expressly
authorized by law." 2" Those authorized exceptions, however, have increasing-
ly subsumed the general principle, the most important exception being the
usufruct in favor of the surviving spouse. t The usufruct, which by its nature
207. La. Civ. Code art. 1495(A).
208. For additional examples of the same underlying theme, see infra text accompanying notes
209 et seq.
209. La. Civ. Code art. 1496 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I). The Comment
explains: "It retains the fundamental principle of prior law, that a forced heir is entitled to his
legitime in full ownership."
The Comment also explains that Article 1496 reproduces the substance of Article 1710 of the
Louisiana Civil Code of 1870. Act No. 77 of the First Extraordinary Session of 1996 does not repeal
Article 1710 because the first independent clause of the Article contains a very important proposition
not reproduced in any of the articles in Act No. 77: "The same causes which, according to the
foregoing provisions of the present title, authorize an action for the revocation of a donation inter
vivos, are sufficient to ground an action of revocation of testamentary dispositions."
210. Article 1496 itself explicitly mentions the surviving spouse's usufruct as an example of a
burden imposed by law upon the legitime: "No charges, conditions, or burdens may be imposed on
the legitime except those expressly authorized by law, such as a usufruct in favor of a surviving
spouse ....
See also La. Civ. Code art. 1499 cmt. a (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1). The
comment also explains that Succession of Suggs, 612 So. 2d 297 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992), was
effectively overruled by the repeal in 1995 of La. Civ. Code art. 1752, the theoretical support for that
decision; however, Article 1499 leaves no doubt that the Suggs case has been repudiated. See also
Succession of Gilbert, 668 So. 2d 1212 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1995), writs granted, 673 So. 2d 1021-22
(1996); Succession of Becker, 660 So. 2d 61 (La. App 4th Cir.), writ denied, 664 So, 2d 455 (1995).
The comment to Article 1496 provides: "Despite that general principle, however, there are well-
recognized impingements on the legitime that are permitted. The two most prominent exceptions to
the general rule are the usufruct of a surviving spouse, in Civil Code Articles 890 and 1499, and the
1996]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
always includes the right to the "fruits" of property subject to the usufruct,2 '
may also under Act No. 77 include the explicit right to dispose of nonconsuma-
bles if the decedent grants the power by testament. 2 ' The burden of the
usufruct imposed on the legitime is greater after January 1, 1996 since the only
forced heirs are those under the age of twenty-four or those who are incapable
and consequently need support. It is also possible that the surviving spouse may
not owe the forced heirs a legal obligation of support."13 She owns the
fruits,2t4 may consume other property" 5 of the decedent, and, with testamen-
tary authority, dispose of nonconsumables.1 6 All of these rights are granted
to the surviving spouse without any protection for the forced heir, unless, of
course, the law permits the forced heir to request security." 7 Despite a
ability of the testator to place the legitime in trust, in La. R.S. 9:1841 et seq. and La. Constitution,
Article XII, Section 5."
The surviving spouse usufruct is contained in La. Civ. Code arts. 890 (intestate), 1499 (testate) (as
amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1), more fully discussed elsewhere in this symposium. See
Dian T. Arruebarrena, Property Changes in the Proposed Successions Revision, 57 La. L. Rev. 149
(1996) (this symposium). Prior to the amendment to Article 890 in Act No. 77, the surviving
spouse's usufruct whether imposed by law or confirmed by testament was provided for in La. Civ.
Code art. 890.
211. La. Civ. Code arts. 550, 555.
212. La. Civ. Code art. 1499 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) (in relevant par):
"The decedent may grant a usufruct to the surviving spouse over all or part of his property, including
the forced portion, and may grant the usufructuary the power to dispose of nonconsumables as
provided in the law of usufruct. The usufruct shall be for life unless expressly designated for a
shorter period."
Under the law of usufruct the person creating the usufruct may grant the right to dispose of
nonconsumable things subject to the usufruct. La. Civ. Code art. 568. See also La. Civ. Code art.
568 cmt. a.
213. Only a parent owes a child an obligation of support, whether the child is a minor (La. Civ.
Code arts. 227, 230; La. R.S. 9:315-315.35 (1991 & Supp. 1996)) or a major (La. Civ. Code art.
229).
214. La. Civ. Code art. 550.
215. La. Civ. Code arts. 568, 629.
216. La. Civ. Code art, 1499 cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I):
This Article also clarifies an issue that has not yet been resolved in the courts, which is
whether the testator may grant the usufructuary the power to dispose of nonconsumables
as provided in the law regarding usufruct in Civil Code Article 568. There is disagree-
ment among scholars as to whether the grant of such authority would constitute an
impingement on the legitime. To remove any doubt and to establish that the grant of that
right would not constitute an impingement, the Article expressly so provides.
217. There are conditions to his ability to request security when the usufruct affects his legitime:
First, if the usufruct is legal, as the usufruct over community property is (La. Civ. Code art. 890
(as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1)), then no security is required. La. Civ. Code art. 573.
See also La. Civ. Code art. 1514 cmt. a (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
Second, if the forced heir is not a child of the surviving spouse, he may request security; or
Third, if the usufiuct affects separate property, to that extent the forced heir, even if a child of the
surviving spouse, may request security.
La. Civ. Code art. 1514 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I). See also La. Civ. Code art.
1514 cmts. b, c.
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comment suggesting that "there is no reason to require a bond" ''1 when the
testator "donated something less than [the disposable portion], namely, a usufruct
only,"' 19 a court should be reminded of the contents of a different comment to
the same article:
The legislature made a policy decision that children of a prior
marriage and illegitimate children are entitled to greater protection than
are children of the marriage, or, in other words, to treat a surviving
spouse who is the parent of the naked owner different from a surviving
spouse who is not the parent of the naked owner. This Article
continues that policy.220
The policy decision made by the Legislature, to which this comment refers, was
made before forced heirs were limited to young or incapable children and the
underlying basis of forced heirship was changed. If the underlying rationale
supporting the protection of forced heirship after January 1, 1996, is support,
these vulnerable categories of children not related by blood to the surviving
spouse deserve even greater protection from the surviving spouse usufructuary
through security. Changes to the usufruct of the surviving spouse are more fully
explored elsewhere in this symposium.
22
'
Cf La. Code Civ. P. art. 3154.1 (limits right to request security to forced heirs who are not
children of the surviving spouse).
218. La. Civ. Code art. 1514 cmt. d (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I):
There are many forms of security, such as a surety bond, a legal or conventional
mortgage, and perhaps, in a more colloquial sense, a designation of the nature of an
investment. An example of that latter kind of provision is found in Civil Code Article
618, which applies when, for example, a usufruct of a nonconsumable is transformed into
a usufruct of a consumable and the naked owner and the usufructuary are unable to agree
on the investment of the proceeds within one year of the transformation of the property.
In that case, Civil Code Article 618 authorizes the court to determine the nature of the
investment. It is hoped that courts will not inflexibly apply the rule of this Article to
require a usufructuary to post bond every time a naked owner requests security, but will
consider all of the circumstances of the situation, such as the nature of the property that
comprises the legitime, and whether the property is movable or immovable, consumable
or nonconsumable, and what practical controls exist or may be used to protect the right
of the naked owner without infringing on the rights of the usufructuary, or if so, by
infringing in the least restrictive manner possible.
An additional consideration not mentioned in the comment is, of course, whether the forced heir
requesting the security is a child of the usufructuary or not.
219. La. Civ. Code art. 1514 cmt. e (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
220. La. Civ. Code art. 1514 cmt. c.
221. Arruebarrena, supra note 210, at 149 (this symposium).
An important change in the usufruct to the surviving spouse that is confirmed by testament is its
duration. Under La. Civ. Code art. 1499 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I) (in relevant
part): "The decedent may grant a usufruct to the surviving spouse over all or part of his
property.... The usufruct shall be for life unless expressly designated for a shorter period."
See also La. Civ. Code art. 1499 cmt. d:
1996]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The second legally permissible charge under Article 1496 is "placing of the
legitime in trust."" The charge of a trust imposed on the legitime is not new;
it has been permitted since the enactment of the Trust Code. However, the
charge or burden of a trust imposed on the legitime does require that certain
conditions be met for the protection of the forced heir.1 3  Although not
mentioned in the Article itself, three other conditions or burdens may be imposed
on the legitime or, under prior law, consented to by the forced heir: (1) the
"short-term survivorship provision presently authorized by Civil Code Article
1521,"" as described in the comment to Article 1496;225 (2) the assignment
by the testator or delegation of the authority to assign specific assets of the estate
This Article legislatively overrules the case of Succession of .J Chauvin, 257 So.2d 422
(La. 1972) which held that when the will "merely confirmed" the legal usufruct to a
surviving spouse over community property without specifying that it was for life, the
usufruct was not a lifetime usufruct.... There is a transitional provision that continues
this rule for testaments executed prior to the effective date of this Act.
That transitional provision is contained in Section 3 of Act No. 77 enacting La. R.S. 9:2441:
"When a testament executed prior to the effective date of this Act leaves a usufruct to the surviving
spouse without specifying its duration, the law in effect at the time the testament was executed shall
govern the duration of the usufruct."
222. La. Civ. Code art. 1496 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1). See also La. Civ.
Code art. 1496 cmt.: "The two most prominent exceptions to the general rule are the usufruct of a
surviving spouse, in Civil Code Articles 890 and 1499, and the ability of the testator to place the
legitime in trust, in La. R.S. 9:1841 et seq. and La. Constitution, Article XII, Section 5."
223. See La. R.S. 9:1841 (Supp. 1996):
The legitime or any portion thereof may be placed in tust provided:
(I) The net income accruing to the forced heir therefrom is payable to him not less than
once each year; and
(2) The forced heir's interest is subject to no charges or conditions except as provided
in R.S. 9:1843, 1844, 1891 through 1906 and Subpart B of Part III of this Chapter.
(3) Except as permitted by R.S. 9:1844, the term of the trust, as it affects the legitime,
does not exceed the life of the forced heir; and
(4) The principal shall be delivered to the forced heir or his heirs, legatees, or assignees
free of trust, upon the termination of the portion of the trust that affects the legitime.
Note that La. R.S. 9:1844 (1991), referred to in R.S. 9:1841 (2) and (3) above, permits the legitime
in trust to be burdened with an income interest in favor of the surviving spouse to the same extent
and for the same term as a usufruct. See supra text accompanying notes 210-221 about the burden
of a usufruct in favor of the surviving spouse.
224. La. Civ. Code art. 1521(A)(2): "That, with regard to the taking of a disposition by any
heir, legatee, or trust beneficiary, including she legilme of a forced heir, a testator may impose as
a valid suspensive condition that the donee, heir, legatee, or trust beneficiary must survive the testator
for a stipulated period, which period shall not exceed ninety days after the testator's death, in default
of which a third person is called to take the gift, the inheritance, or the legacy; in such a case the
right of the donee, heir, legatee, or tust beneficiary is in suspense until the survivorship vel non as
required is determined." (emphasis added).
See also Baten v. Taylor, 386 So. 2d 333 (La. 1979).
225. La. Civ. Code art. 1496 cmt. (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § .1): "Another
example of a condition that may be imposed on the legitime is the short-term survivorship provision
presently authorized by Civil Code Article 1521."
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"in satisfaction of the forced portion of his children;"226 and (3) the usufruct
or annuity donated by the decedent that exceeds the disposable portion with the
resulting option of the forced heir to suffer the charge or abandon the disposable
portion." The latter charge, the usufruct or annuity that exceeds the dispos-
able portion, was implicitly repealed by Act No. 77. Article 1499 was amended
and reenacted to contain provisions relating to the usufruct of the surviving
spouse that is confirmed or granted by will of the decedent"5 without reenact-
ing the substance of former Article 1499 in a different provision. ' 9
Reminder: This is a provision of Act No. 77 that may not be effective
because the Civil Code article was also amended and affected by Act No. 1180.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2501(A) states that Act No. 1180 applies to the
successions of all persons who die after December 31, 1995.
D. Nature of the Forced Heir's Interest
"[T]he legitime may not be satisfied in whole or in part by a usufruct or an
income interest in trust."23 Article 1502, by so expounding, merely reiterates
prior law, particularly the jurisprudence, interpreting the word property that is
226. La. Civ. Code art. 1302 (in relevant part): "The same thing takes place when the testator has
expressly assigned specific assets of his estate, or delegated the authority to assign specific assets of his
estate, in satisfaction of the forced portion of his children," See also La. Civ. Code arts. 1724-1733.
227. La. Civ. Code art. 1499 (prior to Act No. 77 of 1996):
If the disposition made by donation inter vivos or morris causa, be of a usufruct, or of an
annuity, the value of which exceeds the disposable portion, the forced heirs have the
option, either to execute the disposition or to abandon to the donee the ownership of such
portion of the estate as the donor had a right to dispose of.
For a collection of law review notes and citations to cases on the interpretation of this Article, see
Cynthia A. Samuel et al., Successions and Donations--Cases and Readings 340-341 (1996), and
Frederick W. Swaim and Kathryn V. Loro, Successions and Donations § 11.10, in 10 Louisiana Civil
Law Treatise (1995).
See also, e.g., the following two cases that applied Article 1499: Succession of Blythe, 519 So.
2d 284 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988); Succession of Schaub, 453 So. 2d 974 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 457 So. 2d 1194 (1984).
228. La. Civ. Code art. 1499 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I).
229. The reference to Article 1499 in the comment to La. Civ. Code art. 1496 (as amended by 1996
La. Acts No. 77, § I) is to Article 1499 as amended in Act No. 77 which refers to the surviving spouse's
usufruct as an example of a burden or charge that can be imposed on the legitime.
What will now be the result if a testator leaves his entire estate to his forced heir subject to a yearly
charge or a usufruct in favor of X, someone other than the surviving spouse? Under old Article 1499
the forced heir could claim his legitime but only at a price: the abandonment of the disposable portion
to X. Thus, old Article 1499 gave the forced heir an inducement to allow the testator's dispositive plan
to remain intact. Eventually when X dies the forced heir will have the entire estate, not just the legitime.
Without old Article 1499 new Article 1496 would mean that the charge or usufruct to X would be
invalid without the forced heir having to make a choice between the legitime only and the entire estate
subject to the charge or usufruct. This is one of the few changes in the law wrought by Act No. 77 that
favors the forced heir. But see infra discussion of the "credit" of Article 1501 (as amended by 1996 La.
Acts No, 77, § i) in text accompanying notes 288-378.
230. La. Civ. Code art. 1502 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I) (in relevant part).
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reserved for the forced heir in Article 1495.231 The Article does, however,
clarify that if the forced heir is both income and principal beneficiary of the
same interest in trust, "that interest shall be deemed a full ownership interest for
purposes of satisfying the legitime if the trust conforms to the provisions of the
Louisiana Trust Code governing the legitime in trust." '232 A comment to the
Article explains that the result would have been the same even without express
provision for that result, 3 citing the parallel concept in the law of usufruct
that treats an interest in usufruct and naked ownership as full ownership for
purposes of a partition.234 Despite the fact that Article 1502 merely codified
present law about the nature of the forced heir's interest, the Article begins with
the word [n~evertheless." A comment expresses the opinion that the word
nevertheless "is intended to make certain that the provisions of this Article
modify and limit the provisions of Article 1501 .136"237 The obvious intention
of the comment was to address the implications of Article 1501 that the legitime
231. La. Civ. Code art. 1493(A) (prior to Act No. 77 of 1996): "Donations inter vivos and
mortis causa cannot exceed three-fourths of the property of the disposer, if he leaves, at his decease,
one child; and one-half, if he leaves two or more children." (emphasis added).
This Article was interpreted with La. Civ. Code arts. 1499, 1502, and 1710 by the jurisprudence
to mean that the forced heir had to receive his interest in property and not "value." Succession of
Douct, 395 So. 2d 383 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981); Succession of Williams, 184 So. 2d 70 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ refused, 199 So. 2d 183 (1967).
In fact comment (a) to Article 1502 recognizes as much: "This Article is consistent with
Succession of Williams, which held that a child's forced portion may not be satisfied by a bequest
to him of a usufruct." (citation omitted).
232. La. Civ. Code art. 1502 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
233. La. Civ. Code art. 1502 cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I):
To remove any doubt as to that result the Article expressly states that an income interest
and a principal interest combined should be treated as the equivalent of full ownership for
legitime purposes, but it virtually goes without saying that would be the case even in the
absence of such a provision.
234. La. Civ. Code art. 543. See also La. Civ. Code art. 1502 cmt. c (as amended by 1996 La.
Acts No. 77, § 1). For an illustration of such a conclusion for purposes of succession law, see
Succession of Steen, 508 So. 2d 1377 (La. 1987).
235. "Nevertheless, the legitime may not be satisfied in whole or in part by a usufruct or an
income interest in trust." La. Civ. Code art, 1502.
236. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I):
When a forced heir asserts his right to reduce excessive donations, the value of all
donations inter vivos made at any time to him or in trust for his benefit, if the trust
conforms to the provisions of the Louisiana Trust Code governing the legitime in trust,
valued at the time of the gift, shall be credited toward satisfaction of his legitime. This
rule does not apply to donations that are declared by the donor to be extra portions, and
usual or customary donations, as well as expenses of board, support, or education, even
those paid through the age of twenty-three.
In addition, the value of any inheritance or legacy to the forced heir, or for his benefit
in a trust that conforms to the provisions of the Louisiana Trust Code governing the
legitime in trust, shall be credited toward satisfaction of his legitime even if he renounces
all or any part of the inheritance or legacy.
237. La. Civ. Code art. 1502 cmt. c (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
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is nothing more than a "value" of the decedent's estate. That implication arises
from Article 1501, because the Article directs that the "value" of donations inter
vivos, an inheritance, or a legacy "shall be credited toward satisfaction of his
(forced heir's] legitime. '" The comment makes the intention clear that the
legitime, despite the implications of Article 1501, is not simply a "value" that
can be satisfied by a usufruct or an income interest in trust.
E. Calculation of the Active Mass and Reduction Action
I. Reduction Action; Nature
If a donation inter vivos or mortis causa impinges upon the legitime of a
forced heir, it is not null but merely reducible.2 39  As an illustration the
comment uses the following hypothetical:
Under this Article [Article 1500], if the husband's will leaves all
to his wife and there is a forced heir who is entitled to one-fourth, the
legacy to the wife is reduced to the disposable portion in full ownership
and a usufruct for life, with the power to dispose of nonconsumables,
over the forced portion, since that usufruct could have been left to her
expressly under Article 1499."w This is the maximum extent to which
reduction is needed to eliminate the excess that impinges upon the
legitime, since the decedent could legally have made such a bequest to
his surviving spouse. No further reduction is necessary or appropri-
ate.24'
Article 1503 states that the donation is reducible "to the extent necessary to
eliminate the impingement. "4  The language of this Article is subtly different
from that of its predecessor: "[a]ny disposal of property ... exceeding the
quantum of which a person may legally dispose to the prejudice of the forced
heirs, is not null, but only reducible to that quantum."2 43 The word quantum
238. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
239. La. Civ. Code art. 1503 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1): "A donation, inter
vivos or morhis causa, that impinges upon the legitime of a forced heir is not null but is merely
reducible to the extent necessary to eliminate the impingement."
La. Civ. Code art. 1503 cmt. a explains: "This Article reproduces the substance of the first
paragraph of Article 1502 of the Civil Code of 1870."
Compare La. Civ. Code art. 1502 (prior to 1996 La. Acts No. 77) (in relevant part): "Any disposal
of property, whether inter vivos or mortis causa, exceeding the quantum of which a person may
legally dispose to the prejudice of the forced heirs, is not null, but only reducible to that quantum."
240. For a discussion of new Article 1499, see supra text accompanying notes 210-221.
241. La. Civ. Code art. 1503 cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) (citation added)
(emphasis added).
242. La. Civ. Code art. 1503 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
243. La. Civ. Code art. 1502 (prior to 1996 La. Acts No. 77).
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means a fraction, a fraction that represents the disposable portion.2" The
predecessor Article permitted the disposition to be reduced to the disposable
portion, not to be reduced to the extent necessary to eliminate the impingement.
Article 1503, by contrast, permits the disposition to be reduced ONLY to the
extent necessary to eliminate the impingement, making exempt from a reduction
action the usufruct of the surviving spouse and the power to dispose of
nonconsumables.45
The action of reduction may only be instituted after the death of the
donor2" which is no change in the law. 7  Under Article 1504, however, the
action to reduce is not limited to the forced heir or his heirs or assigns."" The
action may also be instituted by the legatees of a forced heir or "an assignee of
any of them [forced heir, his heir or legatee] who has an express conventional
assignment, made after the death of the decedent, of the right to bring ihe
action."' The comment acknowledges that the Article changes the law in part
by "requiring an 'express25 conventional... assignment' for an assignee to
be entitled to assert the personal action of the forced heir." '252 Personal action
in this Article is not synonymous with personal actions under the Code of Civil
244. La. Civ. Code art. 1495 (prior to 1995 La. Acts No. 77).
245. This conclusion is supported by the language found in Article 1499 (as amended by 1996
La. Acts No. 77, § I) (in relevant part):
A usufruct over the legitime in favor of the surviving spouse is a permissible burden that
does not impinge upon the legitime, whether it affects community property or separate
property, whether it is for life or a shorter period, whether or not the forced heir is a
descendant of the surviving spouse, and whether or not the usufructuary has the power
to dispose of nonconsumables.
(emphasis added).
246. La. Civ. Code art. 1504 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
247. La. Civ. Code art. 1503 (prior to 1996 La. Acts No. 77): "A donation inter vivoi,
exceeding the disposable quantum, retains all its effect during the life of the donor."
248. La. Civ. Code art. 1504: "On the death of the donor or testator, the reduction of the
donation, whether inter vivos or mortis causa, can be sued for only by forced heirs, or by their heirs
or assigns; neither the donees, legatees, nor creditors of the deceased can require that reduction nor
avail themselves of it."
249. La. Civ. Code art. 1504 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1). (emphasis added).
250. This term can only mean express as opposed to implied, a distinction that used to be
explicitly made in La. Civ. Code art. 1811 (prior to revision effective Jan. 1, 1985):
The proposition as well as the assent to a contract may be express or implied: Express
when evinced by words, either written or spoken; Implied, when it is manifested by
actions, even by silence or by inaction, in cases in which they can from circumstances be
supposed to mean, or by legal presumption are directed to be considered as evidence of
an assent.
The current equivalent Civil Code article that does not include the two terms, express and implied,
is La. Civ. Code art. 1927 (effective Jan. I, 1985).
251. The term conventional obligations is coextensive with contracts. See La. Civ. Code, Book
1I1, Title IV, Conventional Obligations or Contracts. A conventional assignment is a contractual
assignment meaning nothing more than it was created by agreement of the parties and obligations
were created, modified, or extinguished. La. Civ. Code art. 1906 (effective Jan. i, 1985).
252. La. Civ. Code art. 1504 cmt. (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I) (emphasis added).
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Procedure. 3 Personal, furthermore, is not used in the context of this Article
to mean strictly personal under the Civil Code. 25 4 Nonetheless, in combination
with other sentences in the comment it may have been an attempt by the author
to suggest that a general creditor without an express conventional assignment2 5
may not assert the reduction action via an oblique action. ' The attempt may
253. La. Code Civ. P. art. 422 (in relevant part): "A personal action is one brought to enforce
an obligation against the obligor, personally and independently of the property which he may own,
claim, or possess."
254. La. Civ. Code art. 1766 (effective Jan. 1, 1985) (in relevant part):
An obligation is strictly personal when its performance can be enforced only by the
obligee, or' only against the obligor,
When the performance requires the special skill or qualification of the obligor, the
obligation is presumed to be strictly personal on the part of the obligor. All obligations
to perform personal services are presumed to be strictly personal on the part of the
obligor.
When the performance is intended for the benefit of the obligee exclusively, the
obligation is strictly personal on the part of that obligee.
That is not true of the reduction action which is transferable between living persons (thus heritable
under La. Civ. Code art. 1765) under Article 1504 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) by
express conventional assignment made after the death of the decedent and which is heritable because
its performance may be enforced by a successor (assignee, heir or legatee) of the forced heir (obligee)
under La. Civ. Code art. 1765.
255. "It changes the law in part by requiring an 'express conventional assignment' for an
assignee to be entitled to assert the personal action of the forced heir." La. Civ. Code art. 1504 cmt.
(as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) (emphasis added). The same comment defined an
assignee to include "a creditor as well as a donee or vendee." (emphasis added).
256. La. Civ. Code art. 2044 (effective Jan. 1, 1985) (in relevant part): "If an obligor causes or
increases his insolvency by failing to exercise a right, the obligee may exercise it himself, unless the
right Is strictly personal to the obligor." (emphasis added).
La. Civ. Code art. 2044 cmt. b elaborates on what is strictly personal: "Identification of those actions
which are 'strictly personal' is left to the discretion of the courts, guided by the provisions of the relevant
articles of this revision. See revised C.C. Arts. 1765 and 1766 (Rev. 1984), supra; Succession of
Henican, 248 So.2d 385 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971)."
Interestingly, although referring the reader back to La. Civ. Code arts. 1765 and 1766 may be circular,
the last few sentences of the comment to Article 1504 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) are
elucidating:
There is some possible conflict in the jurisprudence because of the earlier case of
Succession of Hentcan, 248 So.2d 385 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971), which held that a bank as
an unsecured creditor of a forced heir could not compel the forced heir to assert his rights as
a forced heir because those rights were strictly personal. A later case, Succession of Hurd,
489 So.2d 1029 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986), held that because of the supremacy of federal law
over state law a trustee in bankruptcy could assert the personal right of the bankrupt to
demand collation, which, like the right of the forced heir to assert an action to reduce, is also
a personal right. To the extent possible, the Article clarifies that a creditor should not have
the right to assert an action to reduce unless the creditor has an express conventional
assignment. The rule is consistent with Henican in every context other than a bankruptcy
context, and it is hoped, the rule will be held to apply even in that context.
At the time of the Henican case referred to in the comment to La. Civ. Code art. 2044 (effective Jan.
1, 1985) and in the comment to La. Civ. Code art. 1504 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § i),
Article 1991 of the Civil Code of 1870 read as follows:
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not be successful, however, without express language to that effect similar to the
language that appeared in the predecessor to Article 1504.'s' Interestingly, the
comment does not acknowledge the significant change contained in Article
1504-extending the "personal" action of the forced heir to reduce excessive
donations to assignees of his heirs or legatees.5 Personal is thus stretched
beyond recognition. Moreover, and most importantly, an expansion of the right
to institute a reduction action makes less sense now that forced heirship is
founded upon providing support for young or incapable descendants.
2. Calculation of the Active Mass
At least Article 1505, providing for "fictitious collation,"25 9 retains its
number under Act No. 77, despite two arguably significant changes in present law
contained in the first paragraph.sc As has always been the law under Article
1505,261 the first step in calculating the active mass of the "succession"2 2 is to
determine the net estate of the decedent by deducting the debts owed by the
decedent from the aggregate of his property. 63 The first significant change made
There are rights of the debtor, however, which the creditor can not exercise, even should he
refuse to avail himself of them. They can not require the separation of property between
husband and wife; nor can they oblige their debtor io accept a donation inter vivos made to
him, nor can they accept it in his stead. Neither can they call on a coheir of the debtor to
collate, when such debtor has not exercised that right.
By being explicit, prior law [Article 1991 (1870)] did not require utilizing a category of obligations that
for purposes of exercise of the oblique action is not parallel.
257. La. Civ. Code art. 1504 (prior to 1996 La. Acts No. 77).
258. La. Civ. Code art. 1504 (prior to 1996 La, Acts No. 77):
On the death of the donor or testator, the reduction of the donation, whether inter vtvos
or mortis causa, can be sued for only by forced heirs, or by their heirs or assigns; neither
the donees, legatees, nor creditors of the deceased can require that reduction nor avail
themselves of it.
(emphasis added).
259. Succession of Fakier, 541 So. 2d 1372 (La. 1988).
260. La. Civ. Code art. 1505 cmt. a (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I): "Civil Code
Article 1505(A) has been modified slightly to coordinate with La. R.S. 9:2372 as adopted by act 40:2
of 1995, and to change the date of valuation."
261. La. Civ. Code art. 1505(A), (B) (prior to 1996 La. Acts No. 77). In interpreting the two
paragraphs together, in combination with La. Civ. Code art. 1504 (prior to 1996 La. Acts No. 77),
which denies the creditors of the deceased an action in reduction, the debts are subtracted from the
assets of the deceased before the donations inter vivos are added back. See Samuel et al., supra now
227, at 343.
262. Note that the title to this Article reads, "Calculation of disposable portion on mass of
succession." (emphasis added). Succession as used in the title to this Article is not used to descrilb
the process of transmission of the decedent's estate as the term is defined in La. Civ. Code art. 871.
Instead the term is used to denote estate liberally interpreted in La. Civ. Code art. 872.
263. La. Civ. Code art. 1505(A), (B) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1). Literally,
paragraph A suggests that before the debts of the deceased are subtracted the donations inter vivos
must be added back to the extant property of the deceased. The more subtle language of La. Civ.
Code art. 1504 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) denying the reduction action to creditors
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by Article 1505(A) is that the donations to be added back "fictitiously" to determine
the active mass of the decedent's "succession" are limited to those made within
three years of the decedent's death,2' whereas under old Article 1505 all
donations regardless of when made were added back.2" Restricting fictitious
collation to donations inter vivos made within three years of the decedent's death
represents the culmination of a series of amendments to the Revised Statutes begun
in 1981 by applying the restriction to donations made within three years of death
to a charitable, educational, or religious organization2" and a subsequent
"attempt" in 1995 to extend the restriction to all donations made by the dece-
dent. 67 "Attempt" is used to describe the last amendment, because Section 2 of
the 1995 Act read: "The provisions of this Act shall apply to all donations inter
vivos made on or after January 1, 1996."'26 The legislature amended and
reenacted the same section of the Revised Statutes that had provided charitable
organizations with significant protection from the action in reduction by forced
heirs. In addition, the contents of the new section were made applicable only to
gifts made after January 1, 1996. Thus, the protection afforded to charitable
organizations, to whom gifts were made prior to 1996, may have been jeopardized.
"Act 402 may have tacitly repealed previous R.S. 9:2372 which provided an
exemption to gifts to charitable organizations made more than three years before
the donor died, so that curative legislation is truly needed." '69 Practically, the
extension of similar protection to all donees may not have been achieved since the
amendment only applied to gifts made after January 1, 1996. One view expressed
in a comment to Act No. 77 noted:270 older Louisiana citizens would have made
many more donations prior to January 1, 1996.
of the deceased who have no express conventional assignment still supports the interpretation of the
two paragraphs (A & B) that the donations inter vivos are not added back before the deduction of
debts owed by the decedent.
264. La. Civ. Code art. 1505(A) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) (in relevant part):
"to that is fictitiously added the property disposed of by donation inter vivos within three years of
the date of the donor's death."
265. La. Civ. Code art. 1505(A) (prior to 1996 La. Acts No. 77) (in relevant part): "to that is
fictitiously added the property disposed of by donation inter vivos. .. in the state in which it was
at the period of the donation."
266. La. R.S. 9:2372 (1991) (as added by 1981 La. Acts No. 740, § 1) (prior to amendment by
1995 La. Acts No. 402, § 1).
267. La. R.S. 9:2372 (Supp. 1996) (as amended by 1995 La. Acts No. 402, § 1).
268. 1995 La. Acts No. 402, § 2.
269. La. Civ. Code art. 1505 cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
270. La. Civ. Code art. 1503 cmt. a (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1):
Under La. R.S. 9:2372 there is a three year cut off on including gifts in the calculation
of the "active mass" to determine the forced portion as well as to be subject to the action
to reduce. Section 2 of Act 402 may have been unnecessarily restrictive, in limiting the
application of that act to donations made on and after January 1, 1996, and this revision
contains a provision to make it more effective. Under Article 1505(A) of this revision
whether gifts are of an equal value or not in the same year, if they were given three or
more years before the decedent dies, they would not be included under any circumstances.
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The second change in the first paragraph of Article 1505 may well be as
significant in impact as the first change described above-valuing the donations
inter vivos as of the date of the donation."' Prior to the amendment to Article
1505 by Act No. 77, property donated inter vivos that was fictitiously added back
to the net estate of the deceased was valued as of the date of death. Valuing
the property at the date of death was consistent with the theory that the law
reserved to forced heirs a portion of the estate of the deceased as it would have
existed at his death had he not disposed of some of his property by donation.273
The rationale underlying the legislative choice of a different valuation date is not
as obvious. For what purpose, since it is clearly not to recreate the decedent's
estate as it would have existed at his death, would the Legislature choose the
date of the donation?
The effect of the change in valuation dates is that appreciating assets, i.e.
immovable property or certain incorporeal movables, will be included in the
calculation at their lower value, the net effect of which is to reduce the total amount
of the forced portion. By contrast, depreciating assets, i.e. many corporeal
movables, will be added back at their highest value, the net effect of which is to
increase the total amount of the forced portion. Where the decedent's property
consists principally of immovable or incorporeal property, the change in valuation
date combined with the change of including only donations made within three years
271. La. Civ. Code art. 1505(A) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) (in relevant part):
"to that is fictitiously added the property disposed of by donation inter vivos within three years of
the date of the donor's death, according to its value at the time of the donation." (emphasis added).
See also La. Civ. Code art. 1508 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § i) that complements
Article 1505 by providing "[w]hen the property of the estate is not sufficient to satisfy the forced
portion, a forced heir may recover the amount needed to satisfy his legitime from the donees of Inter
vivos donations made within three years of the date of the decedent's death."
272. La. Civ. Code art. 1505(A) (prior to 1996 La. Acts No. 77) (in relevant part): "to that is
fictitiously added the property disposed of by donation inter vivas, according to its value at the time
,of the donor's decease, in the state in which it was at the period of the donation." (emphasis added).
273. C. Civ. (Fr.) art. 922 provides as did La. Civ. Code art. 1505 (prior to 1996 La. Acts No.
77) that donations are fictitiously added back to the net estate at the value of the property given at
the time of the decedent's death. In 1938 the French amended the Code Civil to provide that the day
of valuation was the date of the gift, just as La. Civ. Code art. 1505 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts
No. 77, § 1). This proved unsatisfactory and the jurisprudence invented a method of proportional
reduction that was enacted by legislation in 1971. As of 1971. just as in the Code Napoleon,
donations inter vivos in the active mass are valued as of the date of death and impingement is
determined at this value.
However, C. Civ. art. 868, al. I, was amended to provide that if a gift is partially reducible, one
determines what is the fraction of the gift that impinges the legitime on the day of death. The
reduction is equal to the excessive fraction of the gift, evaluated as of the day of the partition. For
example, the de cujus has three children. Existing property at death is worth 40. He donated
property to a third party worth 40 on the day of the donation, 80 on the day of death, and 100 on
the day of the partition. The active mass is 40 + 80 = 120. (C. Civ. 922) The disposable portion
under French law is one fourth, or 30. The excessiveness of the gift is thus (80 -30)/80 - 5/8. The
donee owes 5/8 of 100, or 62.5. Philippe Malaurie, Cours de Droit Civil, Les Successions, Les
Liberalites, Nos. 667-670 (1989).
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of the donor's death will significantly decrease the value of the forced portion,
which was reserved as support for young or incapable children. In such a case, this
result is another example of a developing pattern evidencing a hostility to forced
heirs who now include only those children whom the law assumes need support.
Article 1505 continues to exclude from the active mass calculation the
premiums paid on and proceeds payable from life insurance on the donor's life.. 4
and the contributions paid to and benefits payable from governmental or otherwise
qualified deferred compensation plans.2 s However, the exclusion of gifts of
equal value made to "each forced heir and the root represented by each forced heir"
during a calendar year was eliminated,27 because the redactors concluded that
"[t]here is no need for such a provision in light of the adoption of a three year cut
off period as provided in La. R.S. 9:2372 as adopted by Act 402 of 1995, and
Article 1505(A) of this revision."'
The calculation of the active mass only includes remunerative7 . and
onerous279 donations if the value of the thing given exceeds by one-half the
services rendered or charges imposed and then only the difference between the
value of the gift and the value of the services rendered and charges imposed may
be included.2 s In an effort to provide for two self contained articles, Act No. 77
incorporates the substance of Article 1526 into the two articles on reducing
remunerative and onerous donations.'s'. The expression of the formula contained
274. La. Civ. Code art.. 1505(C) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1). SeealsoLa. Civ.
Code art. 1505 cmt. c.
Compare La. Civ. Code art. 1505(C) (prior to 1996 La. Acts No. 77).
275. La. Civ. Code art. 1505(D) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I). See also La. Civ.
Code art. 1505 cmt. c.
Compare La. Civ. Code art. 1505(D) (prior to 1995 La. Acts No. 77).
276. La. Civ. Code art. 1502 (prior.to 1996 La. Acts No. 77) (in relevant part):
Any donation inter vivos, from the donor to his descendants, exceeding the quantum of
which a person may legally dispose to the prejudice of forced heirs, is not reducible to
that quantum if each such forced heir and the root represented by each forced heir
receives the same value of property by donation inter vivos during the calendar year.
Such donation inter vivos shall not be included in the calculation of the disposable portion
as set forth in Article 1234 nor as set forth in Article 1505.
277. La. Civ. Code art. 1503 cmt. a (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I).
278. La.Civ. Code art. 1523: "There are three kinds of donations inter vivos: ... The
remunerative donation, or that the object of which is to recompense for services rendered."
La. Civ. Code art. 1525: "The remunerative donation is not a real donation, if the value of the
services to be recompensed thereby being appreciated in money, should be little inferior to that of
the gift"
279. La. Civ. Code art. 1523: "There are three kinds of donations inter vivos: ... The onerous
donation, or that which is burdened with charges imposed on the donee."
La. Civ. Code art. 1524: "The onerous donation is not a real donation, if the value of the object
given does not manifestly exceed that of the charges imposed on the donee."
280. The comment to both La. Civ. Code arts. 1510 and 1511 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts
No. 77, § 1) suggests that the two articles clarify "some ambiguities existing under prior law ...."
281. For example, the comment to La. Civ. Code art. 1511 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No.
77, § I) reads as follows: "This Article reproduces the substance of Article 1514 of the Louisiana
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in Article 1526, which was designed for the purpose of determining whether the
principal reason2 2 the donor acted was to bestow a liberality or to compensate
for past services rendered or to receive the advantages of charges imposed, has been
changed by inverting the fraction on the other side of the equation. 3
The value of a remunerative donation is not included in the calcula-
tion of the forced portion, and the donation may not be reduced, unless
the value of the remunerated services is less than two-thirds the value
of the property donated at the time of the donation, in which event the
gratuitous portion is included in the calculation and is subject to
reduction.
2 4
Article 152683 remains in Chapter 5 of Title II of Book III of the Civil
Code without change so that two differently worded formulas for determining the
principal cause of the donor appear in the Civil Code as mirror images of each
other." 6 The result reached by the application of the Articles before and after
Act No. 77 is the same.2" However, by repeating the formula in Chapter :3
Civil Code (1870). It clarifies the law as to the formula to apply .... Its provisions are similar to
those of Civil Code Article 1526."
282. "Reason" is used to express "cause" which La. Civ. Code art. 1967 defines as "the reason
why a party obligates himself."
283. The comment to La. Civ. Code art. 1510 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I)
explains: "[1]t simplifies the formula to determine the value to be included in the calculation. Its
provisions are similar to those of Civil Code Article 1526."
284. La. Civ. Code art. 1510 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1). Article 1511 of Act
No. 77 of 1996 contains the very same formulation for onerous donations:
The value of an onerous donation is not included in the calculation of the forced portion,
and the donation may not be reduced, unless the value of the charges is less than two-
thirds the value of the property donated at the time of the donation, in which even the
gratuitous portion is included in the calculation and is subject to reduction'
285. "In consequence, the rules peculiar to donations inter vivos do not apply to onerous and
remunerative donations, except when the value of the object given exceeds by one-half that of the
charges or of the services." La. Civ. Code art. 1526 (emphasis added).
286. See discussion in Averette v. Jordan, 457 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984). The court
cites among other authorities an article written by Professor J. Denson Smith, Conventional
Obligations, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Courtfor the 1958-1959 Term, 20 La. L. Rev. 224
(1960).
287. The result before Act No. 77 of 1996 follows from interpreting Articles 1526, 1513, and
1514 (prior to 1996 La. Acts No. 77) together.
"In consequence, the rules peculiar to donations inter vivos do not apply to onerous and
remunerative donations, except when the value of the object given exceeds by one-half that of the
charges or of the services." La. Civ. Code art. 1526 (1870).
"Remunerative donations can never be reduced below the estimated value of the services
rendered." La. Civ. art. 1513 (prior to 1996 La. Acts No. 77).
"Donations, by which charges are imposed on the donee, can never be reduced below the expenses
which the donee has incurred to perform them." La. Civ. Code art. 1514 (prior to 1996 La. Acts No.
77).
La. Civ. Code art. 1511 cmt. (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1):
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that appears in Chapter 5, which was to apply for all purposes not simply the
action in reduction, the redactors raise the specter of the necessity of repeating
the formula in every other article where it may have specific application.
Furthermore, the formula is expressed differently in the two chapters. For
purposes of consistency and symmetry the formulas should be the same. The
redactors have ignored the beauty and simplicity that the seamless whole of a
civil code represents and instead have adopted what is becoming all too common
in Louisiana, the drafting technique of a common law lawyer who attempts to
make a statute contain every principle and every definition that could possibly
govern its application.
Reminder: This is a provision of Act No. 77 that may not be entirely
effective because Civil Code article 1505(B) was also amended and affected by
Act No. 1180. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2501(A) states that Act No. 1180
applies to the successions of all persons who die after December 31, 1995.
F. Credits to the Legitime: "Defensive Collation" or "Imputation"
Even though the Louisiana State Law Institute had recommended the repeal
of the law of collation,28 it decided to retain the concept of "defensive
collation" or "imputation" whenever a forced heir seeks reduction. The doctrine
of "defensive collation" or "imputation,"2"9 long recognized by Louisiana
This Article reproduces the substance of Article 1514 of the Louisiana Civil Code (1870).
It clarifies the law as to the formula to apply, and it further clarifies the law by providing
that where a donation is both onerous and gratuitous it can only be reduced to the extent
that it is purely gratuitous. Its provisions are similar to those of Civil Code Article 1526.
288. Initially, the section of House Bill No. 55 (what became Act-No. 77) that recommended
the repeal of the law of collation presented the problem of whether issues of collation were in the
call for the special session. The call for the Special Session listed numerous items, and House Bill
No. SS that included amendments to the law of forced heirship was obviously contemplated by Item
No. 121: "To legislate relative to forced heirship; to provide as to forced heirs, to disposable
portion, the effect of testaments and otherwise to provide with respect thereto." (emphasis added).
The call for the special session was very specific and narrowly phrased purposefully to exclude
from consideration the more comprehensive bill introduced in both the House of Representatives and
then the Senate during the 1995 Regular Session of the Legislature on recommendation of the
Louisiana State Law Institute that had included the repeal of collation. See S. 1379, 1995 Session.
See discussion of some of the provisions of that bill in this symposium at 57 La. L. Rev. 147-99 and
the Appendix to this Symposium at 57 La. L. Rev. 201, reproducing the bill.
On January 1. 1996, by virtue of the repeal of La. Civ. Code art. 1236 (1870), restricting collation
to forced heirs, collation had been divorced from forced heirship because the obligation had been
extended to all descendants coming to the succession. La. Civ. Code arts. 1228, 1235. If the repeal
of collation was not within the call for the special session then its inclusion in House Bill No. 55
threatened the nullity of the entire bill. La. Const. Art. III, § 2. Representative Jim Donelon on the
floor of the House of Representatives requested a ruling from the Speaker of the House Hunt Downer
about the germaneness of the repeal of collation. Speaker Downer ruled that the repeal of collation
was within the call for the special session.
289. Charles C. Aubry & Charles C. Rau, Droit Civil Francais § 684b, at 234 n.35 in 3 Civil
Law Translation (La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1971). See infra text accompanying note 293.
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jurisprudence,'" is now incorporated into the Civil Code by Act No. 77.2"1
Article 1501 provides that if a forced heir asserts his right to reduce excessive
donations, lifetime inter vivos gifts received by him from the decedent with a
few notable exceptions will be "credited" to his legitime.2 92 The "credit" need
not be raised by another descendant as would be the case of "actual collation";
it is in the nature of a defense or exception of no cause of action to the forced
heir's claim for reduction. The principle underlying the "credit," or defense, is
that the forced heir can not complain that he failed to receive his forced portion
if he received it or any part of it in advance. Thus, the court would "impute"
those gifts made to the forced heir by the decedent when the issue was raised by
any donee, descendant or not, as a defense to an action for reduction. 3 What
developed in doctrine and the jurisprudence recognizing imputation was the
importation of rules from the law of collation that recognized some gifts were
not intended to be imputed to the forced heir's inheritance-those designated by
the parent as extra portions or treated by the law as exempt from collation.
Article 1501 represents the statutory incorporation of "defensive collation" or
imputation. Both "actual collation" and "defensive collation" purport to
constitute a type of credit to the legitime of the forced heir once his share is
determined under Article 1505. With the repeal of "actual" collation the
possibility existed that "defensive collation" was also repealed, thus, the necessity
for incorporating the concept in Article 1501.
Article 1501 of Act No. 77 mandates, although the comment observes, "not
inflexibly,"2  that donations inter vivos.. made at any time to the forced
heir' or "in trust for his benefit, if the trust conforms to the provisions of the
290. Succession of Hendrick, 430 So. 2d 734 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
291. La. Civ. Code art: 1501 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1). The title to the
Article describes its contents as "inter vires donation to forced heir applied towards legitime, testator
may declare otherwise."
292. La. Civ. Code art. 1501.
293. 3 Aubry & Rau, supra note 289, § 684b, at 234 n.35:
It has been objected in vain that donees or legatees cannot demand collation of donations
made to one of the successors, and that this would indirectly require the donee or legatee
of a portion in advance of his inheritance, to collate in their favor by obligating him to
impute his donation to the reserve. Indeed, this imputation does not constitute a collation.
The donee or legatee who claims the imputation does not demand any portion whatever
in kind of the things given or bequeathed to the successor, nor any portion of their value;
in defending the action for reduction instituted against him, he is limited to an exception
of no cause of action based upon the fact that the plaintiff has received his reserved
portion in advance and consequently, has nothing to claim.
294. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. a (as amended by 1996 La Acts No. 77, § 1): "This Article
does not apply inflexibly to make all gifts, inheritances or legacies automatically be credited towards
the legitime. It only becomes operative when and if the forced heir asserts his rights."
295. One type of donation inter viros excluded from the "credit" of Article 1501 is that of a
usufruct or of an income interest in trust. See La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. j (as amended by 1996 La.
Acts No. 77, § 1). See also La. Civ. Code art. 1502 cmt. c (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
296. One issue immediately to consider is whetherforced heir includes the grandchildren who
are mentally or physically incapable of caring for their persons or administering their estates who are
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Louisiana Trust Code governing the legitime in trust" '97 and "the value of any
inheritance or legacy to the forced heir" be credited toward satisfaction of his
legitime. 8  "Not inflexibly" means, according to comment (a), that the
"credit" only "becomes operative when and if the forced heir asserts his
rights." 299  Clearly, the Article supports that observation since it begins,
"[w]hen a forced heir asserts his right to reduce excessive donations."" This
feature of the "credit" of Article 1501 distinguishes it from other similar
concepts: the "credit" of proceeds of life insurance and benefits from pension
and profit sharing plans is "inflexible" or automatic. Under Article 1501, the
imputation is under the parent's control; whereas, under Article 1505 the
imputation appears to be automatic.
3 0
extended the right to represent their predeceased parent regardless of how old that parent would be
at the time of the decedent's death. La. Civ. Code art. 1493(C) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No.
77, § 1). Article 1493(C) does not describe these grandchildren as "forced heirs" and their parent
who was over the age of twenty-four at the decedent's death is not a "forced heir." La. Civ. Code
art. 1493(A) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1). Consider the impact of La. Civ. Code art.
1493 rev. cmt. e (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1): "It should be noted that a grandchild
of any age who is disabled does not qualify as a forced heir unless the grandchild's parent
predeceases the grandparent." (emphasis added). See also La. Civ. Code art. 1235 rev. cmt. c (as
amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
297. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I).
See also Article 1501 cmL h:
If the gift or legacy to the forced heir is in trust, the provisions of the Louisiana Trust
Code that mandate certain requirements for the protection of a forced heir, such as the
requirement that income be distributed not less than annually, or that a legitime trust
terminate upon the benefic*iary's death, unless it is subject to an income interest of a
surviving spouse, obviously must apply to the trust or the legacy should not be credited
toward satisfaction of the legitime. See La. R.S. 9:1841 et. seq. If the trust is a Louisiana
trust, then the Trust Code would automatically make it subject to the provisions of the
Trust Code, but if the trust is an out-of-state trust that could not be so amended, then the
value of the gift or legacy to the trust should not be credited.
298. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1):
When a forced heir asserts his right to reduce excessive donations, the value of all
donations inter vivos made at any time to him or in trust for his benefit, if the trust
conforms to the provisions of the Louisiana Trust Code governing the legitime in trust,
valued at the time of the gift, shall be credited toward satisfaction of his legitime....
In addition, the value of any inheritance or legacy to the forced heir, or for his benefit
in a trust that conforms to the provisions of the Louisiana Trust Code governing the
legitime in trust, shall be credited toward satisfaction of his legitime even if he renounces
all or any part of the inheritance or legacy.
299. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. a (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
300. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I) (in relevant part).
301. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) exempts from the
"credit" donations that are declared by the donor to be extra portions, usual or customary donations,
as well as certain enumerated expenses. The proceeds of life insurance and the benefits from
pensions and profit sharing plans are automatically "credited" to satisfy the forced heir's legitime,




Prior to Act No. 77, the legislative "credit" to the legitime of a forced heh
that most closely resembles the "credit" of Article 1501 is the use of the
proceeds from life insurance and the death benefits from pension and profit
sharing plans to satisfy the forced heir's legitime.01 In both instances the
proceeds and the donations inter vivos to be credited are excluded from the
active mass calculation upon which the legitime is determined.303 The result
is to reduce the size of the legitime by first excluding those sums from the
calculation. Article 1505 is legislative precedent for excluding proceeds payable
at death received by the forced heir from the active mass calculation and then
satisfying the legitime by the same proceeds. Article 1501 "credits" not only
legacies or inheritances received at the death of the decedent and any life
insurance proceeds and benefits from pension plans, but also all donations inter
vivos made by the decedent at any time during the forced heir's lifetime, even
those made more than three years prior to death. So excluding the gifts for the
purpose of calculating the forced heir's legitime, but including the same gifts for
purposes of assuming that the heir has already received his legitime in advance,
further exacerbates the result for the forced heir.
The comments to Article 1501 explain that the rule for crediting lifetime
gifts to the forced heir "implements a rule of fairness that a forced heir cannot
claim that his legitime has not been satisfied and at the same time refuse to give
credit for significant inter vivos gifts that the parent made to him."314  This
policy, noted later in the same comment, is referred to as the t'anti-'double..
dipping' rule."3 5  The argument that "double-dipping" was the motive for
Article 1501 would be more persuasive and convincing if the "credit" applied
only to donations inter vivos made within three years of decedent's death. Is it
fair to use only donations inter vivos made within three years of the decedent's
death to calculate the forced heir's inheritance rights and ALL donations inter
vivos received by the forced heir during the decedent's lifetime to satisfy those
more limited inheritance rights?
As a consequence of assuring that a forced heir does not "double-dip" but
that the rule is "a rule of fairness," Article 1501 borrows from the law of
collation, which the redactors had intended to repeal, for the purpose of
achieving some balance. Just as "imputation" of gifts to the legitime had
302. La. Civ. Code art. 1505(C), (D) (prior to Act No. 77 of 1996).
303. The proceeds of life insurance and the benefits from pension and profit sharing plans under
Article 1505(C) and (D) prior to Act No. 77 were excluded from the active mass calculation. The
same proceeds and benefits continue to be excluded from the active mass calculation under Article
1505(C) and (D) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I). but in addition all donations inter vivo.r
made more than three years before the decedent's death are excluded under Article 1505(A) (as
amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1). Of course, the inheritances and legacies received by a
forced heir are included in the calculation as assets belonging to the deceased from which
inheritances and legacies are to be paid. La. Civ. Code art. 1505(A) (prior to 1996 La. Acts No. 77)
and La. Civ. Code art. 1505(A) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I).
304. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
305. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
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borrowed from the law of collation and, as a consequence is often referred to as
"defensive collation," so, too, does the "credit" of Article 1501. The second
sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1501 does not require the "crediting"
of lifetime gifts to the forced heir if the donor declares them to be extra portions,
or if they are usual or customary donations, or if they represent the expenses of
board, support, or education, even those paid through the age of twenty-three
years."°  According to the comment, "it would be ... unfair to require a
forced heir to account for every gift that he ever received, regardless of its value
or the circumstances of its donation."0 7  Such gifts, after all, are rarely
intended to be in advance of eventual inheritance rights.
Under Article 1501, if the decedent who makes a lifetime gift to a forced.
heir declares it "an extra portion," extra in the sense of over and above what the
law has reserved for him308 and thus, not given in advance of what the forced
heir one day would receive,"° the gift is not credited to the forced heir's
legitime. The option to exempt life insurance proceeds or the benefits of pension
and profit sharing plans does not exist. Although the ability of the donor to
exempt a gift from the "credit" of Article 1501 is similar in this respect to
collation,310 it differs from collation31 because Article 1501 does not pre-
scribe any formal requirements for "the declaration."3 '2  Declared suggests
306. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I): "This rule does not
apply to donations that are declared by the donor to be extra portions, and usual or customary
donations, as well as expenses of board, support, or education, even those paid through the age of
twenty.three."
307. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I).
308. Compare La. Civ. Code art. 1231:
But things given or bequeathed to children or other descendants by their ascendants, shall
not be collated, if the donor has formally expressed his will that what he thus gave was
an advantage or extra part, unless the value of the object given exceed the disposable
portion, in which case the excess is subject to collation.
309. La. Civ. Code art. 1229:
The obligation of collating is founded on the equality which must be naturally observed
between children and other lawful descendants... and also on the presumption that what
was given or bequeathed to children by their ascendants was so disposed of in advance
of what they might one day expect from their succession.
310. La. Civ. Code art. 1231.
311. La. Civ. Code art. 1232, in relevant part: "The declaration that the gift or legacy is made
as an advantage or extra portion may be made in the instrument where such disposition is contained,
even afterwards by an act passed before a notary and two witnesses, or in the donor's last will and
testament."
312. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. c (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1):
This Article intentionally does not set forth any formal requirements for the manifestation
of the "declaration." The declaration may be written or oral. It does not have to be in
the form of a will; ii may be in any form acceptable to the court to establish to the
satisfaction of the court that the donor intends that the value of the gift not be applied
toward satisfaction of the legitime. The thrust, then, is not form but substance: the donor




that the exemption of a gift from the "credit" of Article 1501 does require at
least an oral or written statemen 31  by the decedent that is unequivocal 4
and indicative of his intent."' Although a comment to the Article contains an
example that is ambiguous," 6 actions of the decedent should not be sufficient.
Furthermore, the declaration to exempt a gift from the "credit" can be made at
any time by the donor prior to his death.
If a lifetime gift is usual or customary, the gift is likewise exempt from the
"credit" toward his legitime in an effort to avoid "extortionate wrangling over
relatively insignificant gifts." '' Under the law of collation, "things given by
a father, mother or other ascendant, by their own hands, to one of their children
for his pleasure or other use" are not subject to collation .3 " As interpreted in
Succession of Gomez, 319 the gifts described are manual gifts of corporeal
movables32 that are "things usual for parents of this country to give to a child
without thought or regard to his having to account for them to his co-heirs."32'
The court continued by adding, "[t]he word 'pleasure' has special significance
in this respect because it best describes the motive that usually prompts the
giving of such things. 32  By contrast, Article 1501 credits "usual or custom-
ary" gifts, whether of corporeal or incorporeal property, or of movable or
313. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. c (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § i).
314. La. Civ. Code art. 1233.
315. La. Civ. Code art. 1927 (effective Jan. 1, 1985) recognizes that consent can be expressed
orally, in writing, or by action or inaction "that under the circumstances is clearly indicative of
consent."
316. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. a (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1):
The following example illustrates the importance of the predicate (that the forced heir be
asserting his right to reduce excessive donations before the "credit" of this Article is
triggered]. Suppose that the will leaves Blackacre to Child A and then "leaves the forced
portion to my three children A, B and C." It should be apparent in that case that the
testator intends the legacy of Blackacre to Child A as an extra portion, and A is not
required to credit the value of that legacy toward satisfaction of the legitime.
(emphasis added).
The example in the comment surely demonstrates the importance of the predicate as there will be
no "credit" under the hypothetical facts of the example because A receives his legitime at the very
least and will not be bringing an action to reduce "excessive donations." What is confusing about
the comment is the italicized language: should the testator's intent be apparent if he does not
"declare" he intends Blackacre to A as an extra portion? Furthermore, to be discussed in the text at
infra note 349, the exemption from the "credit" of Article 1501 if the donor declares a donation to
be an extra portion applies only to donations inter vivos by construction of the three sentences in the
paragraph.
317. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
318. La. Civ. Code art. 1245 (1870).
319. 223 La. 859, 67 So. 2d 156 (1953).
320. La. Civ. Code arts. 1539, 471.
321. 223 La. at 875, 67 So. 2d at 161.
322. Id. at 875-76, 67 So. 2d at 162. "The language the redactors chose to describe this kind
of giving was broad and elastic enough to keep apace of changes in our social development." Id.
at 676, 67 So. 2d at 162.
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immovable property. By extending the exemption from the "credit" to both
incorporeal movable property and immovable property, the redactors abandon the
notion that certain gifts based on the type of property given are of such
negligible value323 that the donor would not have intended that such gifts be
accounted for at his death by crediting the gifts to the donee's legitime.
Furthermore, "usual or customary" is not necessarily coextensive with the
interpretation of "for his pleasure or other use." The words usual or customary
in Civil Code article 2349 require concurrence of the spouses for the donation
of community property unless the gift is usual or customary "of a value
commensurate with the economic position of the spouses at the time of the
donation."32' A gift is usual, even if not customary, when the gift is an
ordinary one that a parent would give to a child-money for a movie, an
allowance. A gift is customary if it is given on an occasion for which it is the
custom or tradition to receive gifts, such as a birthday, Christmas, wedding, or
anniversary. 2 After admitting that the redactors borrowed the phrase "usual
or customary" from matrimonial regimes law, the comment to Article 1501
continues by expressing an intent that the borrowed phrase receive the same
interpretation given to Civil Code article 1245 in the law of collation; 326 but,
of course comments are not the law.?2" Furthermore, by borrowing only part
of the phrase from Civil Code article 2349,2' the redactors at least accomplish
the purpose of adopting an objective, rather than subjective, standard by which
to judge gifts. The court should consider whether these gifts are "usual or
customary" for any family, rather than "usual or customary" for this particular
323. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I): "On the other
hand, it would be equally unfair to require a forced heir to account for every gift that he ever
received, regardless of its value."
324. La. Civ. Code art. 2349 (1979)..
325. Katherine S. Spaht & W. Lee Hargrave Hargrave, Matrimonial Regimes § 5.16, in 16
Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1989 and Supp. 1996).
The examples recited in the text that find their source in the Matrimonial Regimes treatise also
appear in La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1):
He [forced heir] should not be required to account for the silver spoon given to him as
a baby, or any other gifts that parents in general regularly give to their children, such as
birthday presents, Christmas presents, and the like. To avoid petty disputes in that regard,
or extortionate wrangling over relatively insignificant gifts, the Article exempts "usual or
customary" donations from the rule requiring that inter vivos gifts be credited toward
satisfaction of the legitime.
326. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1): "The phrase
'usual or customary' is taken directly from Civil Code Article 2349 regarding donations of
community property but in fact is intended to be closer to analogous rules in the area of collation.
Civil Code Article 1245 provided an exemption from collation for usual or customary manual gifts."
(emphasis added).
327. 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 4.
328. La. Civ. Code art. 2349: "The donation of community property to a third person requires
the concurrence of the spouses, but a spouse acting alone may make a usual or customary gift of a




family. 2' The language of exemption for "usual or customary" gifts represents
a hybrid resulting from borrowing indiscriminately from matrimonial regimes law
to accomplish a purpose more recognizable in the law of collation.
Another exemption from the "credit" required for donations exists for
"expenses of board, support, or education, even those paid through the age of
twenty-three."330  Expenditures for board, support, or education are not
ordinarily considered "donations." During a child's minority, a parent is legally
obligated to maintain, support, and educate the child.33' Even after a child
reaches majority, an obligation continues to provide the basic necessities to a
needy descendant, but not an education. 32 Although expenses for support or
education for a major child may not constitute a donation, such expenses may
well fall within the rubric of "advantages.1333  In fact, in Article 1501 the
clause containing the enumerated expenses does not modify the noun dona-
tions,"u thus posing the larger question of whether Article 1501 restricts the
"credit" to donations only or, by virtue of the exemption for certain expenses,
contemplates that "advantages" as well as donations must be credited. The
comment to Article 1501 suggests that the redactors were only concerned with
eliminating the argument that such expenses, even if not legal obligations, were
329. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I):
The focus of the provision is not what might be customary for this particular family, but
what is usual or customary for families in general. If the gift is of the kind that parents
customarily make to their children, then the gift should not be credited toward the
legitime. If the parent gives the child a Rolls Royce for a birthday present, then a court
should conclude that such a gift is not a "usual or customary" donation, but when the
birthday gift is relatively modest or more normal one, then the policy of this Article is
that the heir does not have to account for it.
330. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77. § 1).
331. La. Civ. Code arts. 227. 230; La. R.S. 9:315.22C (1993) (continuation of child support for
unmarried child under the age of nineteen who is a full-time student in good standing in a secondary
school and who is dependent upon either parent). See also La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. d (as
amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
In Succession of Gomez, 223 La. 859, 67 So. 2d 156 (1953), the court concludes that the exclusion
of expenses of board, support, and education from the obligation of collation under La. Civ. Code
art. 1244 was coextensive with the expenses that constituted a legal obligation for parents under
either La. Civ. Code art. 227 or La. Civ. Code art. 229.
332. La. Civ. Code art. 229.
333. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. d (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1): "This
provision clarifies, if not acknowledges, that the payment of educational expenses, even when it is
not the result of a legal obligation to do so, does not constitute a gift. It thereby removes any
argument that the payment of these kinds of expenses might constitute a donation."
"Advantages" is a term used in the law of collation to incorporate "advantages" that a parent
bestows upon a child that are not donations in the strict sense but for which there should be an
accounting to a forced heir's siblings. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 1246, 1248.
334. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 (as amended by. 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I) (in relevant part):
"This rule does not apply to donations that are declared by the donor to be extra portions, and usual
or customary donations, as well as expenses of board, support, or education, even those paid through
the age of twenty-three."
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gifts. 3" Yet, the more serious argument could be that the exemption from "the
credit" for such expenses336 was intended to exclude certain "advantages" from
the scope of the "credit."337 Thus, the argument can be made that Article 1501
contemplates that "advantages" as well as donations must be "credited" to a
forced heir's legitime. Because the policy of Article 1501 is somewhat different
from that of the law of collation,3 it is hoped that the "credit" will not be
generally extended to "indirect" donations, or "advantages."
Whether expenses for board, support, or education constitute a donation or
an advantage received by the forced heir, Article 1501 excludes them from the
"credit" to the heir's legitime. More importantly, by contrast to collation, these
expenses are not to be credited to the legitime of the forced heir even if the
expenses were made after minority through the age of twenty-three. Although
there is no legal obligation to educate a child beyond majority,"' the comment
observes that "most parents continue to pay them [expenses of education]
through the child's graduation from college."3" The comment expresses the
view that, "[t]he policy of the Article is clear: the subvention of educational
335. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. d (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I). For text of
the comment see supra note 333.
336. La. Civ. Code art. 1244: "Neither the expenses of board, support, education and
apprenticeship are subject to collation, nor are marriage presents which do not exceed the disposable
portion."
"This provision had (sic] a direct counterpart in Civil Code Article 1244, regarding exemptions
from collation, but goes beyond that provision and clarifies that the rule applies to such expenses
even when they are paid beyond age eighteen and through age twenty-three." La. Civ. Code art.
1501 cmt. d (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
337. La. Civ. Code art. 1248:
The advantage which a father bestows upon his son, though in any other manner than by
donation or legacy, is likewise subject to collation. Thus, when a father has sold a thing
to his son at a very low price, or has paid for him the price of some purchase, for [or] has
spent money to improve his son's estate, all that is subject to collation.
See also La. Civ. Code arts. 2444; 2025-2027.
La. Civ. Code art. 1246: "The heir is not bound to collate the profits he has made from contracts
made with his ascendant to whom he succeeds unless the contracts, at the time of their being made,
gave the heir some indirect advantage."
These two examples appear to be the type of donation described in La. Civ. Code art. 1228 as
indirect.
Representative cases interpreting La. Civ. Code arts. 1248, 2444, and the action in declaration of
simulation include Succession of Webre, 247 La. 461, 172 So. 2d 285 (1965); Clark v. Hedden, 109
La. 147, 33 So. 116 (1902). Montgomery v. Chaney, 13 La. Ann. 207 (1858); Kinney v. Kinney, 150
So. 2d 671 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
338. La. Civ. Code art. 1229 reflects the policy of collation to equalize gifts and advantages
among children, and the policy reflected in La. Civ. Code art. 1501 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts
No. 77, § 1) is to assure that the forced heir who is seeking reduction has not already received his
inheritance from the decedent by lifetime gifts.
339. La. Civ. Code art. 230 (1992); La. R.S. 9:315.22(C) (1993). No obligation exists to educate
a child after majority unless the child is under the age of nineteen, a full-time student in good
standing in a secondary school and dependent on either parent.
340. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. d (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
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expenses is considered to be laudable and should not enter the picture in
determining the credit that a forced heir must give."""
Nonetheless, expenses of board, support, or education after age twenty-three
may be "credited" to the legitime of a child who is over the age of twenty-three
but is a forced heir because of a mental or physical incapacity. Consider, for
example, expenditures on behalf of such a child for the last two years of law
school; medical school and training; higher education later in life; and board,
support, and education for the mentally incapable child. In fact, by exempting
expenses for board, support, and education when the child is below the age of
twenty-four, the negative implication is that otherwise they would have been
considered donations and "credited" against the child's legitime. Thus, the result
is that board, support, or educational expenses paid for a child after age twenty-
three will be subject to a "credit," reducing what he receives even though he is
"permanently incapable of caring for himself or administering his property."
Remember that this incapable child needs as much support as he can receive.
Children who are mentally retarded and may have received board, support, and
education through the age of forty-five may well be required to "credit" those
expenses paid after they reached the age of twenty-four against what they will
receive as a legitime for their support. The beneficiary of the "credit" that works
to the serious detriment of the decedent's mentally retarded child and, ultimately
to society at large, will be in many cases legatees of the decedent. Those
legatees could be institutions, unrelated third persons, as well as other family
members. Is this good social policy? One explanation for the failure to consider
such hypothetical cases is that the Law Institute had recommended that the
mentally retarded child twenty-four years of age or older not be a forced
heir."2
If the Article only "credited" donations inter vivos made to, or "advantages"
received by, the forced heir, it would be less objectionable; but the Article also
"credits" the value "of) any inheritance or legacy to the forced heir." 3
Furthermore, the Article "credits" the inheritance or legacy EVEN IF THE
FORCED HEIR RENOUNCES ALL OR ANY PART OF THE INHERITANCE OR
LEGACY.' Only one type of legacy will not be "credited" according to the
comment 4 5 -a legacy of a usufruct or an income interest in trust.3 6  Fy
341. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. d (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
342. See supra text accompanying notes 152-157.
343. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
344. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) (in relevant part):
In addition, the value of any inheritance or legacy to the forced heir, or for his benefit in
a trust that conforms to the provisions of the Louisiana Trust Code governing the legitime
in trust, shall be credited toward satisfaction of his legitime even if he renounces all or
any part of the inheritance or legacy.
345. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. j (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
346. Comment (j) of La. Civ. Code art. 1501 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) cites
as authority La. Civ. Code art. 1502 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) that begins with
"[n]evertheless .... and then continues by providing that a usufruct or income interest in trust may
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"crediting" inheritances and legacies the "credit" of Article 1501 more closely
resembles the treatment of proceeds from life insurance than collation by taking
less; legacies are not subject to collation according to the majority of cases."'
Consider the forced heir who receives a particular legacy from the decedent and
inherits testate with his siblings who are not forced heirs. If his legacy is not
sufficient to satisfy his legitime because the decedent made large inter vivos gifts
to his siblings within three years of his death, he may assert his right to reduce
those excessive donations. However, when the forced heir who is under the age
of twenty-four or incapable institutes his reduction action, Article 1501 "credits"
his legacy and all donations Inter vivos made to him during his entire lifetime,
with the limited exceptions already discussed. Furthermore, despite a confusing
hypothetical situation mentioned in a comment348 the structure of the two
paragraphs of Article 1501 arguably precludes the decedent from declaring in a
testament his intent that the particular legacy be an extra portion.349
Inheritances and legacies are "credited" to the satisfaction of a forced heir's
legitime not only when the forced heir accepts the "inheritance" or the legacy,
but also when the forced heir "renounces all or any part of the inheritance or
legacy."" 0  Presumably, the partial renunciation would result from a partial
not be used to satisfy the legitime of a forced heir. Comment (c) to Article 1502 explains that, "[t]he
word 'nevertheless' is intended to make certain that the provisions of this Article modify and limit
the provisions of Article 1501."
347. See, e.g., Succession of Fakier, 541 So. 2d 1372 (La. 1988); Jordan v. Filmore, 167 La.
725, 120 So. 275 (1929).
The conclusion that legacies are not subject to collation defies the mention in numerous Civil Code
articles of the collation of donations and legacies. See, e.g., La. Civ. Code arts. 1228, 1229, 1231,
1233, 1234.
348. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. a (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1):
The following example illustrates the importance of the predicate. Suppose that the will
leaves Blackacre to Child A and then "leaves the forced portion to my three children A,
B and C." It should be apparent in that case that the testator intends the legacy of
Blackacre to Child A as an extra portion, and A is not required to credit the value of that
legacy toward satisfaction of the legitime.
349. The second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1501 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts
No. 77, § 1) begins with "[t]his rule" to which an explicit exception is "donations that are declared
by the donor to be extra portions." "This rule" refers to the first sentence in Article 1501 and that
sentence enunciates a rule that donations inter vivos "shall be credited toward satisfaction of his
[forced heir's] legitime." In a separate paragraph that begins, "[i]n addition" to the rules provided
for in the first paragraph, the value of any legacy to a forced heir "shall be credited toward
satisfaction of his legitime even if he renounces." The statement is categorical without exception.
No provision is made for the exemption for legacies if the testator "declares" his intention that the
legacy be an extra portion. Even comment (b) to Article 1501 describes the first paragraph (two
sentences) as applying "to lifetime gifts."
Further support for the conclusion is the analogy between the second paragraph of Article 1501
and La. Civ. Code art. 2435 concerning deducting legacies from the marital portion. The analogy
is mentioned in comment (f) to Article 1501. The deduction of legacies from the marital portion is
automatic and the decedent can not declare that the legacy is an extra portion or over and above what
the spouse receives as a marital portion.
350. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I).
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acceptance as its mirror image, which is explicitly recognized in Article 986.11
Suppose the decedent leaves the forced heir who is under twenty-four years of
age or is incapable Blackacre Plantation, which it so happens is worth his
legitime. The forced heir who knows he either needs support immediately or
may need it in the future would rather receive one-quarter of the estate instead
of Blackacre. Without the "credit" of the legacy of Blackacre, he could renounce
the legacy (elect against the will) and take his one-quarter of the estate as forced
heir. The renunciation "credit" prevents him from choosing this alternative. It
accomplishes what the parent is permitted to do elsewhere in the Civil Code, that
is, to select particular assets to be used in satisfaction of the forced heir's
legitime. '3S The difference is that the "credit" of the renounced legacy under
Article 1501 does not require that the parent's intention in this regard be explicit.
The comment to Article 1501 offers an explanation for the renunciation
"credit" and confirms the intent of the redactors to accomplish the result
described in the hypothetical example above:
The second paragraph of this Article is new, and it clarifies the law.
It is needed for theoretical consistency but deals with a very sophisticat-
ed and highly unlikely situation. Technically, there is a distinction
between accepting or renouncing a legacy on the one hand and asserting
rights as a forced heir on the other hand. By way of example, if the
decedent leaves a legacy to the forced heir worth $50,000.00, whether
cash, securities or land, but the legitime of that forced heir is
$100,000.00, the forced heir may renounce all or part of the legacy but
nonetheless assert his rights as a forced heir. The price of his doing so
is that he must credit the value of the inheritance or legacy that he has
renounced, but he nonetheless may assert his rights as a forced heir for
the balance.3
351. La. Civ. Code art. 986: "He who has the power of accepting the entire succession can
divide and accept only a part, but with the same effect as to the debts of the succession as if he had
accepted in full."
352. La. Civ. Code art. 1302. See also La. Civ. Code arts. 1724-33. For a lengthy discussion
in this article of those provisions, see infra text accompanying notes 360-361. The author criticizes
this power of the parent/testator because of the altered nature of forced heirship.
353. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. e (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) (emphasis
added).
If this scenario is that unlikely and is highly technical then why provide for it? In fact, the
comment continues by attempting to convince the reader that the scenario is unlikely:
The two kinds of renunciations (of his rights as forced heir and his right to the legacy]
are not inconsistent although as a practical matter it is extremely unlikely that a forced
heir who claims that he has not received as much as he is entitled to receive would at the
same time renounce an inheritance or legacy. In the unlikely situation where a forced heir
asserts his right to the legitime but renounces all or part of an inheritance or legacy in his
favor, the value of the inheritance or legacy will be credited toward satisfaction of the
forced heir's legitime. The second paragraph provides for that remote possibility.
La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. e (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I) (emphasis added).
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One of the comments to Article 1501 states that this second paragraph "is
consistent with the rule regarding the marital portion set forth in Article
2435 ...." The same comment describes the parallel treatment of legacies
attributable to the marital portion: "[L]egacies to a surviving spouse in the
decedent spouse's will, and payments due to the surviving spouse as a result of
the decedent's death, are to be deducted from the marital portion. 354  The
language of Article 2435 is directly parallel to the "credit" of the second
paragraph of Article 1501. Furthermore, the language implies that whether the
surviving spouse accepts or renounces the legacy is immaterial; the condition of
the Article is simply that a legacy is "left by the deceased to the surviving
spouse . . . .""' Virtually identical language appeared in the predecessor to
Article 243536 and the Louisiana Supreme Court interpreted the language of
the predecessor to require the deduction of a legacy to the surviving spouse from
the marital portion even if the spouse renounced the legacy."' Article 2435
was enacted one year after that decision and a comment to Article 2435 cites the
decision approvingly. 5  The comment to Article 1501 likewise cites the same
Louisiana Supreme Court opinion.5 9
Another parallel in the Civil Code to the "crediting" of a renounced legacy
to the legitime is the ability of the testator to designate property to satisfy a
forced heir's legitime.36 The testator may expressly assign specific assets of
his estate in satisfaction of the forced portion of his children. The child has no
354. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. f (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1). "Louisiana
courts have routinely enforced this rule (Article 2435] and have held that legacies left to the survivor
by the deceased must be deducted from the marital portion. See Succession of Lichtentag, 363 So.2d
706 (1978); Succession of Henry, 287 So.2d 214 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Melacon's Widow v. His
Executor, 6 La. 105 (1833)."
355. La. Civ. Code art. 2435.
356. La. Civ. Code art. 2382 (1870).
357. Succession of Lichtentag, 363 So. 2d 706, 710 (La. 1978). The court opined:
To include within the meaning of the word "legacy" an acceptance of such legacy would
be to disregard the letter of the law as it appears before us. If the redactors of the code
had intended that the legacy must be accepted by the surviving spouse before its value
was to be included in the marital portion, we believe they would have used express
language to that effect.
358. La. Civ. Code art. 2435 cmt. b: "Legacies left to the survivor by the deceased must be
deducted from the marital portion. See Succession of Lichtentag, 363 So.2d 706 (La. 1978)."
359. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 cmt. f (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I): "Louisiana
courts have routinely enforced this rule and have held that legacies left to the survivor by the
deceased must be deducted from the marital portion. See Succession of Lichtentag."
360. La. Civ. Code art. 1302:
There is no occasion for partition, if the deceased has regulated it between his lawful
heirs, or strangers, or if the deceased has expressly delegated the authority to his executor
to allocate specific assets to satisfy a legacy expressed in terms of a quantum or value;
and in such case the judge must follow the will of the testator or his executor.
The same thing takes place when the testator has expressly assigned specific assets of
his estate, or delegated the authority to assign specific assets of his estate, in satisfaction
of the forced portion of his children.
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other option but to accept his legitime and the property assigned to satisfy it, or
to renounce his legitime. In effect, Article 1302 and the other complementary
articles36" ' accomplish the same purpose as the second paragraph of Article
1501; but Article 1302, unlike Article 1501, requires that the testator be specific
about assigning the property bequeathed in satisfaction of the legitime. Under
Article 1501, all the testator need do is bequeath property to his forced heir.
Then, the forced heir has no option but to accept the legacy or to be considered
as having accepted it.
An even more direct parallel to the "credit" of property inherited by or
bequeathed to the forced heir used to appear in the Uniform Probate Code:
property inherited through testate or intestate succession by a surviving spouse
who asserted the right to an elective share was "credited" to the share even if the
spouse renounced the legacy.362 However, in the revision of the Uniform
Probate Code in 1993 the provision that directed that inherited property be
deducted from the spouse's elective share, even though renounced by the
surviving spouse, was eliminated.363
Consider another hypothetical situation that more fully demonstrates the
application of Article 1501 to legacies bequeathed to a forced heir. A testament
bequeaths the usufruct of all of the testator's property to X, a bright young
twenty-four year old student prot~g6 of the testator. The naked ownership of the
testator's property is bequeathed to his only child, Y, who is forty-eight years old
but permanently incapable of caring for his person. The legitime of Y is
calculated by valuing the assets of the decedent at death, deducting the debts
owed by the decedent, and adding back to the net estate the value of property
donated within three years of the decedent's death at the value that the property
had at the time donated. Assume no gifts were made within three years of the
decedent's death. The legitime would be one-fourth of the value of the net
estate. The value of the naked ownership will require actuarial computations
(deducting the value of the usufruct from the value of the property). The naked
ownership, although not very valuable considering the age' of the usufructuary,
may constitute one-fourth of the value of the decedent's estate; but, the forced
361. See also La. Civ. Code arts. 1724-1733.
362. Uniform Probate Code § 2-207(a) (prior to amendment in 1993). See also William Mt.
McGovem et al., Wills, Trusts and Estates Including Taxation and Future Interests 122 and n.61
(1988).
363. See Uniform Probate Code § 2-209 (1993). The Official Comment to § 2-209 explains the
elimination of the deduction for inheritances or legacies renounced by the surviving spouse:
The provision that the spouse is charged with amounts that would have passed to the
spouse but were disclaimed was deleted in 1993. That provision was introduced into the
Code in 1975, prior to the addition of the QTIP provisions in the marital deduction of the
federal estate tax. At that time, most devises to the surviving spouse were outright
devises and did not require actuarial computation. Now, many if not most devises to the
surviving spouse are in the form of an income interest that qualifies for the marital
deduction under the QTIP provisions, and these devises require actuarial computations that
should be avoided whenever possible.
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heir is unlikely to receive any sums for his support due to the nature of his
interest.
Renunciation of the legacy of the naked ownership to assert his right as
forced heir to receive some property of the decedent in full ownership3" will
not benefit Y. Article 1501 "credits" the value of the naked ownership to his
legitime and all lifetime gifts he received except those excluded by the express
provisions of Article 1501. A forty-five year old child who is incapable of
caring for his person may well have received substantial gifts over forty-five
years, not to mention expenditures on his behalf after he reached the age of
twenty-four that may constitute indirect gifts. If he renounced, he would be in
an even worse position than if he had accepted the legacy; because in the latter
case at least he has the hope, remote though it may be, that he will ultimately
receive something. In effect, this Article would permit the testator in the
hypothetical facts to impose the equivalent of a charge or burden on the
legitime36' in contravention of Article 1496 that provides "no charges or
conditions may be placed on the legitime." 3"
Prior to June 18, 1996, the Civil Code provided for the hypothetical above
by permitting the forced heir, who received the naked ownership of the entirety
of the decedent's estate, to elect to suffer the usufruct or to receive full
ownership of his legitime after abandoning the naked ownership of the disposable
portion.367 The Civil Code article that provided for this election constituted an
exception to the more general principle that the testator could not impose
conditions or charges upon the legitime of the forced heir.368 As applied to the
previous hypothetical, the Article providing for the election by the forced heir
prevented the testator from saddling the legitime with a usufruct or an annuity,
but at a price to the forced heir of abandonment of the disposable portion. The
content of that Article, as already mentioned elsewhere,'" was eliminated by
amending and reenacting the Article.37 As an exception to prohibition against
the testator's imposition of charges, old Article 1499 gave the forced heir an
364. La. Civ. Code art. 1502 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § i) (in relevant part):
"Nevertheless [despite Article 1501], the legitime may not be satisfied in whole or in part by a
usufruct or an income interest in trust."
365. La. Civ. Code art. 1496 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1): "No charges,
conditions, or burdens may be imposed on the legitime except those expressly authorized by law,
such as a usufruct in favor of a surviving spouse or the placing of the legitime in trust." (emphasis
added).
366. La. Civ. Code art. 1496 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
367. La. Civ. Code art. 1499 (1870). substance repealed by reenactment of La. Civ. Code art.
1499 (1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
368. La. Civ. Code art. 1710. See also La. Civ. Code art. 1496 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts
No. 77, § 1). Remember, however, that La. Civ. Code art. 1496 was amended by 1995 La. Acts No.
1180, § I; and as a consequence, under La. R.S. 9:2501(A) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77,
§ 2) that version of Article 1496 prevails regardless of the amendment to La. Civ. Code art. 1496 in
the same Act (1996 La. Acts No. 77).
369. See supra text accompanying notes 224-229.
370. See La. Civ. Code art. 1499 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
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inducement to allow the testator's dispositive plan to remain intact: eventually
when X dies the forced heir will have the entire estate, not just the legitime.
Without old Article 1499, new Article 1496 now could be interpreted to preclude
the charge or usufruct to X over the legitime of Y. The charge in the form of
a usufruct to X would be invalid without the necessity of Y having to make a
choice between the legitime only and the entire estate subject to the charge or
usufruct. Thus, Y could accept the succession and demand a termination of the
usufruct of X over Y's legitime as an unauthorized condition. Y could argue
that this action to remove a charge or burden on the legitime is not an action to
reduce excessive donations provided for in Article 1503 that would trigger the
"credit" of Article 1501. Instead, Y can argue that the action is a different one
authorized by Article 1496 and Article 1710. The latter article appears in an
entirely different chapter and contemplates that the forced heir has received his
legitime but merely desires that the burden be removed."' Y, who has
received the naked ownership of the decedent's property, may in fact be in a
better position under Act No. 77 of 1996 than he would have been previously
under Article 1499 when he had to choose to relinquish the naked ownership of
the disposable portion if he wanted his legitime in full ownership.
Just as the active mass calculation requires that donations inter vivos made
within three years of the donor's death be included using the value at the time
of the donation," 2 lifetime donations to the forced heir are to be "credited" to
the satisfaction of his legitime using the value at the time of the gift.3"
Choosing the date of the gift for valuing a donation for purposes of the "credit"
differs from Article 1501 where traditional rules of collation distinguished
between immovable property valued at the date of death 7" and movable
property valued at the date of the donation. 375 The only policy furthered by
the change in valuation dates that this author can discern is that the result of
choosing value as of the date of the donation is to treat the donee as absolute
owner of the donated property. For example, in a case like Succession of
Hendrick,'76 the donated property was movable property that appreciated in
value. The forced heir who received appreciating stock under Article 1501
371. La. Civ. Code art. 1710 (in relevant part): "[P]rovided, however, that no charges or
conditions can be imposed by the testator on the legitimate portion of forced heirs, nor can they lose
their inheritance for any act of ingratitude to the testator, prior to his decease."
372. La. Civ. Code art. 1505 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1). For a discussion, see
supra text accompanying notes 259-287.
373. La. Civ. Code art. 1501 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I).
374. La. Civ. Code art. 1269.
375. La. Civ. Code art. 1283:
When movables have been given, the donee is not permitted to collate them in kind; he
is bound to collate for them by taking less, according to their appraised value at the time
of the donation, if there be any annexed to the donation. In default thereof, recourse may
be had to other evidence to establish the value of these movables at the time of the
donation.
376. 430 So. 2d 734 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
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would be "credited" with the lower value, rather than the higher value as the
court had done in the Hendrick case. One justification for using the value as of
the date of the gift is that it was difficult under prior law for attorneys to
speculate about the value of movable property no longer owned by the donee on
the date of the decedent's death. Is it easier to speculate about the value of gifts
received by a child over a lifetime, some possibly as long ago as thirty years?
Objections to the "credit" as formulated in Article 1501 rest principally on
the new purpose to be served by forced heirship. Even though a decedent has
been able to satisfy the legitime by life insurance proceeds or by selecting and
assigning property in his testament, those provisions assumed that the vast
majority of forced heirs were able-bodied descendants. Should not any provision
that affords the decedent such control over what property the forced heir
receives377 be reconsidered in view of the fact that only the most vulnerable
Louisiana children are forced heirs?... If a forced heir received lifetime gifts
377. The only explicit exception is that found in La. Civ. Code art. 1496 (as amended by 1996
La. Acts No. 77, § 1) (no charges or conditions on the legitime; can not satisfy legitime with a
usufruct or income interest in trust).
378. The argument that the law on the marital portion which is intended to support the surviving
spouse permits the decedent to control the property the survivor receives is unpersuasive. La. Civ. Code
art. 2435, discussed supra text accompanying notes 354-359. The condition for awarding the marital
portion is not dependent purely on the assumption of the need for support, but rather dependent upon
proof that the deceased die rich only in comparison to the survivor. This condition suggests that rather
than simply providing support for the survivor, there are social policies involved which are confined to
the relationship of husband and wife. See La. Civ. Code art. 2432; see also La Civ. Code art. 2432 cmts.
b, c.
Furthermore, the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Succession of Lichtentag, 363 So. 2d 706
(La. 1978), which included a renounced legacy in the marital portion can be criticized. In the opinion
the interpretation of "left a legacy by the deceased" was literal and need not have been. Consider the
enlightening discussion in the opinion about the policy supporting a literal interpretation:
We are strengthened in our interpretation of the word "legacy" as it appears in article 2382
by the policy of the law that underlies the marital portion doctrine. As stated earlier in this
opinion, the marital portion doctrine derives from the mutual marital obligations of fidelity,
support and assistance.... It is apparent that whatever legacy a deceased spouse leaves the
surviving spouse is, whether eventually accepted or renounced, at least a partial compliance
with the obligation to provide created by the pre-existing marital relationship. Article 2382,
on the other hand, contemplates that the decedent spouse has to some degree left unfulfilled
his marital obligation to provide. In the instant case, the terms of the testament indicate that
decedent intended to provide some financial support for his surviving wife. Hence, to hold
the value of the legacy renounced by Mrs. Lichtentag is not to be included in the marital
portion claimed by her would be to disregard the spirit as well as the letter of article 2382.
Lichtentag, 363 So. 2d at 711.
One observation that can be made about the court's description of the policy of the marital portion
is that the testator by bequeathing a legacy may not always intend to provide some financial support.
He may intend the opposite. If the purpose of the marital portion as well as the legitime is to provide
support, then the testator should not be permitted to control without constraint what property satisfies
that purpose. Secondly, a surviving spouse who is poor only by comparison to the decedent may need




from the decedent, he may well have consumed that property. What he is to
receive as his legitime involves a calculation that includes only gifts made within
three years of the decedent's death. His legitime will be significantly smaller
than it used to be with the possibility that what he has received in advance
throughout his lifetime and thereafter consumed will be considered as having
satisfied his legitime. Yet, at his parent's death, the law by reserving a fraction
of the decedent's property intended to provide that the forced heir would receive
additional property from the decedent parent, presumably because his need
continues. Inheritance is a single-event beneficence, but support represents long
term need.
Prior to January 1, 1996, when forced heirship was purely an inheritance
concept, it was sensible to say that if the forced heir is owed an inheritance and
he has already received it in advance, he should not receive any more property.
Furthermore, it was difficult to criticize the latitude the law permitted the
decedent to select the property found in his estate used to satisfy the legitime.
However, forced heirship is no longer purely an inheritance concept; it is now
a mechanism for enforcing the social policy of parental support of vulnerable
children. Legislation should assure that forced heirship is an effective mechanism
for providing support for vulnerable children and should not carry over from the
old law concepts that tend to subvert the mechanism. To do so ultimately
subverts the policy reflected in the new forced heirship. On balance, the policy
of the new forced heirship is best served by eliminating the "credit" of Article
1501.
G. Actual Collation
Article 1235 was amended by Act No. 77 to read:
The right to demand collation is confined to descendants of the first
degree who qualify as forced heirs, and only applies with respect to
gifts made within the three years prior to the decedent's death, and
valued as of the date of the gift. Any provision of the Civil Code to the
contrary is hereby repealed.
The substantive content of the Article concerns (1) who can demand collation,
(2) to what does collation apply, and (3) the value to be used. 79 Thus, the
379. Even though collation may occur in kind or by taking less, this article will only consider
collation by taking less, or "when the donee diminishes the portion he inherits, in proportion to the
value of the object he has received, and takes so much less from the surplus of the effects as is
explained in the chapter which treats of partitions." La. Civ. Code art. 1253.
Collation in kind consists of delivering up the thing which has been given to be united to the mass
of the succession. La. Civ. Code art. 1252. If an immovable was given to the donee and the donee
still has possession of it, "he has the choice to make the collation in kind or by taking less, unless
the donor has imposed on him the condition of making the collation in kind, in which case it can not
be made in any other manner than that prescribed by the donor .. " La. Civ. Code art. 1255.
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omnibus repealer in the second sentence that repeals provisions of the Civil Code
to the contrary can only pertain to those three items. Even though only collation
by taking less will be extensively analyzed in this article, remember that the
forced heir who received a donation of immovable property has the choice of
collating the property in kind3" or by taking less. Collation in kind concerns
how the collation is to be made,3 '" not who can demand it, what collation
applies to, or the value to be used. As a consequence, Article 1255 that permits
the forced heir to collate in kind is not encompassed within the omnibus repealer.
The interaction of Article 1235 that requires the forced heir to collate donations
valued as of the date of the gift and Article 1255 that permits the forced heir to
surrender the property itself may influence significantly the forced heir's choice.
Initially, it is important to emphasize that actual collation is different from
the "credit" imposed in Article 1501 which has been referred to as "defensive
collation" or "imputation." '  Actual collation is "the supposed or real return
to the mass of the succession which an heir makes of property which he received
in advance of his share or otherwise, in order that such property may be divided
together with the other effects of the succesion."3s
The obligation of collating is founded on the equality which must
be naturally observed between children and other lawful descendants,
who divided among them the succession of their father, mother and
other ascendants; and also on the presumption that what was given or
bequeathed to children by their ascendants was so disposed of in
advance of what they might one day expect from their succession."'
Who owes the obligation of collation under new Article 1235?... All of
the articles that precede or follow Article 1235 speak of the obligation to col-
late," not the "right to demand" collation. The other articles state that the
obligation to collate is owed by children or grandchildren "coming to the
succession,' 3 s not just by descendants of the first degree who qualify as forced
heirs. In fact, the predecessor to the first paragraph of Article 1235 had used the
language "[t]he obligation of collating is confined" to descendants coming to the
succession; and then the second paragraph, which was not amended by Act No.
77, continued, "[t]herefore this collation can not be demanded by any other heir,
nor even by the legatees or creditors of the succession . . ,,3 ' The two
380. La. Civ. Code art. 1255.
381. La. Civ. Code art. 1255 appears in Section 3. (How Collations are Made) of Chapter I.
(Of Collations) of Title 1. (Of Successions) of Book III of the Louisiana Civil Code.
382. See supra discussion in part IV, F.
383. La. Civ. Code art. 1227.
384. La. Civ. Code art. 1229.
385. La. Civ. Code art. 1235 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
386. La. Civ. Code arts. 1227, 1228, 1229, 1234, 1237, 1238(A), 1238(B), 1239, 1240.
387. La. Civ. Code art. 1228 (1870).
388. La. Civ. Code art. 1235 (1870) (emphasis added).
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paragraphs of Article 1235, before the Article was amended by Act No. 77,
connected the obligation to collate to the right to demand collation. Amended
Article 1235 breaks the connection by the words selected by the redactors. Thus,
it is possible to argue that even though only forced heirs of the first degree have
the right to demand collation, other descendants coming to the succession owe
the obligation to collate. Even the Revised Comment written after the Act
passed through the legislative process is not necessarily inconsistent with such
a conclusion." 9 Furthermore, retaining the obligation to collate of descendants
coming to the succession alleviates some of the unfairness to the young forced
heir that may result from decedent's numerous, large gifts made to his other
children who were over twenty-four long before his death.
By contrast to the "credit" of Article 1501 that applies to all forced heirs
who seek reduction, the right to demand actual collation is "confined to
descendants of the first degree who qualify as forced heirs .... " Grandchil-
dren who for purposes of forced heirship represent predeceased descendants of
the first degree in the two instances when they are permitted to do so39' are
"stepping into the shoes of the ancestor." Representation is defined as "a fiction
of the law, the effect of which is to put the representative in the place, DEGREE,
and rights of the person represented." '392 Thus, it can be persuasively argued,
despite a contrary comment drafted after the Act completed the legislative
process,393 that by virtue of representation the descendant of the second degree
389. La. Civ. Code art. 1235 rev. cmt. c (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § !):
Collation is a presumption of the law that a parent wants to treat all of his children
equally, but it is not required, as is forced heirship, and the donor may dispense with it.
The rules of collation did not coordinate with the new law on forced heirship by which
only children who are "23 years of age or younger" are forced heirs, because, without
amendment collation would apply to all children, regardless of age. The amendment of
Civil Code Article 1235 avoids the situation where an older child might have no claim
as a forced heir but, because of an inadvertent failure of his parent to exempt inter vivos
gifts from collation, the older child might nonetheless assert a claim against his siblings,
even those who are forced heirs, to equalize the gifts.
(emphasis added).
The first language italicized suggests that collation does not apply to all children. However, apply
is ambiguous in this context. Does it mean that all children do not have a right to demand collation,
or that all children do not owe an obligation to collate? The example that follows in the language
italicized next in the comment is clearly correct; the older child has no right to demand collation from
the forced heir, but it does not necessarily follow that he has no obligation to collate at the demand
of the younger child who is a forced heir.
390. La. Civ. Code art. 1235 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I).
391. La. Civ. Code art. 1493(B) and (C) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
392. La. Civ. Code art. 881 (emphasis added).
393. La. Civ. Code art. 1235 rev. cmt. c (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I): "Under
this article, if a child has attained the age of 25 and is not otherwise disabled, he is not permitted to
demand collation; nor is a grandchild permitted to demand it, even if he qualifies as a forced heir,"
See also La. Civ. Code art. 1235 rev. cmt. a (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I).
Compare La. Civ. Code art. 1493 cmt. c (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I) prior to the
comment's revision after passage of the Act: "Since the grandchildren 'stand in the place and
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(the grandchild) is elevated to the degree of his ancestor and hence, in the first
degree within the meaning of Article 1235.
Unlike the "credit" of Article 1501, the right to demand actual collation of
donations is restricted to "gifts" made within three years of the decedent's
death.'" For purposes of collation, "gifts" that appear in the active mass
calculation395 and those that are subject to collation are the same. 96 Use of
"gifts" in the first sentence of Article 1235 is troublesome because of the
omnibus repealer clause in the second sentence. Is the collation of "indirect"
donations, such as the advantage gained by the purchase of property at a very
low price,397 no longer intended by the use of the word "gifts"? Hopefully not.
The purpose of the language "confining" collation was to emphasize that the
right to demand collation would not apply to gifts whenever made, only those
made within three years of the decedent's death.398
Under new Article 1235, collation of the gift or advantage by taking less
must be made by using the value of the donation at the time of the gift,3"
regardless of whether or not the property donated was movable or immovable.
Prior to Act No. 77, the law of collation by taking less distinguished between the
value to be used if the property was movable and the value to be used if the
property was immovable. Movables were collated by taking less in accordance
with their value at the time of the gift. 0  By contrast, immovables were
degree' and have the same rights of the predeceased child who is being represented, it would appear
that representation should be constitutionally permissible for grandchildren where the representation
is consistent with the age requirement for the predeceased parent himself." (emphasis added).
394. La. Civ. Code art. 1235 rev. cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1):
The amendment further simplifies the application of collation by limiting its range: even
when the child qualifies as a forced heir, and has a right to demand collation because the
inter vivos gifts have not been exempted from collation, his claim is now limited to those
gifts that have been made within three years of the decedent's death, valued at the time
of the gift. The new rule thereby eliminates the inclusion of more remote gifts and also
makes it easier to determine the value of those that are included.
395. La. Civ. Code art. 1505(A) (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
396. La. Civ. Code art. 1235 rev. cmt. d (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
397. La. Civ. Code art. 1248.
398. La. Civ. Code art. 1235 rev. cmt. d (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1):
This provision repeals the rule that permitted a child to demand collation with regard to
gifts that had been made many years previously, and intentionally adopts rules that are
parallel to the new forced heirship rules, which now limit the "fictitious collation" for
purposes of calculating the "active mass" to gifts that were made within three years, and
which now require that the gifts be valued at the time of the gift.
399. La. Civ. Code art. 1235 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
400. La. Civ. Code art. 1283:
When movables have been given, the donee is not permitted to collate them in kind, he
is bound to collate for them by taking less, according to their appraised value at the time
of the donation, if there be any annexed to the donation. In default thereof, recourse may




valued in accordance with their value at the date of death./' At least as to
immovable property, the value for purposes of collation was the same value used
for the active mass calculation. For movable property the value used for
purposes of collation was different from the value used for the active mass
calculation. The explanation is the redactors' assumptions that immovable
property appreciates and movable property depreciates, and that the donee of
movables became the absolute owner with no option to collate in kind. By using
two different values with movable property that the redactors assumed would
decrease in value after the gift, the redactors accomplished the purpose of
recreating the estate of the deceased as it would have existed had he not disposed
of property by gift and then charging the forced heir (collation) with the value
of the advantage he received in advance of the decedent's death. In the case of
depreciating movable property, the value the forced heir received was the value
of its use, represented by the difference between the value at the time of the gift
and the value at the date of death. Article 1235 changes the valuation date for
immovables if the heir elects to collate by taking less; because, in the words of
the revised comments, the change "makes it easier to determine the value of
those [gifts) that are included"' 2 and "makes the collation and forced heirship
rules more consistent with each other, especially as to ... valuation.""
Despite the omnibus repealer clause of Article 1235,40 the clause does not
repeal the Civil Code articles on how collations are made, which permit the heir
who owes collation to collate an immovable in kind. 5 When the heir collates
an immovable in kind, he surrenders the immovable at its current value for the
purposes of its division among those with a right to demand collation.
The omnibus repealer clause in Article 1235 purports to repeal any provision
of the Civil Code4" contrary to the first sentence.407 "Contrary to" in the
401. La. Civ. Code art. 1269 (1870):
When the donee has elected to collate the immovable property given him by taking less
on the part which comes to him from the succession, the collation must be made
according to the value which the immovable property had at the opening of the
succession, a deduction being made for the expenses incurred thereon, in conformity with
what has been heretofore prescribed.
402. La. Civ. Code art. 1235 rev. cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
403. La. Civ. Code art. 1235 rev. cmt. d (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1): "The
valuation rules for collation purposes were also different from the rules for valuation of gifts for
forced heirship purposes: collation previously required that immovables be valued as of the date of
death, not the date of gift, but that movables be valued at the date of the gift."
404. La. Civ. Code art. 1235 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I) (in relevant part):
"Any provision of the Civil Code to the contrary is hereby repealed."
405. La. Civ. Code art. 1252: "The collation is made in kind, when the thing which has been
given, is delivered up by the donee to be united to the mass of the succession."
See also La. Civ. Code arts. 1256-1268.
406. Any provision of the Revised Statutes, the Code of Civil Procedure, or other statute that
mentions or affects "actual," as distinguished from "fictitious," collation is not repealed or affected.
407. La. Civ. Code art. 1235 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1) (in relevant part):
"The right to demand collation is confined to descendants of the first degree who qualify as forced
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first sentence means "contrary" to the following propositions: (1) the right to
demand collation is confined to descendants of the first degree who qualify as
forced heirs; (2) the gifts subject to collation include only those made within
three years of the decedent's death; and (3) the gifts subject to collation must be
valued as of the date of the gift. Clearly, the Civil Code articles dealing with
collation by taking less of an immovable that value the immovable at the date
of the decedent's death are repealed."°s If the reference in Article 1235 to
"gifts" was intended to exclude advantages from collation,"° the three articles
that describe such advantages are repealed."0 Likewise, if the obligation as
well as the right to demand collation is limited to descendants of the first
degree,"' then four other articles that regulate collation when grandchildren
and great-grandchildren inherit are repealed." 2
The socially desirable policy of seeking to achieve some measure of equality
among children" 3 remains embodied in the Civil Code thanks to the members
of the Senate Committee on Judiciary A who voted to delete the repeal of
collation contained in the bill that became Act No. 77. As letters to Ann
Landers and the excerpts from the book, Beyond the Grave, previously
quoted "4 indicate, siblings are remarkably conscious of and sensitive to actions
of their parents that they perceive to be unfair treatment or demonstrative of
favoritism, even after the death of the parent. Some modifications of collation
and a reconsideration of the "credit" of Article 1501 would significantly improve
Act No. 77.
H. How Reduction Is Accomplished
Donations that impinge upon the legitime are not null, but merely reducible
"to the extent necessary to eliminate the impingement.""'  The language
chosen to express this principle differs from its predecessor that had used
references to the disposable portion instead of "impingement."" 6 Presumably,
heirs, and only applies with respect to gifts made within the three years prior to the decedent's death,
and valued as of the date of the gift."
408. La. Civ. Code arts. 1269-1272.
409. For a discussion of this issue see supra text accompanying notes 333-338.
410. La. Civ. Code arts. 1246, 1247, 1248.
411. See supra text accompanying notes 385-389.
412. La. Civ. Code arts. 1238, 1239, 1240, 1241.
413. La. Civ. Code art. 1229. "Actual collation" as the Civil Code explains "is founded on the
equality which must be naturally observed between children and other lawful descendants, who divide
among them the succession of their father; mother and other ascendants; and also on the presumption
that what was given or bequeathed to children by their ascendants was so disposed of in advance of
what they might one day expect from their succession." La. Civ. Code art. 1229.
414. See supra text accompanying notes 136-137.
415. La. Civ. Code art. 1503 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § i).
416. La. Civ. Code art. 1502 (as amended by 1981 La. Acts No. 765, § 1) (in relevant part): "Any
disposal ofproperty, whether inter vivos or mortis causa, exceeding the quantum of which a person may
legally dispose to the prejudice of the forced heirs, is not null, but only reducible to that quantum."
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the choice of "impingement" was to permit the article creating an action in
reduction to be read with the article permitting a testamentary usufruct in favor
of the surviving spouse, which describes the usufruct as "a permissible burden
that does not impinge upon the legitime."'4t Thus, if the decedent leaves all
of his property to the surviving spouse and a forced heir also survives, the legacy
to the surviving spouse may be reduced to full ownership of the disposable
portion (three quarters of the estate) with a usufruct over the legitime for life and
the power to dispose of nonconsumables. 41 9 "This is the maximum extent to
which reduction is needed to eliminate the excess that impinges upon the
legitime, since the decedent could legally have made such a bequest to his
surviving spouse. No further reduction is necessary or appropriate."4t9
Without the language of "impingement," the legacy could have been reduced to
the disposable portion in full ownership, and under some jurisprudence a usufruct
over the legitime42 but without the power to dispose of nonconsumables.
Reduction begins with donations mortis causa under Article 1507.42' The
testator is permitted to express a preference in his testament that a legacy is to be
paid in preference to others.' 22 However, if he does not, the articles amended in
Act No. 77 do not provide for how the donations mortis causa are to be reduced.
One possibility is to proportionately reduce the donations morhis causa. Anothe r
is to reduce the donations in order of preference based upon their characterization
as particular legacies, legacies under universal title, or universal legacies. Article
1511 directed that the reduction among legacies was to be pro rata without any
distinction between particular and universal dispositions.423 Thus, under Article
1511 particular legatees had to bear a proportionate share of the reduction; the
amount needed to satisfy the forced heir could not be taken entirely from the
universal legatee. 24 That Article was repealed by virtue of its amendment and
reenactment without providing for its content elsewhere. Interestingly, Article
417. La. Civ. Code art. 1499 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I).
418. La. Civ. Code art. 1503 cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
419. La. Civ. Code art. 1503 cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § i).
420. See, e.g., Succession of Moore, 42 La. Ann. 332, 7 So. 561 (1890), discussed in Winsberg
v. Winsberg, 233 La. 67,.96 So. 2d 44 (1957).
421. La. Civ. Code art. 1507 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
422. A parallel provision exists. See La. Civ. Code art. 1635.
"This Article [Article 1507) retains the first sentence of Civil Code Article 1507 (1870), and
restates the concept in Civil Code Article 1635 (1870) that the testator can assign preference in the
reduction of legacies." La. Civ. Code art. 1507 cmt. (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I).
See also La. Civ. Code art. 1512 (1870): "Nevertheless, in case the testator has expressly declared
that any particular legacy should be paid in preference to the others, that preference shall take place,
and the legacy that is the object of it, shall not be reduced, if the value of the others does not fall
short of the legal reservation."
423. La. Civ. Code art. 1511 (1870): "When the dispositions mortis causa exceed either the
disposable quantum or the portion of that quantum that remains after the deduction of the value of
the donations inter vlvos, the reduction shall be made pro rata, without any distinction between
universal dispositions and particular ones."
424. See also La. Civ. Code arts. 1611, 1642. See Aubry & Rau, supra note 289, § 685a.
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1511 was cited as a source of Article 1507, although Article 1507 does not contain
the rule of Article 1511. The only remaining article of the Civil Code that does
pertain to how legacies are to be paid provides: "Particular legacies must be
discharged in preference to all others, even though they exhaust the whole
succession, or all that remains after the payment of the debts and the contributions
for the legitimate portion, in case there are forced heirs.""'  Act No. 77 has
eliminated one of the two different articles addressing the reduction of legacies that
exceed the disposable portion. As a consequence, Article 1634 remains to provide
that particular legacies are paid in preference to all others;4' 6 conversely, univer-
sal legacies and legacies under universal title are reduced first.
If the estate is not sufficient to satisfy the legitime, a forced heir may reduce
donations inter vivos made within three years of the decedent's death, "beginning
with the most recent donation and proceeding successively to the most re-
mote."'27 A complementary provision permits the action against the donee "or
his successors by gratuitous title in accordance with the order of their donations,
beginning with the most recent donation.' 28 It is not entirely clear from reading
the two provisions together whether direct donees of the decedent must be pursued
first in order of their donations before proceeding against the gratuitous transferees.
Another possible reading is that gratuitous transferees of donees must be pursued
first in the order of their donations and the donation to the donee, beginning with
the most recent first. The next sentence of Article 1513 suggests that it is the latter
because it treats the donee and his successors as a unit if the donee or successor still
owns the donated property:
When the donated property is still owned by the donee or the successors,
reduction takes place in kind or by contribution to the payment of the
legitime, at the election of the donee or the successors, who are account-
able for any diminution in the value of the property attributable to their
fault or neglect and for any charges or encumbrances imposed upon the
property after the donation.'29
425. La. Civ. Code art. 1634 (emphasis added).
Note that the comment to Article 1507 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I) states that
Article 1507 restates the concept of Article 1635, a cross reference which suggests that Article 1634
also affects the reduction of excessive donations.
426. Even among particular legacies the Civil Code directs how they are to be paid:
If the effects do not suffice to discharge the particular legacies, the legacies of a certain
object must be first taken out. The surplus of the effects must then be proportionally
divided among the legatees of sums of money, unless the testator has expressly declared
that such a legacy shall be paid in preference to the rest, or that the legacy is given as a
recompense for services.
La. Civ. Code art. 1635 (1870).
427. La. Civ. Code art. 1508 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
428. La. Civ. Code art. 1513 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1). Compare La. Civ.
Code art. 1518 (as amended by 1981 La. Acts No. 739, § 1).
429. La. Civ. Code art. 1513 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1). Compare La. Civ.
Code art. 1516 (as amended by 1981 La. Acts No. 739, § 1).
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By use of the word "property" in Article 1513 without an adjective
preceding the word, the option of the donee or his successor who still owns the
property to surrender it is not limited to immovables. Even though the title to
old Article 1513 read "[i]mmovables subject to real rights," the language of the
article did not restrict its application to immovable property.4 31 Thus, the
donee or his successor who owns naturally depreciating movable property or
immovable property may surrender the property without any further responsibili-
ty, absent fault or charges imposed on the property, rather than contribute to the
payment of the legitime "to the extent of the value of the donated property at the
time the donee received it."' 3'
The manner in which the sentences in Article 1513 are constructed allow
that only donees or their successors who own the donated property are
accountable for its diminution in value, whether they elect to reduce in kind or
by contribution to the payment of the legitime. If the donee or his successors
no longer own the donated property, they must contribute to the payment of the
legitime to the extent of the value of the donated property at the time the donee
received it. Presumably, despite the two introductory clauses to the sentences in
Article 1513432 that distinguish between donees who own and donees who do
430. La. Civ. Code art. 1516 (as amended by 1981 La. Acts No. 739, § I):
When the property given is owned by the donee or his successors by gratuitous title,
reduction takes place in kind or by taking less at the election of the donee or his
successors. Property that it brought into the succession through the effect of reduction
is brought into it subject to any real rights created by operation of law or by onerous title.
In such a case, the donee and his successors by gratuitous title are accountable for the
resulting diminution of the value of the property.
(emphasis added).
431. La. Civ. Code art. 1513 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77. § 1) (in relevant part):
When the property given is no longer owned by the donee or his successors by gratuitous
title, the donee and the successors must contribute to the payment of the legitime. A
donee or his successor who contributes to payment of the legitime is required to do so
only to the extent of the value of the donated property at the time the donee received it.
Compare La. Civ. Code art. 1517 (1981 La. Acts No. 739, § 1): "When the property given is no
longer owned by the donee whose donation is subject to reduction, the donee is bound to return to
the succession the value that the property has at the time of the opening of the succession." (emphasis
added).
La. Civ. Code art. 1513 cmt. (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1): "This Article combines
the substance of Articles 1516 through 1518 of the Louisiana Civil Code (1870). It changes the law
in part by using the date of gift value for purposes of determining the amount of liability of the
donee. Under prior law, the date of death valuation is used."
432. La. Civ. Code art. 1513 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77. § 1) (in relevant part):
When the donated property is still owned by the donee or his successors, reduction takes
place in kind or by contribution to the payment of the legitime, at the election of the
donee or the successors, who are accountable for any diminution in the value of the
property attributable to their fault or neglect and for any charges or encumbrances
imposed upon the property after the donation.
When the property given is no longer owned by the donee or his successors by
gratuitous title, the donee and the successors must contribute to the payment of the
legitime. A donee or his successor who contributes to payment of the legitime is required
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not own the property, only the donee or his successor who opted to reduce in
kind, by surrendering the property, should be accountable for diminution in the
value of the property. Such a result is just like that provided by the predecessor
to Article 1513.433 The donee or his successor who contributes to the payment
of the legitime to the extent of the value of the donated property at the time the
donee received it necessarily accounts for any diminution in value of the
property.
The donee or his successor who opt to surrender the property become
accountable for any diminution in the value of the property attributable "to their
fault43 or neglect" and "for any charges or encumbrances imposed upon the
property after the donation."43 The donee's accountability for diminution in the
value of property due to his "fault or neglect" is new. The language is virtually
identical to that of Article 1260 that imposes responsibility on a donee who collates
an immovable in kind for deterioration that has diminished the value of the property
"when caused by his fault or negligence."''" In addition, Articles 576... and
2369.3, 4'3 which impose responsibility upon usufructuaries and spouses who are
co-owners of former community property respectively, contain similar language
and concepts. The predecessor to Article 1513 had imposed responsibility upon the
donee for a diminution in value as a result of real rights created on the property
when he elected to reduce in kind.439 Article 1513 does not restrict the responsi-
bility of the donee or his successor for diminution in value to the property caused
by the creation of real rights,' but instead extends the responsibility to charges
to do so only to the extent of the value of the donated property at the time the donee
received it.
(emphasis added).
433. La. Civ. Code art. 1516 (in relevant part):
Property that it brought into the succession through the effect of reduction is brought into
it subject to any real rights created by operation of law or by onerous title. In such a
case, the donee and his successors by gratuitous title are accountable for the resulting
diminution of the value of the property.
(emphasis addded).
434. La. Civ. Code art. 3506(13).
435. La. Civ. Code art. 1513 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1).
436. La. Civ. Code art. 1260: "The donee, who collates in kind the immovable property given
to him, is accountable for the deteriorations and damage which have diminished its value, when
caused by his fault or negligence."
437. "The usufructuary is answerable for losses resulting from his fraud, default, or neglect."
La. Civ. Code art. 576. See also La. Civ. Code art. 576 cmt. b.
438. La. Civ. Code art. 2369.3:
A spouse has a duty to preserve and to manage prudently former community property
under his control, including a former community enterprise, in a manner consistent with
the mode of use of that property immediately prior to termination of the community
regime. He is answerable for any damage caused by his fault, default, or neglect.
See also La. Civ. Code art. 2369 cmt. e.
439. La. Civ. Code art. 1516. For text, see supra note 433.
440. A real right is defined as "a right in the thing that can be held against the world." La. Civ.
Code art. 1763 cmt. b (b) (1985), quoting from I A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property 380 (2d ed. 1980).
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or encumbrances imposed on the property after the donation, whether or not the
charges or encumbrances are real rights and regardless of which donee or his
successor created the charge or condition.
Fruits and products of donated property belong to the donee "except for those
that accrue after written demand for reduction is made on him."" Fruits are
"things that are produced by or derived from another thing without diminution of
its substance""42 and products are "derived from a thing as a result of diminution
of its substance... ."44 The Article makes the donee, or his successor presum-
ably, the owner of fruits and products until written demand is made on the
donee." Written demand, "not necessarily a judicial demand,"s marks the
point at which the donee or his successor by gratuitous title is required to restore
the fruits to the forced heir, rather than, as under previous law, from the day of the
donor's death "if demand for reduction was made within one year of the death of
the donor.""' 6 This is another instance of changing the law to the disadavantage
of the forced heir. Old Article 151 547 gave the forced heir one year to "get his
act together" and make the demand to be entitled to the fruits from the date of
death. Under the provisions of Act No. 77 the forced heir will have to make
demand on the date of death in order to be entitled to the fruits from the date of
death.
V. ANTICIPATED SUCCESSION LAW CHANGES-1997
Other articles published in this symposium concern anticipated changes in
succession law to be introduced during the 1997 Regular Session."' The
441. La. Civ. Code art. 1512 (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I) (emphasis added).
442. La. Civ. Code art. 550.
443. La. Civ. Code an. 488.
444. La. Civ. Code art. 1512 cmt. b (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I):
Under Article 1504 of the Civil Code, the demand for reduction cannot be made until
after the donor has died. Therefore, the donee owns, and therefore is clearly entitled to
keep all of the fruits and products that accrue before the donor's death as well as those
received after death and before demand.
445. La. Civ. Code art. 1512 cmt. b(asamendedby 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § 1): "The 'demand'
contemplated by this Article is not necessarily a judicial demand, as in an action to reduce excessive
donations, but a written demand of any kind."
446. La. Civ. Code art. 1512 cmt. a (as amended by 1996 La. Acts No. 77, § I):
This Article changes the law by providing that the donee is to restore fruits only from the
time of demand in all cases. Under Article 1515 of the Louisiana Civil Code (1870), the
donee restored fruits from the day of the donor's death if the demand for reduction was
made within one year of the death of the donor.
Compare La. Civ. Code art. 1515.
447. La. Civ. Code art. 1515: "The donee restores the fiuits of what exceeds the disposable
portion only from the day of the donor's decease, if the demand of the reduction was made within
the year; otherwise from the day of demand."
448. Some of the anticipated changes have been discussed elsewhere. See Cynthia Picou,




changes constituting the subject matter of the articles are anticipated because they
were contained in Senate Bill No. 1379 introduced during the 1995 Regular
Session of the Legislature, upon recommendation of the Louisiana State Law
Institute but not acted upon during that session. In any case, this author will not
address the proposed revisions except to express the necessity for a careful and
deliberate consideration of the content of those revisions. Act No. 77 only
contained twenty-three Civil Code articles; yet as the discussion in this article
has demonstrated, there were "glitches" and serious policy issues not sufficiently
debated and considered. Unlike the articles on forced heirship, there is simply
no urgency for enacting new Civil Code articles on seizen, acceptance and
renunciation, capacity, legacies, payment of debts, forms of testaments and
codicils, and revocation of testaments that would prevent their careful study.
However, there is one area of succession law not included within the
revisions proposed by Senate Bill No. 1379 of 1995 and directly related to forced
heirship--disinherison."' Considering that forced heirship is restricted to
young and incapable children for the purpose of providing for their support,
grounds for disinherison'o should be carefully considered with a view to
paring them down significantly. In fact, in 1989 one member of the House
Committee on Civil Law and Procedure45 asked whether Louisiana law should
permit disinherison if forced heirship was nothing more than a substitute for
support. Furthermore, Article 1624, which imposes an onerous burden of proof
upon the forced heir challenging disinherison, needs serious rethinking.
The legislative committees responsible for hearing bills concerning
succession law should hold interim hearings to fully explore the subject and
become educated on the important policy choices to be made. The seriousness
of succession law to all Louisiana citizens deserves careful and deliberate
attention by those responsible for enacting our law. Citizens of the State of
Louisiana can not postpone their deaths, absent some new scientific discovery,
until a regular session during which faulty statutes can be corrected.
VI. CONCLUSION
The principal purpose of this article has been to explain, to the extent
possible, the current state of succession law in'Louisiana and to inform the
profession about events that occurred at the time of the enactment of the new
legislation. Understanding the context in which amendments were offered and
the expressed motivations of some of the legislators and the redactors permits a
better understanding of the legislation itself. In addition, this author hopes to
interest members of the profession in future developments in the area of
succession law, for there most assuredly will be continued legislative activity
449. La. Civ. Code arts. 1617-1624.
450. La. Civ. Code art. 1621.
451. Representative Naomi E. White-Warren Farve.
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affecting the law of succession. Greater involvement from the profession could
prove enormously helpful.
This author has also sought to explain how the institution of forced heirship,
even today, accomplishes critically important societal goals. That forced heirship
clings heroically to life is of more than symbolic importance. It clings to life
supported by humane considerations of caring for those most vulnerable of
Louisiana citizens, the young and the incapable offspring of a deceased parent.
Despite its tenuous hold on the psyche of Louisiana citizens, it is an institution
worth preserving. At a time when opinion elites and both major political parties
express concern about the disintegration of the family, forced heirship serves as
a reminder of the special relationship between parents and children and the
importance of law in binding them together as a way of strengthening the family.
The Louisiana law of forced heirship tells a story about our citizens; and as long
as the story lasts it depicts a fundamental understanding of human beings and the
necessity of aspiring to loftier goals. Human existence begins with the family,
and the law must protect the family as an institution from all onslaughts.




(a) Article 1493 is the threshold Article of the forced heirship revision. The
first sentence of the Article defines forced heirs and limits them to children, i.e.
"descendants of the first degree." The second sentence provides for representa-
tion of a predeceased child in a very limited instance to be consistent with the
legislative policy expressed in the enabling legislation. The third sentence makes
clear that the language "twenty-three years of age or younger" in Article XII,
Section 5(B) of the Louisiana Constitution, as amended in October, 1995, means
that the child has "not attained the age of twenty-four years." Act 147 of 1990
used the language "attained the age of twenty-three years" to clarify the exact
age, but neither the amendment of Article XII, Section 5, nor the implementing
legislation uses that language. Instead, both refer to descendants of the first
degree "twenty-three years of age or younger." The assumption seems warranted
that the Legislature meant that until the descendant of the first degree "attains"
the age of twenty-four years he is "twenty-three years of age or younger" and
therefore will be a forced heir.
(b) Article XII, Section 5 of the Constitution requires the Legislature to
enact legislation making all descendants of the first degree who are "twenty-
three years of age or younger" forced heirs. Indisputably, a child who has not
yet reached his twenty-third birthday is "twenty-three years of age or younger."
Some scholars have raised the question, however, whether, after reaching that
birthday, and prior to reaching his twenty-fourth birthday, he is still "twenty-
three years of age or younger." Arguably, a child who has reached his twenty-
third birthday and is now midway into the year is twenty- three and one-half
years of age and therefore not "twenty-three years of age or younger."
Act 147 of 1990 used different language in determining the age at which a
child no longer was a forced heir. Act 147 provided that a descendant of the
first degree was a forced heir until he had "attained the age of twenty-three
years." That language is not used in Article XII, Section 5 of the Constitution,
although, ironically, it is used in the second paragraph of Article 1493 of the
enabling legislation which provides for grandchildren to represent a predeceased
parent who would not have "attained the age of twenty-three years."
In order to avoid a constitutional issue in the very threshold definition of
forced heirs, this Article contains the exact language of Article XII, Section 5 of
the Constitution itself. The redactors believe, however, that the common sense
meaning of "twenty-three years of age or younger" is that the child has not yet
attained his twenty-fourth birthday and therefore that, throughout the child's
twenty-third year he is still "twenty-three years of age." To assist the courts if
this becomes an issue, this Article contains language to that effect in the third
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sentence. That statement in the third sentence should not jeopardize the
constitutionality of the first and second sentences which, by using the exact same
language that the Constitution uses, must of necessity be constitutional.
(c) This Article provides for representation of a predeceased child by his
children. Article XII, Section 5 states emphatically that "except as provided irk
Paragraph B," forced heirship is abolished. Paragraph B nowhere provides for
grandchildren to be forced heirs. Nonetheless, representation of a deceased
parent is a fiction of the law of long standing and general acceptance, and it is
certainly reasonable to accept the distinction that a grandchild who represents a
deceased child is not a forced heir in his own right but standing in "the place and
degree" of a child who would have been a forced heir if he were still alive. For
that reason, Article 1493 clarifies a provision in the enabling legislation which
provides that the grandchild may represent his parent only if the parent would
not "have attained the age of twenty-three years." If being "twenty-three year;
of age or younger" is the same as "not having attained the age of twenty-three
years," then the enabling legislation is consistent in the same way that the
provisions of this Article are consistent, but the redactors believe that they are
not consistent. In the redactors' view, Article 1493 of the implementing
legislation uses inconsistent ages: to be a forced heir in one's own right one
must not have "attained the age of twenty-four years," but for a grandchild to
represent a predeceased parent, the parent must not have "attained the age of
twenty-three years."
One argument supporting the constitutionality of allowing representation as
provided in this Article is the permissive provision in Article XII, Section 5 to
the effect that the Legislature "may" provide that descendants of any age are
forced heirs if for mental or physical reasons they are either unable to take care
of their persons or administer their estates. By biological necessity, if the
predeceased parent would be no older than his early twenty's, whether that age
is twenty-three or twenty-four years, any grandchild who would represent that
parent would of necessity have to be a very young infant, and grandchildren of
that age would probably not be able to take care of their persons and, as minors,
are legally incapable of administering their estates. However, even though a
minor child would lack capacity to administer his estate, that disability is not a
physical or mental handicap; it is a legal disability.
Civil Code Article 881 defines representation as "a fiction of the law, the
effect of which is to put the representative in the place, degree, and rights of the
person represented." Since the grandchildren "stand in the place and degree" and
have the same rights of the predeceased child who is being represented, it would
appear that representation should be constitutionally permissible for grandchildren
where the representation is consistent with the age requirement for the
predeceased parent himself.
The question whether to make grandchildren forced heirs is a policy decision
as well as a legal decision. There has been comment both in reported decisions
as well as discussion and debate in the Legislature and the Constitutional
Convention, in some instances decrying the remoteness in today's world of
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grandchildren from their grandparents. One of the rallying cries of the
proponents of the constitutional amendment adopted in October, 1995 was the
fact that it would cut off rights of grandchildren to be forced heirs.
It should be noted, however, that a constitutional challenge, when it comes,
must come from a relatively narrow pool of potential claimants. The grandchild
must have a parent who has predeceased him, and the predeceased parent must
have been relatively young, and the grandparent against whose estate the claim
is made must have failed to provide adequately for the grandchild. A grandchild
whose parent is living would have no standing, nor would a grandchild whose
predeceased parent would have been in his mid- twenty's or beyond. Thus, the
practical problem is relatively narrow in scope, but it nonetheless poses a very





(a) Article 1493 is the threshold Article of the forced heirship revision.
Paragraph A defines forced heirs and limits them to children, i.e. "descendants
of the first degree." Paragraph B provides for representation of a predeceased
child in a very limited instance to be consistent with the legislative policy
expressed in the enabling legislation. Paragraph C provides for representation
of a predeceased child of any age in favor of children of the predeceased child
that, because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are permanently
incapable of taking care of their persons or estates. Paragraph D makes clear
that the language "twenty-three years of age or younger" in Article XII, Section
5(B) of the Louisiana Constitution, as amended in October, 1995, means that the
child has "not attained the age of twenty-four years." Act 147 of 1990 used the
language "attained the age of twenty-three years" to clarify the exact age, but
neither the amendment of Article XII, Section 5, nor the implementing legislation
uses that language. Instead, both refer to descendants of the first degree "twenty..
three years of age or younger." The assumption seems warranted that the
Legislature meant that until the descendent of the first degree "attains" the age
of twenty-four years he is "twenty-three years of age or younger" and therefore
will be a forced heir.
(b) Article XII, Section 5 of the Constitution requires the Legislature to
enact legislation making all descendants of the first degree who are "twenty-three
years of age or younger" forced heirs. Indisputably, a child who has not yet
reached his twenty-third birthday is "twenty-three years of age or younger."
Some scholars have raised the question, however, whether, after reaching that
birthday, and prior to reaching his twenty-fourth birthday, he is still "twenty-
three years of age or younger." Arguably, a child who has reached his twenty-
third birthday and is not midway into the year is twenty-three and one-half years
of age and therefore not "twenty-three years of age or younger."
Act 147 of 1990 used different language in determining the age at which a
child no longer was a forced heir. Act 147 provided that a descendant of the
first degree was a forced heir until he had "attained the age of twenty-three
years." That language is not used in Article XII, Section 5 of the Constitution,
although, ironically, it is used in the second paragraph of Article 1493 of the
enabling legislation which provides for grandchildren to represent a predeceased
parent who would not have "attained the age of twenty-three years."
In order to avoid a constitutional issue in the very threshold definition of
forced heirs, this Article contains the exact language of Article XII, Section 5 of
the Constitution itself. The redactors believe, however, that the common sense
meaning of "twenty-three years of age or younger" is that the child has not yet
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attained his twenty-fourth birthday and therefore that, throughout the child's
twenty-third year he is still "twenty-three years of age." To assist the courts if
this becomes an issue, this Article contains language to that effect in the third
sentence. That statement in the third sentence should not jeopardize the
constitutionality of the first and second sentences which, by using the exact same
language that the Constitution uses, must of necessity be constitutional.
(c) Article XII, Section 5, of the Louisiana Constitution, as amended in
1995, requires the Legislature to provide implementing legislation to the effect
that all children who are "twenty-three years of age or younger" are forced heirs,
but it also permits the Legislature to provide that descendants of any age who,
"because of physical incapacity or mental infirmity, are incapable of taking care
of their persons or administering their estates" are also forced heirs. Utilizing
that authorization, Article 1493(A) makes provision for such disabled children
to be forced heirs.
The origin of the double disjunctive "either/or" approach to disability may
be found in Act 147 of 1990 and its predecessor, Act 788 of 1989, which
provided that descendants of any age who were "subject to interdiction" were
forced heirs. The phrase "subject to interdiction" in Act 788 was considered to
be unclear, among other reasons, because it did not differentiate between the two
different kinds of interdiction, namely, the full interdir on in Civil Code articles
389 and 422, and the limited interdiction in Civil Code article 389. 1. A decision
was made to change the terminology and employ the terms found in the concept
of limited interdiction, rather than the full interdiction. The new language was
used in Act 147 of 1990, which provided that a child of any age would qualify
as a forced heir if he were either incapable of taking care of his person or
incapable of administering his estate, and which further made the disability
exception applicable whether the disability was either physical or mental. That
identical approach is followed in the amendment to Article XII, Section 5, of the
Constitution that was adopted in 1995. The drafters of Act 147 of 1990
contemplated that the guidelines that the courts would use in interpreting and
enforcing the disability provisions were the jurisprudence under Civil Code
Article 389.1 concerning limited interdiction.
Nevertheless, concern has been expressed regarding a possible lack of
precision in the double disjunctive "either/or" approach, and also concerning
difficulties involved in taking criteria that may work to determine when
appointment of a curator is needed and applying them in a different context,
namely inheritance rights. Concern was expressed, too, that the broad scope of
the terms might encourage spurious claims for relatively minor disabilities, and
also concerning the uncertainty whether a temporary, albeit severe, disability
might qualify a child as a forced heir. Article 1493(A) clarifies the law in
several respects and should held reduce unwarranted or inappropriate claims. For
one thing, the article specifies that the time at which the disability is determined
to be relevant is at the donor's death, which was always intended but may not
have been fully clear in the earlier legislation. More important, the Legislature
added the word "permanently" before the word "incapable" for the express
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purpose of emphasizing that a temporary disability, even if severe, should not
apply. The Legislature thereby expressly manifested its intent that the rule
making disabled children of any age forced heirs should only apply to "seriously
handicapped" individuals. The Legislature requested specifically that these
Comments be written to explain that it is the purpose of adding the word
"permanently" to more effectively express the public policy intended, namely,
to protect children who are over the age of 23 as forced heirs if, and only it'
they are severely disabled. Although the jurisprudence on limited interdiction
may be helpful, the new rule expressed in this Article is intentionally different
and more restrictive than the standard for interdiction because of the use of the
word "permanently" to describe the nature of the incapacity.
The Legislature also requested that these Comments note that as a factual
matter a person can be permanently disabled but on occasion have a temporary
remission. It is not intended to be the policy of the Article that a mere
temporary remission at the time of the decedent's death would disqualify an heir
from being classified as "permanently" disabled within the new definition of
incapacity, provided that the disability is otherwise permanent.
(d) This Article provides for representation of a predeceased child by his
children. Article XII, Section 5 states emphatically that "except as provided in
Paragraph B," forced heirship is abolished. Paragraph B nowhere provides for
grandchildren to be forced heirs. Nonetheless, representation of a deceased
parent is a fiction of the law of long standing and general acceptance, and it is
certainly reasonable to accept the distinction that a grandchild who represents a
deceased child is not a forced heir in his own right but standing in "the place and
degree" of a child who would have been a forced heir if he were still alive.
(e) Paragraph C of this Article is new. It expands the narrow rule regarding
the ability of a grandchild to represent a predeceased parent that is set forth in
Paragraph B by extending the right of representation to disabled grandchildren
of any age. Paragraph B requires that a predeceased parent not have attained the
age of twenty-four by the time of the decedent's death for the grandchild to be
able to represent him. Paragraph C, on the other hand, permits representation
irrespective of the age of the predeceased parent, if the grandchild is disabled at
the time of the death of the decedent. The nature of the disability of the
grandchild that is required for him to qualify as a forced heir under Paragraph
C is the identical kind of disability that is required for a child to qualify as a
forced heir, namely, the grandchild must be severely disabled. See the
discussion in Comment (c) above. It should be noted that a grandchild of any
age who is disabled does not qualify as a forced heir unless the grandchild's
parent predeceases the grandparent. Representation of a living person is not
permitted, and Paragraph C is consistent with that requirement.
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